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master-slave dialectic and Sartrian existentialism. 
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Part I illustrates de Beauvoir's concept of woman as 11 the Other. 11 It asserts that 
the experience of woman has been neglected by conventional theorists and that 
although The Second Sex is the foremost theoretical work of its kind, it has never 
been proper~ discussed. 
Part II provides the theoretical framework for an understanding of The Second Sex. 
It begins by outlining the main aspects of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, 
as extrapolated by Alexandre Kojeve. It then summarises and comments on aspects 
of Jean-Paul Sartre's worko It traces the development of Sartre2s thought from 
ontology to ethics, and finally to Marxism. The way in· which He gel and Sartre 
provide the theoretical basis for de Beauvoir 1 s analysis of woman, is illustrated 
in the subsequent chapter. It develops the concept of woman as 11 the Other" and explains 
how de Beauvoirian woman is "alienated" and n oppressed. n 
Part III examines de Beauvoir's theory of the sources of woman's oppressiono It 
begins by assessing the significance de Beauvoir attributes to woman's biology. 
It argues that the logic of her idea that woman is "alienated" in her reproductive 
role is the elimination of biological femininity. De Beauvoir's theory of the 
history of the male-female relationship is then outlined. By using the Hegelian 
principles of mastery and slavery to explicate de Beauvoiris account of woman's 
oppression, it shows how man is privileged in her theory because historically he 
fought and laboured. This account of human development is criticised in the following 
chapter. It questions the values and assumptions on which de Beauvoir 1 s ideas of 
human development are based and outlines an alternative theory; a theory which 
values woman's reproductive role. Finally, the meaning of de Beauvoir 1 s emphasis 
on such factors as private property is discussed. By way of a comparison with 
Engels, it shows how de Beauvoir's theory is rooted in idealist philosophy. 
Part IV illustrates de Beauvoir's theory of the contemporary relations between the 
sexes. It outlines her theory of the development of a girl's life from birth to 
maturity, and how it is the girl who ultimately "chooses" her feminine destiny. 
The way in which woman attempts to justify and compensate for the "mutilated" condition 
of femininity is the subject of the following chapter. Final~ what man wants to 
attain from his relationship with woman is outlined. It shows how in de Beauvoir' s 
theory it is through woman that man hopes to attain "recognition" and unity with Nature. 
Part V assesses de Beauvoir's politics. It begins by examining her concept of woman's 
emancipation. As it is the male revolutionary .who is portrayed as woman's liberating 
hero, de Beauvoir's inability to provide a convincing strategy for change is outlined. 
This leads to an examination of the socialist nature of de Beauvoir 1 s theory. 
De Beauvoir claims that she was a "socialist" when she wrote The Second Sex, yet we 
find few traces of socialism in her theory. The last chapter examin~s the feminism 
of The Second Sex. It shows that the major difference between de Beauvoir and modern 
feminists is that she wants woman to become like man. This male bias in de Beauvoir' s 
theory is rooted in the Hegelian and Sartrian concepts which she employs. 
lki-d this side only 
It is a strange experience for an individual who feels himself to be 
an autonomous and transcendent subject, an absolute, to discover 
inferiority in himself as a fixed and preordained essence: it is a 
strange experience for whoever regards himself as the One to be 
revealed to himself as otherness, alterity. This is what happens 
to the little girl when, doing her apprenticeship for life in the 
world, she grasps what it means to be a woman therein. The sphere 
to which she belongs is ever.ywhere enclosed, limited, dominated, by 
the male universe: high as she may raise herself, far as she may 
venture, there will always be a ceiling over her head, walls that 
will block her way. 
Simone de Beauvoir 
The Second Sex 
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"The Second Sex" 
In Ways of Seeing (1972) John Berger uses this picture by 
Trutat to illustrate the difference between masculine and feminine 
1 
consciousness . He writes : 11Men act and women appear ." As the 
picture suggests, man is active and assertive and appraises woman as 
2 
obj ect . Because woman's success in man's world depends on her qualities 
as an inert and desirable object (e.g. youth, beauty, poise) she too 
comes to "survey" herself in this way . In seeing herself as object, 
Berger claims that woman ' s "own sense of being in herself is supplanted 
by a sense of being appreciated as herself by another." 
3 
Berger's revealing illustration of womanis self-perception uses 
the concepts of the Hegelian and existentialist philosophical traditions 
in which the relation between Self and Other is analysed in terms of 
subjects and objects. Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex (1949) 
also employs these Hegelian and Sartrian concepts to analyse the feminine 
4 
condition. She begins by positing that in the male-female relationship 
5 6 
woman is "the Other.i' For de Beauvoir "the drama of woman" is that 
she sees man as the essential being - the sovereign subject - and 
defines herself as inessential and object with reference to him. It is 
this notion of woman as "the Other" which is the leitmotiv of The Second 
Sex. De Beauvoir uses it to explain how man sees woman and how woman 
sees herself. In Ways of Seeing Berger comments revealingly on the 
nature of feminine consciousness but for a comprehensive and compelling 
7 
theory of the feminine condition we must turn to de Beauvoir's work. 
In The Second Sex de Beauvoir analyses the feminine condition 
from an existentialist perspective and frequently uses the Hegelian 
master-slave dialectic as a source of ideas, but neither Hegel nor 
Sartre have properly considered the male-female relationship. Still 
less do these theorists discuss whether the consciousness they describe 
is applicable to the male human being and to the female. We are not 
led to ask whether the self-consciousness locked in deathly combat with 
the Other in Hegelian philosophy can be female, or whether "the Look" 
in Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness (1943)8 has the same 
dynamic irrespective of the sex of the existents involved. Thus in 
neither Hegel's nor Sartre's work do we know if the hateful objectification 
of oneself affected by the Other is influenced by gender. 
Indeed, for different reasons, Hegel and Sartre would be 
uns.y.mpathetic to a study of woman's experience. In The Phenomenology 
2 
of Mind (1807) Hegel does not lead us to inquire whether the consciousness 
9 
of which he writes may be female, but in The Philosophy of Right 
(1821) he portrays woman's consciousness as unworthy of philosophical 
investigation: 
The difference between men and women is like that between 
animals and plants; men correspond to animals, while women 
correspond to plants because their development is more placid 
and the principle that underlies it is the rather vague 
unity of feeling. • •• women regulate their actions not by 
the demands of universality, but by arbitrary inclinations 
and opinionso Women are educated - who Imows how? - as it 
were by breathing in ideas, by living rather than by 
acquiring knowledge. The status of manhood, on the other 
hand, is attained only by the stress of thought and much 
technical exertion. 10 
Although it was Sartre who originally suggested to de Beauvoir that she 
undertake the project Which culminated in The Second Sex, there is no 
hint in Being and Nothingness that he would have been very sympathetic 
to such a stuqy. To be sure Sartre does not subscribe to Hegel's view 
of the difference between men and women, but his silence implies that 
a study of woman's experience is unnecessary in as nru.ch as what may be 
said of the for-itself and the relations between existents applies 
equally well to male and female. Other political philosophers rarely 
see the relationship between men and women as a power relationship 
rooted in social organisation and therefore requiring political 
11 
resolution, and so they too have not addressed themselves to this issue. 
By keeping silent, either through hostility or indifference, 
philosophy has not contributed to a discussion of feminine experience 
and how its negative features might be overcome. By using Sartrian and 
Hegelian ideas de Beauvoir broke this silence. Her work is the foremost 
philosophical treatise on woman's experience. However, the public 
3 
4 
outcry which followed publication of de Beau.voir 1 s work reinforced the 
idea that such a stuqy is not a serious contribution to our understanding 
of human existence. Accordingly it is rarely acclaimed as a theoretical 
work. As the indignation subsided only its commitment to a change in 
woman's role has ensuretl it lasting success. 
Currently The Second Sex is hailed as "the Bible of feminism." 
12 
But although this book is revered by feminists, they have not thoroughly 
examined de Beauvoir' s particular theory of woman's subordination. Thus 
there has been no proper assessment of what contribution de Beauvoir7s 
philosophical perspective has made to an understanding of the feminine 
condition. Sadly this has meant that de Beauvoir's concept of woman as "Other" 
13 
has· little· currency in feminist thought. To understand why 
The Second Sex is extolled yet de Beauvoir's theory neglected, we must 
know something of its historical background. 
I 
The Second Sex was first published in France in 1949 under the 
title Le Deuxi~me sexe •14 Appearing almost midway between the two great 
waves of feminism - the early 1900's and the late 1960 1 s - it was 
isolated from any movement to achieve womani s emancipation. Although 
de Beauvoir was committed to such emancipation, The Second Sex was 
originally conceived as a philosophical work. At this time de Beauvoir, 
aged forty-one, had been involved with Jean-Paul Sartre for twenty 
years and was a committed. existentialist. With a number of philosophical 
essays and novels to her credit,
15
de Beauvoir decided to write an 
autobiographical work in which she would use existentialism to analyse 
her past. But, as she explains in Force of Circumstance (1963), in order 
to undertake such a project she had to take account of how gender 
16 
affects "facticity"; she had to decide how her femininity had affected 
her choices and the general shape of her life. 17As she never experienced 
~feelings of inferiority about her status as a woman, de Beauvoir 
thought she could "dispose" of the subject quite quickly. Sartre, 
however, suggested that she should look into it further. Although de 
Beauvoir felt that the issue was personally irrelevant to her, she 
followed this advice and began to investigate the idea that there is a 
specifically "feminine" situation. "The problem did not concern me 
directly," de Beauvoir writes in her memoirs, rrand as yet I attributed 
18 
very little importance to it, but my interest had been aroused.rr 
The fruit of such arousal was the publication of The Second Sexo 
However, although de Beauvoir spent several years researching into the 
question of woman's situation, her fundamental attitude to this issue 
did not change. She devoted almost two years to analysing how femininity 
limits a woman's life, yet she still maintained that for her it is a 
19 
rather unimportant aspect of human existence. The introduction to 
the book reads like an apology: de Beauvoir apparently felt that she 
must justify herself; explain to her readers why she had devoted so 
20 
much time to a subject which is "irritatingrr and "not new." It 
appears that de Beauvoir was only able to overcome her initial hesitation 
to write a book on women because she believed the level of discussion 
on the subject urgently required to be raised. 
In place of the controversy and quarrelling which, she claims 
at the outset of The Second Sex, usually characterises books written by 
women on their situation, de Beauvoir intends to undertake an objective 
investigation. De Beauvoir considers herself well qualified for such 
5 
a task; not only does she know "the feminine world more intimately 
than do the men" but also, because she has "escaped" the usual oppression 
21 
of her sex, she can "afford the luxury of impartialityo" Thus, from 
the introduction to The Second Sex,we may expect of de Beauvoir a study 
of woman Vs subordination which is more of an "effort towards clarity and 
understanding" of the issues than a polemical attempt to assert women vs 
22 
rights. 
De Beauvoiris hopes for elevated discussion of the issues never 
attained fruition. The subject matter of The Second Sex, still less 
de Beauvoiris ideas, was too controversial for it to be met with 
equanimity and reason. In de Beauvoiri s own words it "shocked" and 
23 
ntroubled peopleYs minds." In Force of Circumstance she 
discusses the impact the book had in France. She describes some of 
the numerous obscene and disparaging letters she received and how the 
critics went "wild." In such a climate, her complacency about her 
position in the world as a woman who had escaped oppression was short-
lived. From de Beauvoiri s own corrnnents and from the reviews it seems 
that in the absence of a feminist movement or a philosophical tradition 
concerned with the issues she raises, there were few attempts to 
discuss or criticise the content of The Second Sex. In place of 
scholar~ or serious criticism de Beauvoir herself became the object 
of attack. For example, it was claimed that de Beauvoir only wrote 
this book because she was "frustrated," "cheated,n trenvious" and 
"embittered." 
24 
The review in Time magazine of the .American publication 
of the book is almost a caricature of the sentiments of many reviewers: 
6 
••• author de Beauvoir knows how to take on a man and brings 
him down like a sack of hypocrisy. More 1 s the pity that 
she writes pages of non-sensical epitaphs over her bleeding 
targets. The chip on her shoulder makes her believe that every 
man is as autocratic as a Turk and every female as malleable 
as a slave. Many of her protestations would ~~ike even the 
inmates of a harem as being behind the timeso 
More surprisingly, many of de Beauvoir 2 s male li tera:ry colleagues did 
not treat the book seriously. In the introduction to The Second Sex 
de Beauvoir criticises Claude Mauriac for his attitude to women, but 
his retaliation did not take issue with de Beauvoir 2 s ideas; it tried 
to undermine de Beauvoir as a woman. He wrote to one of the contributors 
of Les Temps Modernes (of which de Beauvoir was a member of the editorial 
26 
board): "Your employeri s vagina has no secrets from me .rr De Beauvoir 
also reports that Albert Camus "in a few morose sentences" accused 
her "of making the French male look ridiculous." 
27 
The controversial nature of The Second Sex was the main reason 
for its immediate commercial success. After serialisation in Les 
Temps Modernes, the first volume alone sold twenty-two thousand copies 
' in the first week. It was, as Laurent Gagnebin points out, "le succes 
28 
de scandale." But despite such good sales Caroline Moorhead of 
The Times can with justification claim that "people were not ready for 
29 
what • • • (de Beau voir) said in 1949." As it was not part of a 
movement for woman's emancipation and was the only recent book on this 
topic, it first appeared in an environment uns.y.mpathetic to her aims. 
And this inhibited discussion of de Beauvoir's ideas. Those opposed to 
the notion that womanis situation should be changed dismissed her 
ideas as the product of one frustrated womanis imagination, while those 
sympathetic came to de Beauvoiri s defence. In such polarised surroundings 
The Second Sex was associated with the cause of woman's rights and 
7 
those in favour could not afford to criticise, or indeed evaluate, 
the only book which proclaimed the cause. 
From its publication in France in 1949 to the appearance of 
Betty Friedan's book The Feminine Mystique published in the United 
30 
States in 1959, The Second Sex remained the sole work of its kindo 
It was only with the emergence of the women's liberation movement in 
the late 1960's that feminist books began to appear in any number o 
For nearly two decades, then, de Beauvoir 1 s book was the most significant 
31 
analysis of woman's oppression. The sustained interest shown in 
The Second Sex illustrates that there were women who, although not 
actively seeking to change their situation, were eager to read a book 
which expressed dissatisfaction with the role to which they had been 
consigned. That it had an impact on them cannot be denied. Margaret 
Walters in an article called "The Rights and Wrongs of Womenrr (1976) 
is critical of major aspects of de Beauvoir's theor,y yet claims that it 
had an enormous impact on her own and on other women's lives: 
When I first read The Second Sex- ••o before the present women's 
movement - it shook me with the force of a genuine revelation. 
It helped me make some sense of my confused and isolated 
depression. Since the book appeared in 1949, de Beauvoir has 
received thousands of letters from women all over the 
world, grateful for the way the book has helped them to see 
their personal frustrations in terms of the general conditions 
of women.32 
In a period in which there was neither a coherent organisation of 
feminists nor a body of feminist theory, The Second Sex thus had a 
valuable consciousness-raising effect. But while this increased the 
book's reputation and sales, it did not promote a systematic evaluation 
of de Beauvoir's theor,y. 
8 
The Second·Sex continues to be neglected in this way. Suzanne 
Lilar, one of the few serious commentators on this book, complained 
of this neglect when she said: "A ma connaissance • • • j amais personne 
nYa discut~ ce livre. CYest un phenom~ne de fascination. On a comme 
33 
un sentiment religieux 'a son egard. CYest un livre tabou." Although 
Lilaris comments were made in 1969 before the surge of interest in 
feminist literature had reached its peak, they still retain their 
relevance. There are two main reasons for this o 
Although feminist literature has been much in demand in recent 
years, The Second Sex has been by-passed in favour of more readable 
and contemporary works. Nowadays Kate Millett's Sexual Politics (1969), 
Germaine Greer's Female Eunuch (1970), and Eva FigesY Patriarchal 
Attitudes (1970) are more likely to be read by those interested in 
34 
feminism than de Beauvoir's thirty year old booko Moreover, although 
much has been written on women over the past ten years, this literature 
lacks an analytical history. Many writers have provided information on 
women's condition and given their interpretation of it but there are 
few books on the nature and development of feminist theories. 35 And 
it is only in this kind of systematic analysis that de Beauvoir's 
particular contribution can be appraised. 
What is surprising, then, is that The Second Sex continues to 
sell wello One explanation for this may be de Beauvoir's personal 
reputation and following as a novelist and autobiographer. As Caroline 
Moorhead points out, in recent years de Beauvoir has become something 
of a "cult figure. rr 3~ndeed de Beauvoir is often portrayed as the high 
priestess of feminism idolised by a growing number of disciples. In 
1 977 Alice Schwar~r in an interview with de Beauvoir referred to such 
devotion when she said: 
9 
I know that for nearly thirty years you have 
been receiving letters everyday from women all over 
the world. For many of them, you Simone, have been, even 
before the new united struggle of women, the living incarnation 
of our revolt. This is due no doubt to the whole of your 
work of analysis in depth of the position of women, and also 
to your autobiographical no3~s, because they presented 
a woman who dared to exist. 
Certainly the untimely publication of The Second Sex has ensured 
de Beauvoir a reputation as the darling of feminismo But the respect 
which de Beauvoir has gained from women around the world is, as 
Schwartzer indicates, also due to her novels and to her autobiography. 
Her most recent novels have particularly focussed on the problems 
women face and her autobiography has alw~s given women insight into 
how it is possible for a woman to lead a life as a writer and intellectual. 
A second reason for the popularity of The Second Sex is that 
it is now the "classicrr work of feminist literature. But like many 
classical texts it is frequent~ extolled and infrequently read. 
The Second Sex is a difficult book to understand. It requires to be 
read and understood against the theoretical background from which 
many of its insights are gained, yet increasingly Sartre and Hegel are 
not theorists which many people encounter. Thus although de Beauvoir 
states in the introduction to her book that she hopes her analysis of 
woman's situation will be an rr effort towards clarity and understandingj' 
in comparison with most other books on the subject her argument is 
complicated and obtuseo As Sheila Rowbotham indicates when discussing 
her own feminist development in Woman's Consciousness, Manis World (1973), 
de Beauvoir's ideas may remain stubbornly incoherent despite a 
rigorous academic training: "I had been picking up and putting 




very inaccessible at first. They were not easy to internalise." 
Rowbotham's comments also highlight the way in which many readers 
approach The Second Sex: for instead of reading it systematically from 
cover to cover, they flick through it only reading sections of immediate 
interest or intelligibility; a practice which makes it even more 
difficult to grasp the precise nature of de Beauvoir's theory. 
Flicking through a long book is no way to come to terms with 
its arguments but ironically de Beauvoir's prolixity may be protecting 
The Second Sex's reputation as "the Bible of feminism." At the time 
of writing this book, de Beauvoir had little sympathy for feminists; 
we are even urged in the introduction to regard "feminists with suspicion. n 39 
There are also a good many strands in her theory which, once clearly 
appreciated, would be anathema to contemporary feminists~0 Thus although 
they may continue to regard this work as a milestone in the development 
of feminist theor.y, few would praise it wholeheartedly if they understood 
de Beauvoir's ideas. 
II 
There is little commentary on The Second Sex.41 The most 
substantial work is Le Malentendu du 'Deuxi~me saxe" (1969) by Suzanne 
Lilar. It is a critical work which begins from the assumption that 
it is time to "profane" The Second Sex - to break the reverent silence. 
Lilar recognises de Beauvoiris debt to Sartre's philosophy and helpful~ 
explains some aspects of de Beauvoir's analysis with reference to 
Sartre's work, but she neglects the influence of Hegel. This profane 
work does not pretend to be a theoretical explication of The Second Sex, 
Lilar vs main contribution to an understanding of this book is to be 
found elsewhere. For example, she criticises the general style of 
de Beauvoir' s theory, maintaining that this is based on "trois vices": 
••• le manque de rigueur. L'obstination que 1 1 auteur met 1 
reaffirmer sa th~se ne doit pas faire illusion sur la consistance 
du questionnement. Seul le ton est resolu. Une trop grande 
complaisance dans le cholx des citations et des examples, la 
hS.te ~ conclure sur des premisses incertaines ••o d 1 autres 
precedes ••• aident l 1 auteur a se debarrasser de ce qui lui 
fait echec. Une question embarrassante? Ce n 1est jamais le 
moment d 1 en parlero Un exemple contraire & sa these? C1est 
l'exception qui confirme la regle.42 
Another major aspect of Lilar 1 s criticism of de Beauvoir concerns 
biology. Lilar claims that de Beauvoir' s views of the biological 
differences between men and women are scientifically inaccurate. She 
takes into account advances in endocrinology since 1949 and appends 
a discussion on this topic by an endocrinologist. Lilar also takes issue 
with de Beauvoir's descriptions of how women experience their reproductive 
role and, as author of Aspects of Love in Western Society (1963), she 
disagrees with de Beauvoir's portrayal of the couple.43 Lilar 1 s 
12 
criticisms of de Beauvoir are made from the standpoint either of "scientific 
facts" or of "cormnon sense," and so her worthwhile contribution to an 
understanding of The Second Sex lacks a theoretical perspectiveo This 
is also true of Daniel Ar.mogathe 1 s book Le Deuxi~me sexe (1977).44 
As part of the "Profil D1une Oeuvre" collection, its aim is to summarise 
the main aspects of de Beauvoir 1 s theory in simple fashion and make 
only occasional criticisms of the theory. 
Apart from these two books, there are on~ short articles or 
chapters in books which are specifically on The Second Sex. And the 
limitation of space is always such that they do not manage to summarise 
or criticise the totality of de Beauvoir's ideas. Thus de Beauvoir's 
work, like its subject matter, has been little discussed by theorists. 
This thesis aims to begin such discussiono It intends to 
explicate de Beauvoir' s theory and evaluate it on its awn terms; to see 
what she contributes to our knowledge of woman~s experience. This will 
lead us to question aspects of de Beauvoir's ontology and ethics. 
Because de Beauvoir' s theory is indebted to Hegelian and Sartrian 
philosophy we shall also begin to evaluate what contribution these 
theorists can make to an anaJysis of woman vs situation. 
As it is de Beauvoir~s theory which is of predominant interest, 
for the most part we shall not make evaluations or criticisms on other 
grounds. Certainly the factual basis of the book is suspect. As the 
anthropologist Margaret Mead in a review (1953) points out: 
To appreciate it proper~ The Second Sex must be recognised 
as the work of a French woman novelist who has drawn with 
high personal selectivity from a large number of fields -
comparative religion, psychiatry, Marxism, existentialist 
philosophy- and she has cast her work in the form of a piece 45 of specialist non-fiction which is precisely what it is not. 
However, what Mead does not realise is that de Beauvoir is "personal 
selectivity" is due to her existentialism; that it is this which leads 
her to portray the world in a narrow way. Witness, for example, de 
Beauvoir's interpretation of the origin of incest taboo. In line with 
the existentialist revulsion for Nature, and hence the reproductive 
process, de Beauvoir claims that the "universal law of incest" is due 
to man?s desire to eliminate motherhood from his carnal relationship 
with women: "Man finds it repugnant to come upon the dreaded essence 
of the mother in the woman he possesses; he is determined to disassociate 
these two aspects of femininity.n
46 
However, even the translator 
indicates the dubiety of de Beauvoir's theory. He writes in a footnote: 
13 
According to the view of the sociologist, G.P. Murdoch, 
eo• incest prohibition can be fully accounted for only 
by a complex theory, involving factors contributed by 
psychoanalysis, sociology, cultural anthropology, and 
behaviouristic psychologr.. No simple explanation, o•o 
is at all satisfactoryo 47 
As such ·unsatisfactory aspects of The Second Sex emanate from its 
theoretical perspective it is best to concentrate on evaluating this 
aspect of de Beauvoir's work. 
Likewise we shall not attempt to evaluate de Beauvoir's 
contribution to an analysis of woman's situation by examining her 
personal life. As de Beauvoir has written volumes of autobiography 
it is possible to illustrate how de Beauvoir acted out aspects of her 
commitment to woman's emancipation. This is what Albert Memmi does 
in a chapter of his book Dominated Man (1968) where he argues that if 
we take The Second Sex together with de Beauvoir's own life we have the 
48 
most important "feminist project" ever to have been attempted. 
However, while this approach gives certain insights into de Beauvoir's 
theory it is of limited use to us here; instead of concentrating on 
the precise theoretical contribution de Beauvoir has made we would 
easily · become embroiled in appraising such individual matters as the 
success of her relationship with Sartre and what sacrifice was involved 
in de Beauvoir's evasion of maternity. For the most part, then, the 
background material used to illuminate de Beauvoiris work will be 
theoretical, not personal. 
This thesis is divided into four parts. The first gives the 
theoretical framework of The Second Sex and outlines the way in which 
de Beauvoir portrays the negative aspects of the feminine condition. 
14 
Part II 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
16 
Chapter Two 
The Hegelian Master-Slave Dialectic 
Hegelis master-slave dialectic underlies much of de Beauvoiris 
theor.y in The Second Sex - her emphasis on recognition, work, fighting, 
all can best be understood with reference to Hegelian ideas. But 
although the master-slave dialectic haunts de Beauvoir 2s analysis of 
the male-female relationship, she refers to it on very few occasionso 
It is only if we have prior knowledge of its dynamics that we can 
therefore appreciate de Beauvoiris indebtedness to Hegelian theory. 
In this chapter we shall set out the main aspects of the master-
slave dialectic which are helpful in understanding The Second Sex. 
\ 
For this purpose we shall use Alexandre Kojeveis exposition of Hegel, 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures in the "Phenomenology 
1 ' 
of Spirit" (1947). Kojevevs work has been acclaimed as an exposition 
f H 1 b t th · d bt b t th f his t t 
2 
o ege , u ere lS some ou a ou e accuracy o in erpre ationo 
' However, it is a Kojevian Hegel which is most suitable as the theoretical 
background for de Beauvoiris ideas: his lectures in France in the 
1930 2 s were profoundly influential on the intellectual circles in which 
de Beauvoir moved;3and, as Koj~veis interpretation has an existentialist 
tinge, he makes Hegel more compatible with de Beauvoiris ideas.4 
I 
For Hegel men, unlike animals, are self-conscious. A necessary 
condition of this self-consciousness is desire for it is this which 
) 
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forces man to act, to negate the given in accordance with his wishes, 
and which reveals man to himseli' as an "Io" However, for Hegel, it is 
not unqualified desire which leads to self-consciousness, as this 
would necessarily include basic animal desire. Rather, it is desire 
which is directed towards something which goes beyond material objects 
' and that something is desire itself. Thus, Kojeve writes: "•o• anthro-
pogenetic Desire is different from animal Desire ••• in that it is 
directed, not towards a real ipositive,r given object, but toward 
5 
another Desire." Man wants another human being to "recognise" his 
value. As we shall see, in defining self-consciousness as arising 
from desire, and in emphasising the importance of recognition, Hegel 
avoids the static implications of consciousness dependent on contemplation 
and places man within a world in which it is action and relations with 
others which ultimately lead to a full awareness of his existence. 
The awakening self-consciousness exists for and in itself; that 
is, its identity depends on the simple exclusion of every other thing 
from itself. Man as a self-conscious subject sees himself as essential 
and everything else as inessential, yet the full awareness of his being 
is dependent on his relati0ns with another, albeit non-essential, 
consciousnesso This dependence on the Other in the Hegelian system 
may be seen in two ways. Being-for-others is a necessar.y structure of 
the world where man does not exist in isolation and so a self-consciousness 
must be shom: how it appears to others; that is, as an external and 
determined object. Moreover, man sees himself as a sovereign subject 
but this notion remains within himself as pure subjectivity unless 
it can find objective expression in the recognition of another separate 
yet identical being. Thus the truth of man r s sovereignty depends on 
its "recognition" by another human being and it is this notion, leading 
to the idea of man risking his life for the recognition of another, 
which underpins the Hegelian master-slave dialectic. 
In the Hegelian system, pure self-consciousness is egotistical, 
in the sense that it considers itself the essential being, and directed 
to others in the attempt to gain confirmation of its pretensions. But 
when it is confronted by another the illusions of sovereignty, far from 
being confirmed, are shattered)for the other shows it to exist in an 
alien and unacceptable way; being-for-another means being an object 
for the Other. In this confrontation of Self and Other, both beings 
desire recognition and both are shown an alien image of themselves: 
this applies to both; f·or what we are discussing here is a facet of "raw" 
and undifferentiated being. Thus both want recognition of their 
·sovereignty, the obliteration of their own object status and hence the 
destruction of the Other, so from this confrontation of two self-
conscious subjects a life and death struggle ensueso It is this fight 
for recognition which provides the means by which one may attain 
objective proof of one 2s sovereignty, thus the combat to be meaningful 
must not only yield a victor but also must allow both opponents to 
survive the fight, else the victor's hopes for recognition will perish 
with the Other's death. A death other than a biological death must 
be achieved - the Other must be overcome "dialectically." The victor 
6 
"must leave him life and consciousness and destroy only his autonomy." 
Thus the Fight ends when one opponentis fear of death forces 
him to submit; 7 his preference for basic animal life to that of his 
own extinction leads him to surrender his previous notions of himself 
and he recognises without being recognised in return. It is in this 
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way that there arises a master and a slave. The master by risking 
his life and winning has asserted his humanity over his biological 
instincts, for he has preferred an abstract principle - the objective 
reality of his human existence - to his animal life. It is for this 
reason that the fight for recognition is, in Hegelian terms, the first 
truly human action in that it contradicts man's animal urge for self-
preservation and shows him risking his life for an ideala The slave 
has not, however, confirmed his humanity in this way. To him slavery 
appeared better than death and he preferred to accept the life given 
to him by another. In his own and others' view of him, the slave is 
simply an animal or thing; he is no more than a being-for-others. 
' Kojeve argues that in Hegelian philosophy this division into 
master and slave is an essential prerequisite for human development. 
'\ 
"In his nascent state," KoJeVe asserts, "man is never simply mano He 
8 
is always, and essentially, either Master or Slave." This means that 
before the Fight there is in fact some differentiation between 
consciousnesses- one of them, through fea~must submit: '~ithout 
being predestined in any way, the one must fear the other, must refuse 
9 
to risk his life for the satisfaction of his desire for 'recognitioni on 
In Hegelian theo~ the master is the victor in the fight for 
recognition. But this is a victo~ devoid of satisfaction as it does 
not fulfil his original desires. The recognition he gains from the 
slave is not that of a fellow human being but that of a thing; it is 
a recognition which holds no value. Moreover, the light has not allowed 
the master to gain autonomy but has in fact made him dependent on the 
slave: others accept his status as master only by virtue of his 
possession of a slave and his biological existence is sustained by 
the products of the slaveYs work. The master's life becomes one of 
mere consumption of the products of the slave's work. In Hegelian 
terms this kind of inuned.iate consumption can give some pleasure but it 
can never offer the lasting satisfaction which man desires. The 
10 
master is in an "existential impasse": he has attained what he was 
prepared to die for but only to find that it is devoid of satisfaction. 
To attain satisfaction he would have to be recognised by another master, 
but as this contradicts the essence of mastery - death rather than 
recognition - this remains impossible. The assertion of his humanity 
has been confined to a life and death struggle - he is master in a 
world where human dignity is accorded solely through wars of prestige. 
He cannot transcend this world, so he must remain master or die. 
The slave's situation, on the contrary, is not one he actively 
desired but merely one his fear of death forced him to accept. He 
could not adhere to the principle of his master, "to conquer or to 
11 
die, rr and so the slave has preferred to accept the life granted to him 
by another. The essence of his subsequent slavery is forc'Sd labour: 
he is bound to work for his master, to use his life working for the 
12 
benefit of another. But paradoxically it is this which contains the 
germ of his liberation; for although work does not in itself liberate 
the slave, it does furnish him with the conditions necessary for him 
to take up his fight against the master. 
According to Hegel, it is through forced labour - that is, work 
carried on in terror of the master - that man learns to repress his 
natural instincts to satisfy his desires by immediate consumption. If 
this repression did not take place the raw object would never be changed, 
and man's material existence would be confined to what is naturally 
given. The master asserted his humanity by overcoming the biological 
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desire for self-preservation,the slave now asserts his through forced 
but creative labour - he too represses his instincts in relation to 
an ideao Moreover, the slave through his work becomes master of Natureo 
"Understanding, abstract thought, science, technique, the arts," 
~ 13 
writes KojeveJ "have their origin in the forced work of the Slave .rr 
In changing his environment the slave also changes and educates 
himself. The slave vs work thus f'urni shes him with a new self-identity: 
after the Fight he accepted the master's definition of himself as a 
thing, but through labour he begins to develop notions of himself as a 
creative human being. This notion does not need the recognition of 
the Other in combat to be given objective expression, for the products 
of the slave's labour externalise his consciousness and affirm his 
objective existence as a self-conscious and creative subject. Objects 
which encapsulate the consciousness of their creator are thus the 
confirmation of the slave's humanity. 
In this way the slave comes to know that he is not free but 
nevertheless believes himself to be a human being. Now he must claim 
recognition from the master, and for two reasons this necessari~ means 
a fight: the master will not recognise another, and the slaveYs own 
liberation requires him to assert his humanity over his animal life. 
However, before "realizing Freedom the Slave imagines a series of 
ideologies, by which he seeks to justify himself, to justify his slavery, 
14 
to reconcile the ideal of Freedom with the fact of Slavery o" 
The first ideology which the slave adopts is Stoicism; he adheres 
to a philosophy in which freedom is an abstract idea and which 
renders one's actual physical situation irrelevant by denying the 
importance of the external world. Stoicism gives way to Scepticism 
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which also denies the importance of man's situation and which renders 
action irrelevant. However, this goes further than Stoicism in the 
sense that it completely denies the value of being in the world: 
everything is irrelevant and the Sceptic ought, taking his philosophy 
to its logical conclusion, to commit suicide. Christianity, the next 
stage in the slave's justification of his oppression, unlike the 
ideologies of Stoicism and Scepticism, does admit that the slave is 
unfree but claims that in GodVs eyes, and in the future world, men are 
equal. The slave frees himself to some extent from the human master 
15 
but merely to be enslaved by God - the rrnivine Master.·" Man thus 
adopts and accepts his own slavery; he enslaves himself in this 
respect for the same reasons as before - through fear of death and in 
16 
face of the '·\Nothingness ... at the foundation of his being.rr However, 
with the acceptance of Christianity and the emergence of what Hegel 
calls the trunhappy consciousness,rr the dialectic takes a new form. 
Unlike the master-slave relationship where the basis of true conscious-
ness -that is) the recognition of selfhood and freedom both in oneself 
and the Other -are divided between two individual consciousnesses of 
master and slave, the division and basis of the dialectic now takes 
place within the same self. 
These three ideologies adopted by the slave have staved off 
the necessity for his violent revolt. However, the true liberation 
of the slave cannot take place without the risk of life which up to 
now has been so carefully avoided: in the case of the "unhappy 
consciousness" it is not actual violence which is required but its 
acceptance of the human condition of existence - that of mortality. 
One of the strengths of Hegel's theory is his portr~al of the oppressed 
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slave. On the one hand, Hegel illustrates how man?s relationship with 
the material world allows him to gain the consciousness requisite for 
his liberation, while on the other he shows that once a certain stage 
has been reached in the master-slave dialectic the continuation of the 
slave's oppression is to be found more in his psyche than in the external 
worldo It is this delicate balance which we shall find lacking in 
existentialist workso 
In the Hegelian system the liberation of the slave would not 
simply benefit the slave but i~ on the contrary, necessary for the 
development of all mankind. ''Man achieves his true autonomy, his 
' authentic freedom," writes Kojeve, "only after passing through Slavery, 
after surmounting fear of death performed in the servitude of another. n17 
The master, as we have seen, is unable to transcend the present situation 
and if he remains dominantJ the first fight will be merely imitated in 
a succession of wars of prestige. Moreover, the master principle is 
one of universality; for "the Man who risks his life is in no way 
different, by the sole act of having risked his life, from all the 
18 
others who have done as much." For example, within the family the 
master neither works nor fights and so it is not his humanity which is 
recognised but only his various family roles of father, brother, son 
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and so on. The slave principle, on the other hand, is one of "particularity" 
for it is through creative labour that fundamental differences, in 
terms of personalities and capabilities, between men are established. 
It is this type of diversity which is, in Hegel's philosophy, a 
prerequisite of historical development and hence significant social 
change. 
The slave is not only the one person who can initiate change, 
but it is also he who most desires it and who, in his work and his fear, 
most understands the human situation. Through his "animal fear of 
19 
death," experienced in his combat with the master and now a fundamental 
part of his daily life, the slav~ grasps that being has at its foundation 
20 
a Nothingness and that "the given world is hostile to him" and must 
be overcome. He also realises the value of recognition and the value 
of an independent existence, for he recognises the master without being 
recognised in return. However, before the slave can carry out his 
historical mission he must impose himself on the master and overcome 
his fear of death. His liberation cannot be achieved until he is 
prepared to fight: he was enslaved through fear and so this fear must 
be transcended before he can liberate himself from the power of the 
master. 
Thus we see how in the Hegelian master-slave dLalectic the 
21 
master is "the catalyst of the historical, anthropogenetic process" 
but that he is in an impasse: he is a trapped, unsatisfied man for 
whom death is the only escape. The slave, on the contrary, becomes 
the creator of history, as history becomes bound to the activities of 
the labourer. In short, the future belongs to the oppressed. In his 
desire to establish socialism Marx saw the advantage of such a theory; 
but an intriguing feature of de Beauvoir's work is that although she 
is committed to woman's emancipation she . scarcely uses this liberating 
aspect of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic. It is the principles 
of mastery and slavery - fighting and creative labour - which de Beauvoir 
most uses in explicating the nature and causes of woman's oppression. 
And, as we shall see, it is partly in accepting so wholeheartedly 
Hegel's notions of the preconditions of human development that 
24 
de Beauvoir's theory goes astray. But before we can turn to de Beauvoir's 
thought we must examine the other major source of ideas in The Second 





In the introduction to The Second Sex de Beauvoir claims that 
she is an-existentialist. This chapter sets out those aspects of 
Sartrian existentialism which enable us to understand de Beauvoiris work. 
By 1947 de Beauvoir had written a few existentialist essays and novels 
but Sartre's philosophical works provide the theoretical background 
1 
to The Second Sexo We shall begin our examination of Sartre's philosophy 
by explicating the ontology of his main philosophical work, Being and 
Nothingness. Then we shall summarise the ethical position Sartre 
2 
adopted in his lecture Existentialism and Humanism ( 1945) • As the 
purpose of this chapter is to give the theoretical framework within 
which to understand The -Second Sex we shall deal with Sartre's development 
up to the late 1940Vs. Thus we shall complete our study of Sartre's 
thought by looking at his early comrni tment to Marxism. 
I 
Being and Nothingness is subtitled: A Phenomenological Essay 
on Ontology. In it Sartre aims to study "the structures of being" 
3 
(ps788) by examining how such phenomena are given to us in experience. 
Subsequently Sartre discerns in the world a duality of being; a sharp 
division of the world into being-for-itself (~tre-pour-soi) and being-
in-itself (~tre-en-soi). He makes a radical distinction between man, 
the being of consciousness, and the in-itself world of animals and 
things. But despite this bifurcation of being, Sartre maintains that 
the two types of being are related; although the in-itself is a 
completed being which has no need of the for-itself, consciousness is 
dependent on an external object. "The cogito," writes Sartre, 
"necessarily leads out of itself" (p.786). The essential aspect of 
Sartreis definition of consciousness is precisely this idea that 
consciousness is always conscious of something, that it never exists in 
a pure state but is alw~s directed towards something other than 
itself. Because Sartre maintains that self-consciousness does not imply 
consciousness of consciousness his definition is a modification of the 
Cartesian cogito. He claims that self-consciousness is not objective 
or reflective consciousness but, on the contrary, pre-refective. This 
means that while I am conscious of objects, I am non-reflectivelY 
conscious of this awarenesso Nevertheless, according to such a 
perspective it is possible for consciousness to reflect on itself and 
thus become its own object. 
A significant feature of Sartreis duality is the way in which 
he conceptualises the distinction between the two types of being: a 
distinction which hinges on the notion that whereas the in-itself is 
an equivalence of being, an existent with clearly defined and limited 
properties, the for-itself is a being of nothingness and so the foundation 
of its being is a lack. In contrast to the for-itself which has a 
hole in its very being, the in-itself has not even "the tiniest crack 
through which nothingness might seep in" (p.121 ). 
According to Sartre, then, nothingness is never the property 
of things for it is always generated by the for-itself. It is this 
notion that man, the conscious being, is the foundation of his own 
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nothingness which leads Sartre to the proposition: "The Being by 
which Nothingness arrives in the world is a Being such that in its 
Being, the Nothingness of its Being is in question" (p .157). Thus, 
unlike a table which is a table, man is not a"pleni tude of being" 
(p.561). It is his being as nothingness which puts man's identity in 
question and which leads him to wonder what he is. Because man is 
able to put himself outside of being and ask questions about himself, 
he is not determined by his being and is able to modify it. Being 
undetermined man therefore escapes the causali~ of the world of the 
in-itself and exists as a free being. For Sartre, then, the major 
distinction between man and the in-itself is that for man "existence 
precedes ••• essence" (p.565). In short, man exists first and defines 
himself later. It is this notion that freedom is not something which 
has been tacked on to man 2 s existence but is on the contrary at its 
core that leads Sartre to the famous but chilling proposition that man· 
is rrcondemned to be free" (po186); that "there is no difference between 
the being of man and his being free" (p.60). 
Although Sartre claims that man is free>he recognises that 
man's existence is "contingentrr (p., 132ff.) and appears to have the 
"character of an unjustifiable fact" (p .128). As man is not the 
foundation of his own being he is born into a world which is not of 
his choosing. If we take into consideration what Sartre calls the 
"facticityrr of the individual - such factors as class, race, physiology, 
place in history, and his own past - there seems to be a number of 
barriers to freedom. But Sartre disputes this is the case. He 
maintains that it is facticity which grounds the for-itself in the 
world; it is this which links it to the in-itself and which allows us 
to say that the for-itself is. 
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Moreover, Sartre argues that to be free is "not to choose the 
historic world in which one arises - which would have no meaning -
but to choose oneself in the world whatever this may be" (p.668). But 
although we have not chosen our facticity Sartre maintains that we are 
nevertheless responsible for it; responsible because we are free to 
determine what to make of it. Thus Sartre claims: 
•o• I can not be crippled without choosing myself as crippled. 
This means that I choose the way in which I constitute my 
disability (as "unbearable", "humiliating", "to be hidden", ••• 
"an object of pride" • • • etc.) (p .,432) o 
The for-itself is "situated" in the world and this "situation" has 
two dimensions: facticity and the resistance of things encountered in 
the "coefficient of adversity" (p.428) on the one hand, and the 
meanings and significations which man chooses to attribute to them on 
the other. 
Although freedom is constitutive of Sartrian man's very being, 
it is in "anguish" that he is conscious of this freedom. Unlike fear; 
which is fear in the face of external objects, anguish is "anguish 
before myself" (p.65) o It has no specific object and is simply a 
manifestation of the fear of oneis own freedom; the realisation that 
meaning and value in the world can only be derived from oneself. 
But although Sartre claims that consciousness of freedom is anguish, 
he recognises that anguish is a relative~ uncommon experience. To 
explain this Sartre argues that we are engaged in a ready-made world 
and that we usually act without reflecting on the significance of our 
actions. We also tend to accept the meaning of the world as fixedo 
In the form of policemen, signboards and alarm clocks we accept the 
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apparent solidity and permanence of the world and it is these "guard 
rails" (p., 79) which help protect us from the agony of anguish. In 
moments of reflection, however, such guard rails collapse and we 
experience our freedom in anguish. Instead of confronting this reality 
our immediate response is to flee it; to hide from the anguish by 
denying the existence of our terrifying freedom. According to Sartre, 
such flight not only manifests itself in the way we individually live 
our lives but also in psychological determinism; that is, in theories 
which seek "to deny the transcendence of human reality" (p.79)o It is 
for these reasons that Sartre claims: "Human reality may be·defined as 
a being such that in its being its freedom is at stake because human 
reality perpetually tries to refuse to recognise its freedom" (p .568). 
The pattern of behaviour in which such a refusA.l is manifest is called 
by Sartre "bad faith" (mauvaise foi) and so is essentially a lie to 
oneself in an attempt to hide from freedom and so escape the agony of 
anguish. However, although bad faith may be likened to a lie it is 
different from other forms of deception in that there is no duality of 
deceiver and deceived. Thus Sartre claims that the consciousness 
which "affects" (p. 89) itself with bad faith is simultaneously conscious 
of its bad faith. 
Although Sartre gives a full description of bad faith, for the 
purposes of this stuqy it is possible to summarise it as being an 
inability of the for-itself to co-ordinate the two aspects of its 
existence - facticity and transcendence. Thus I am in bad faith if I 
see my existence as being like that of the in-itself - if, for example, 
I claim I am a waiter or a homosexual in the sense that a table is a -- --
table. In other words, as soon as I try to strip myself of transcendence 
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and see myself as having some fixed unchangeable essence I am manifestly 
in bad faith. Conversely, if I see myself only as a transcendence 
and thereby deny my facticity, I am also in bad faith since I deny that 
I am actually grounded in the world. Thus I maintain myself in bad 
faith if I deny all responsibility for my past actions or if I claim 
that my past determines my future. Indeed Sartre claims that Freudis 
concept of the unconscious encourages bad faith in that it denies 
individual freedom of choice and allows people to disclaim responsibility 
for their actions. 
As Sartre's concept of consciousness emphasises the intentional 
aspect of consciousness, it refutes the Freudian notion of the 
unconscious. What Freud attributes to the workings of the unconscious 
mind, Sartre views as the dAliberate putting out of mind characteristic 
of bad faith. But Sartre maintains that bad faith may exist at the 
level of pre-reflective consciousness; although it is part of a conscious 
process the subject may not know it and so it may only be revealed to 
him by reflection. Such reflection, moreover, may have to be initiated 
by another person. Thus Sartre says of bad faith: "There is no 
question of a reflective, voluntary decision, but of a spontaneous 
determination of our being." (p.106). The Sartrian notion of consciousness 
and the continual emphasis on the freedom of choice of the individual 
lead Sartre to refute some of the major premises of conventional 
psychoanalysis. Indeed Sartre hopes to replace this with what he calls 
"e:x:istential psychoanalysis.'' Essentially this involves moving from 
an explanation of behaviour premised on biological drives towards one 
based on a notion of a fundamental human project. But in order to 
understand this it is necessary to reveal another aspect of Sartre's 
ontology. 
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Sartre claims that because the for-itself does not coincide 
with itself the foundation of its being is a "lack" (p .133ff). And 
what it lacks is being. In other words, it lacks that which would 
make it a totality. As Sartre maintains that "this perpetually absent 
being which haunts the for-itself is itself fixed in the in-itself" 
(po140), it is the synthesis of "for-itself-in-itseli'" which it thus 
desires. ButJaccording to Sartre, such a synthesis is impossibleJfor 
a satisfied for-itself would no longer be for-itself - it would, in 
fact, be God. Because Sartre claims that the for-itself is synonymous 
with this project of being God, he writes: "Consciousness is in fact 
a project of founding itself: this is, of attaining the dignity of 
in-itself-for-itself or in-itself-as-self-cause" (p.789)o 
Sartrews opposition to a conventional psychoanalytic inter-
pretation of human behaviour and symbolism is neatly expressed in his 
discussion of the significance of holes. He argues that the for-itself 
is attracted to holes because they present themselves as a nothingness 
"to be fille~" that people are greatly tempted to "plug up holesn -
to use their body to fill a nothingness - so that a "plenitude of 
beingn (p. 781) may exist. In other words, the attraction of holes 
is that they present the symbolic possibility of achieving the desired 
synthesis of for-itself-in-itselfo It is from this standpoint of being 
that Sartre thinks we can pass to a discussion of the sexual significance 
of holeso Thus unlike Freud who would maintain that holes are fascinating 
because of their sexual symbolism, Sartre claims that "sex is a hole" -
an n appeal to being" (p. 782). 
Although the project of becoming God is for Sartre, the fundamental 
human project he believes it does not constitute a limit or obstacle 
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to individual freedom. Like the facticity of the for-itself, it is 
merely the framework within which individual choice must be made. For 
Sartre the way in which an individual embarks on "the project of being" 
(p.712 ff) depends on how he freely chooses to relate to being. There 
is therefore "an infinity of possible projects" just as there is an 
"infinity of possible human beings" (p.721)o 
In Sartreis theory it is ontological phenomenology which reveals 
the nature of the human project but it is existential psychoanalysis 
which reveals the nature of the individual's choice. Although Sartre 
rejects the premises of Freudian psychoanalysis; he hopes to use :bhis 
method to elucidate the nature of the individualis choice of being. 
But in Being and Nothingness Sartre is vague on the question of how 
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and when an individual makes this original choice. Such vagueness is 
predominantly due to his notion that choice and consciousness are 
synonymous. In other words, Sartre claims that it is not a question 
of an individual at a certain point in time making a deliberate and 
conscious choice but rather that this "profound choice is oo• at one 
with the consciousness an individual has of himself" (p. 534ff). What 
is clear, however, is that this original choice, although creating a 
"hierarchy" (p.186) of possible choices leading the individual in a 
certain direction, can at any moment be altered radically. Indeed it 
is this total metamorphosis of an original project which Sartre claims 
underlies what is commonly referred to as "conversion:• 
But let us leave in abeyance the question of individual freedom 
and choice, and examine another aspect of Sartre's ontology- the 
relationship between the for-itself and the Other. 
II 
Although we shall see that there is a strong Hegelian element 
in Sartre's theory of the interaction between Self and Other, in 
several fundamental respects Sartre is critical of Hegel. Thus while 
Sartre is attracted to Hegel~s notion that the Other is indispensible 
to the development of self-consciousness, he claims that the existence 
of the Other cannot be derived "ontologically" (p.376). Sartre argues 
that it is not possible to prove logically that the Other exists and 
that discussion can begin only with the cogito. In other words, as the 
Other is "encountered" (p.336) by us, Sartre claims it is not necessary 
to refute solipsism on a theoretical level for we may simply take the 
Other as given. Sartreis disagreement with Hegel on the ontological 
derivation of the Other does not simply lead to a different starting 
point in his own theory, but is, on the contrary, the basis for a 
major critique of Hegel's theory of Self and Other. As the criticisms 
are detailed and complex we are only able to outline them. 
Sartre's main objection of Hegel is that it is not possible 
to recognise oneself in the Other. That is, one cannot see the Other 
simultaneously as subject and object and have oneself similarly 
reflected in the Other. As ''the for-itself as for-itself cannot be 
known by the Other'' (p .327) Sartre claims I cannot apprehend myself as 
I appear to the Other or apprehend how the Other is for himself. Sartre 
argues by claiming that I .£.§11. know myself in the Other - that mutual 
recognition is possible - Hegel refuses to recognise the "ontological 
separation'' (p.3c8J of consciousnesses; a refusal which leads Sartre 
to accuse him of 1•epistemological optimism'' (p.3~4J. 
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It is important to note, however, that although Sartre refutes 
the idea that "my objectivity for (the Other] can not appear to me" 
(p.J27), he does accept that through my encounter with the Other I 
experience myself as an object. But this leads Sartre in a different 
direction from Hegel: 
My abject-ness for myself is in no way a specification of 
Hegel's Ich bin Ich. We are not dealing with a formal identity, 
and my being-as-object or being-for-others is profoundly 
different from my being-for-myself •••• Thus the Me-as-object-
for-myself is a Me which is not Me; that is, which does not 
have the characteristics of consciousness. It is a degraded 
consciousness; objectification is a radical metamorphosis (p.J65). 
Therefore, Sartre rejects the initial stage posited by Hegel in which 
there is an identity between Self and Other, and categorically picks up 
on the notion that through the Other I experience myself as a fixed, 
determinate object. As this is feeling does not correspond to the 
way I see myself, Sartre argues it constitutes my alienation. Hegel, 
unlike Marx, defines objectification as alienation and Sartre follows 
him in this respect; '~y being-for-others is a fall through absolute 
emptiness towards objectivity ••• this fall is an alienation " 
5 
(p.J67). In other words, alienation results from the simple fact 
that I have an "outside" and so appear to the Other as an object. 
But while Sartre accepts a Hegelian definition of alienation 
.6 
he does not follow Hegel and posit that such alienation can be removed. 
In fact, Sartre claims that in maintaining that conflict and alienation 
may be eradicated from human relations Hegel is guilty of "ontological 
optimism" (p .328). Indeed Sartre argues that He gel views the relations 
between consciousness "from the point of view of the Absolute" (p.J28); 
that is to s~, Hegelis consciousness and his relation to the Other 
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are never called into question and he discusses the conflict between 
Self and Other as though it had already been resolved. Sartre claims 
that whereas ontology can only describe "the scandal of the plurality 
of consciousnesses" (p .329 b Hegel attempts to use ontology to overcome 
it; an attempt which cannot succeed, for Sartre believes: rrso long as 
consciousnesses exist the separation and conflict will remain" (p.329). 
But it is only by examining Sartre's own theory of the Other than we 
learn why he challenges Hegel and takes such a pessimistic view of 
human relations. 
Instead of following Hegel and reducing the relation of Self 
and Other to Imowledge, Sartre claims that we must see it as a relation 
of "being to being" (p.327ff). Thus we must see the encounter with 
the Other as taking place when consciousness already knows itself as 
such. The consciousness in question, moreover, must not be the "universal" 
consciousness of Hegelian philosophy and must refer to an individual 
being. 
Beginning with the cogito, that is to say undertaking a 
phenomenological analysis, Sartre reveals that the foundation of the 
original relation between myself and the Other is the n appearance" 
(p.340ff) of the Other in my world. I "encounter" another being whom 
I differentiate from the other objects in my field of vision because I 
realise that he organises the world around himself and is capable of 
holding his own, as opposed to my, point of view. It is this 
regrouping of the world around the Other which Sartre claims we experience 
as an internal haemorrhage in our universe: 
Thus suddenly an object has appeared which has stolen the 
world from me. Everything is in place; everything still 
exists for ~; but everything is traversed by an invisible 
flight and fixed in the direction of a new object (p.343). 
But this first encounter with the Other, although introducing a 
11 drain-hole 11 (p.343) in the universe, does not mean that I perc,·..:ive 
the Other as being anything more than a "privileged object" (p.344). 
Indeed it is only when the Other "looks" (p.344ff) at me that he ceases 
to be a mere object for me and, by annihilating .lli.Y. subjectivity, 
constitutes me as an object for him. By looking at me the Other 
implicitly evaluates and judges me and so the Look "shocks" (p.354) 
my being and forces me to realise that I exist in another way; that is, 
as an object in another's world. 
For Sartre it is the feeling of shame which accompanies the 
realisation of objectivity for the Other. A feeling which does not 
result from "being this or that guilty object but in general of being 
an object" (p.384) o Sartre indeed maintains that the feeling of shame 
demonstrates not only that I recognise that I am an obj9Ct in the Otheris 
world but also that I directly apprehend the existence of the Other. 
Even when the Other is not actually before me he is within my consciousness, 
leading me to appraise myself as object and making me feel guilt, shame 
or pride. Moreover, the Otheris look shocks my being because it 
reveals to me my objectivity and forces me to realise that there is 
another being who can act as a barrier to my desires. As the Other 
is "the hidden death of my possibilities" (p.3.54) when I encounter him 
"I am no longer master of the situation" (p .355). In a word, I am a 
"transcendence-transcended" (p.3.52). 
As Sartre argues that in "the phenomenon of the look, the Other 
is on principle that which can not be an object" (p.359)
1 
he maintains 
that the Other is not immediately perceived by us as object. Indeed 
he claims that perception of the Other only as object is the product 
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of self-defence. As one cannot look at the Look without cancelling its 
meaning, to look at the Other in retaliation is to affect his 
objectification. Subsequently he claims that it is possible to relate 
to one's status as object- come to terms with the notion that the 
Other holds "the secret" (p.475) of what you are - in two fundamentally 
different ways. 
The first way in which one can relate to the Other is listed 
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under the heading: "Love, Language, Masochism..'' The principle which 
underlies it is succinctly contained in Sartre 2s statement: 
in so far as the Other as freedom is the foundation of 
my being-in-itself, I can seek to recover that freedom and to 
possess it without removing from it its character of freedom. 
In fact if I could identify myself with that freedom which is 
the foundation of my being-in-itself, I should be to myself 
my own foundation (p.473). 
Therefore the project involved in the adoption of this set of attitudes 
is to incorporate the freedom of the Other while retaining his freedom 
intact. 
In love a fundamental desire is not to deny my being-for-Others 
but to adopt the loveris perspective on myself. I consent to being an 
object in this relationship and recognise the freedom of the Other but 
I desire that this freedom should take my objectivi~ as its object. 
That is, I want my existence to be justified by becoming the raison d'~tre 
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of another's freedom. As my loveris freedom is central to the foundation 
of my being I want to possess the Other's freedom; to dispel my 
insecurity my subjecting his freedom to my freedom. But Sartre believes 
that the project of love is doomed to failure and is beset inevitably 
by conflict. He maintains that the lover will not freely agree to limit 
his transcendence and so the project of love becomes the project of 
seduction. In order to capture my lover's freedom I make myself "a 
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fascinating object" (p.484). If this strategy succeeds and I seduce 
the Other into loving me then he becomes a lover in his own right and 
hence wants me to be for him what I want him to be for me. Thus we 
both end attempting to conceal our freedom, the basis of the original 
attraction, in order to ensnare the freedom of the other. Indeed 
Sartre maintains: " to love is in essence the project of making 
oneself be loved" (p.488). It is doomed not only for the reason already 
mentioned but also because the Other may at any point look at me and 
make me experience in alienation my own unmed.iated objectivity. Moreover) 
the lovers may be looked at by another and then each one will experience 
"not only his own objectification but that of the other as well" (p.490). 
Perhaps more importantly love,in Sartrevs viewJis doomed because it is 
a hopeless attempt to overcome the "ontological separation" of 
consciousnesses. 
The project of love having failed, either of the lovers may 
attempt to overcome such failure by freely consenting to be an object 
for the Other. By becoming a masochist I could absorb myself in the 
Other's subjectivity. The attraction of this, according to Sartre, is 
that "if I relied on the Other to make me exist, I should no longer be 
anything more than a being-in-itself founded in its being by a freedom" 
(p.491 ). Thus unlike love where I want to be the object of the Other's 
transcendence, now I simply want to be used like any other object; 
become no different from the in-itself. Mor~over, unlike love where I 
becom~ a fascinating object for the Other in order to facilitate his 
seduction and my possession of his freedom, in masochism I am fascinated 
by my objectivity-for-others. But like love, masochism is doomed to 
failure - the masochist has to use his transcendence in order to become 
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a being-transcended. In other words, even when attempting to be a mere 
instrument for others the masochist is demonstrating his freedom of 
choice. Thus Sartre claims: "Even the masochist who pays a woman to 
whip him is treating her as an instrument and by this very fact posits 
himself in transcendence in relation to hern (p.493). In this way the 
masochist's desired objectivi~ escapes him. 
With the failure of both love and masochism I may resort to 
the second fundamental attitude. An attitude which basically involves 
the attempt: 
••• to deny the being which is conferred upon me from outside; 
that is, I can turn back upon the Other so as to make an 
object out of him in turn, since the Other'~s abject-ness 
destroys my abject-ness for him (po473). 
In short I can attempt to transcend the Other'~s transcendence. I can, 
for example, treat others with "indifference"; I can pretend that they 
do not really exist and regard them as simple objects. Indeed Sartre 
maintains: ". • • there are men who die without - save from brief and 
terrifying flashes of illumination - ever having suspected what the 
Other is." (p.496). Instead of seeking to deny the Other'~s subjectivity 
in indifference I can attempt "to get hold of the Other's frr-;e 
subjectivity through his objectivity-for-men (p.497); and it is this 
original project which Sartre calls "sexual desire.rt But before looking 
at its constituent parts it is necessary to understand something 
of Sartre'~s rather original approach to sexuality. 
Sartre maintains that there are two basic ways in which we can 
interpret sexuality. We can either see it as "a contingent accident 
bound to our physiological nature, or ••• (as) a necessar.y structure 
of being-for-itself-for-others" (p.499). In other words, Sartre claims 
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sexuality can be conceived primarily as a product of the reproductive 
process or as a medium through which the for-itself relates to others. 
And it is the latter approach which Sartre himself adopts. Identifying 
sexuality with desire, he takes issue with biological determinists and 
maintains: n. • • desire is by no means a physiological accident, an 
itching of our flesh which may fortuitously direct us on to the Other's 
flesh" (p .510). In this way Sartre also opposes Freud in as much as 
he does not see sexual desire as an attempt to release sexual energy. 
Indeed Sartre warns that we should not see desire as something which 
resides within consciousness, for consciousness "chooses itself as 
desire" (p.508). Desire, then, for Sartre is an expression of the 
freedom of the for-itself. This means that sexual impulses, the basis 
of Freudian analysis, are themselves a mere result of ontological 
needs. As John Passmore points out, Freudians may see sexual symbolism 
in Sartre's ontology but in response Sartre would maintain that they 
are attempting to disguise their rr ontological loneliness" - seeking 
refuge "in the comfortable doctrine that loneliness is no more than a 
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sexual need, not, then, beyond human skill to satisfy." 
If desire is an expression of one's freedom what is it that one 
actually desires? According to Sartre: "The being which desires is 
consciousness making itself body" (p .505). In sexual desire, unlike 
hunger or other bodily desires, the body is overwhelmed by desire, 
consciousness becomes "clogged" and "invaded by facticity" (p .504). In 
other words, through desire the for-itself becomes a thing. Through 
the caress, which Sartre claims is the vehicle for the expression of 
such desire, the two subjects involved experience themselves and each 
other simultaneously as "flesh." The object of this exercise is to 
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"make myself flesh in the presence of the Other in order to appropriate 
the Other's flesh." In other words, as Wilfred Desan succinctly points 
out: 
••• I engulf myself into my body with the hope and the wish 
that the Other will also confine his possibilities, realize 
his being-matter, and become flesh not only in my eyes but in 
his own eyes as well. Desire is thus fundamentallfc an invitation 
to Desire. Only flesh find the way to the flesh. 0 
This attempt to "appropriate" the Other's flesh, to possess 
the Other's transcendence as boqy, is of course doomed to fail. Not 
only does the fulfilment of desire in coitus kill the desire but also 
the use of the Other's boqy reduces it to a mere instrument and hence 
to an ordinary object. Moreover, having reduced the Other to boey, 
having grasped him only in his facticity, his sought-after transcendence 
is preserved intact. This leads Sartre to claim that the object of 
desire ultimately becomes so elusive that I am no longer sure of what 
I seek. He maintains that with desire extinguished in coitus one is 
left "like a sleepwalker who wakens to find himself in the process of 
grasping the edge of the bed while he can not recall the nightmare 
which has provoked his gesture .. " Gloomily he adds: "It is this situation 
which is at the origin of sadism" (p.517). 
Certainly Sartre sees similarities between desire and sadism 
in as much as both use flesh as a w~ to overcome the transcendence of 
the Othero But they are different in as much as the sadist "wants 
the non-reciprocity of sexual relations" (p.518); he desires to use 
his boey as an instrument which will forcibly subjugate the Other. This 
attempt also cannot succeed: not only may the victim be using the 
sadist as an instrument for his masochistic desire, but also he is 
42 
'· 
alwaus free to look at the saoist. In other words the sadist may at 
any moment experience in the Other's look "the absolute alienation of 
his being in the Other's freedom" (p.525). Moreover Sartre claims 
that the victim is always free to "determine" (p.523) the precise moment 
at which the activities of the sadist become unbearable: a determination 
and control which lead Sartre to maintain that the victim is ultimately 
"responsible" for what he undergoes. 
Having failed in this attempt to obliterate the subjectivity 
of the Other, the sadist may attempt to escape his objectivity for 
others by wishing their extinction or destruction - and it is this 
which Sartre defines as "hatred" (p.532ff). It is the most radical 
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attempt to refuse to be an object for the Other. But paradoxically 
hatred necessarily contains a recognition of the Other's freedom and 
the threat he may pose to one's desires. Like the other attitudes 
adopted toward the Other it is bound to fail for even if one succeeds 
in eliminating this dangerous Other, one cannot bring about his non-being 
in the sense of obliterating his past life. Moreover, the very act 
of destruction is in itself proof of the importance and influence of 
the Other's existence. As Sartre maintains that hatred falls outwith 
the main categories of love/masochism and desire/sadism, he claims that 
with its failure "nothing remains for the for-itself except to re-enter 
the circle and allow itself to be indefinitely tossed from one to the 
other of the two fundamental attitudes" (p.534). 
The notion of inevitability leads us to point out the status 
of the fundamental attitudes in Sartre's theory. Sartre argues that 
all these attitudes, with the exception of hate, are essentially 
sexual attitudes in the sense of being a fundamental project of the 
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for-itself. More important~, these are attitudes which underlie 
all other examples of behaviour towards the Other. That is to say, 
"collaboration, conflict, rivalry, emulation, engagement, obedience 
etc." have as "their skeleton" (p.527) these fundamental attitudes. 
Thus Sartre says that both love and desire are contained in such 
emotions as maternal love, pity, and gratitude and that each person 
will be able to determine this relation by "referring to his own experience" 
(p.528). 
Sartre's view of the for-itself's relation to the Other is 
therefore that it is inevitably beset by failure and conflict. Thus: 
Everything which may be said of me in my relations with the 
Other applies to him as well. While I attempt to free myself 
from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself 
from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks 
to enslave me. We are by no means dealing with unilateral 
relations with an object-in-itself, but with reciprocal and 
moving relations ••• descriptions of concrete behaviour must 
therefore be envisaged within the perspective of conflict 
(pp.474-5). 
However, while stating this Sartre nevertheless admits that such an 
account fails to include certain experiences where the Other is not 
seen in conflict with ourselves, but in community. He therefore embarks 
on an analysis of the communal dimension of human relations. He claims 
that the for-itself may experience a certain solidarity with the Other; 
a solidarity which is expressed in the grammatical terms "us" and "we" 
and which is of two different types. In the first type of corrnnunal 
experience, where the term "us" is appropriate, I feel solidarity with 
the Other on~ in the presence of a "third}' Thus Sartre claims in 
the category of the "us-object • • • I arn engaged with Others in a 
community of transcendences-transcended, of alienated Me'a The 'Us' 
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here refers to an experience of being-objects-in-common" (p.537). In 
this sense, then, Sartre claims that the "us" refers to a "community 
alienation.:• It is a real aspect of our existence since it is an 
inevitable product of the combination of our being-for-Others and the 
presence of a third. 
But accordingto such a perspective, while the experience of 
"us-object" is real, the experience of 11we-subjecttr is not. It is a 
purely trpsychological" experience which does not "correspond to any 
real unification of the for-i tselfs under consideration" (p .549). I 
may experience a feeling of "we" but the Other, to whom the "we" refers 
may not. And so the gulf between my consciousness and the Other's 
consciousness remains. Accordingly Sartre rejects Heidegger for he 
maintains: "One must either transcend the Other or allow oneself to be 
transcended by him. The relations between consciousnesses is not the 
Mi tsein; it is conflict" (p .555). 
Returning to a comparison between Sartre and Hegel we thus see 
that in both the Sartrian theory of human interaction and the Hegelian 
master-slave dialectic there is an attempt to enslave the Other. In 
Hegel the desire to enslave leads to physical combat and the emergence 
of a victor who is able to exact recognition of his essential status 
from his vanquished opponent. The hostility between Self and Other is 
not masked but displayed quite openly in a murderous fight. In Sartre' s 
theory, on the other hand, no such direct confrontation takes place and 
so any battle between the rivalrous subjects is conducted in a much 
more subtle manner. By substituting the Look for Hegel's Fight, Sartre 
leads us into the realms of psychological warfare. Indeed Sartre has 
also substituted the concept of war for Hegel's concept of battle or 
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Fight. In other words, there is no definitive act of hostility from 
which a master emerges but rather a series of acts of aggression which 
involves neither masters nor slaves. Continually engaged in conflict 
with the Other the for-itself is always a subject; but a subject who 
never manages to maintain a "consistent attitude towards the Other" 
(p.529). Thus what the attempt to enslave the Other leads to in Sartre 1 s 
theory is not formal inequalit~ but simply the vacnlation of the for-itself 
towards the Other - a vac~ation which involves either seeing the Other 
as a "transcendence-transcended or as a transcendence-transcending" 
(p.529). 
Although there is a strangely Hegelian tinge to Sartre's 
descriptions of the two sets of fundamental attitudes, in as much as 
in each case the relationship between the two consciousnesses is other 
than it first appears, we can now see the differences in approach. 
Unlike Hegel's theory where there is a continual dialectical movement 
towards the obliteration of objectivity, for Sartre relations between 
consciousnesses are fraught with eternal conflict and change happens 
in a cyclical and not a dialectical fashion. Thus when Sartre discusses 
the nature of the relationship between the for-itself and the Other 
he describes it as a "circle" in which both are "ceaselessly" and 
"indefinitely tossed" between the two fundamental attitudes. 
In The Phenomenology of Mind the master-slave conflict is overcome 
by the potential inherent in the slave's labour, and so the foundations 
for change and development are contained within the relationship itself. 
It is the formalism of this approach which Sartre criticises and rejects 
when he maintains that the Hegelian analysis is undertaken from the 
point of view of the Absolute. Sartre's analysis, on the other hand, 
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is phenomenological for it begins with the cogito and from this 
constructs an ontology of the for-itself 7s relation to the Other. But 
in doing so Sartre's theory is limited by present experience. The 
way relationships are revealed to consciousness now is, according to 
such an approach, the way in which they must be. A picturS! of the world 
is built up using our every day experiences, but such a picture, far 
from illustrating the structures of human existence, may simply 
illustrate the particular nature of our culture. Thus, starting from 
th3 standpoint of a consciousness in a highly individualistic and 
competitive culture Sartre latterly concludes "conflict is the original 
meaning of being-for-others" (p.475, emphasis added). 
Sartre has been repeatedly criticised for the pessimistic 
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conclusion to this work • From a footnote in Being and Nothingness and 
from later writings, we learn that Sartre too is dissatisfied. Thus 
when describing the circular nature of relationships he adds in a 
footnote: "These considerations do not exclude the possibility of an 
ethics of deliverance and salvation. But this can be achieved only 
after a radical conversion which we cannot discuss here" (fn p .534). 
Moreover, his concluding sentence promises that he will write a book 
on ethical questions. Later in this chapter we shall assess Sartre's 
concept of freedom and if he manages to move from a position of inevitable 
conflict to an "ethics of deliverance and salvation~" But now, having 
outlined how Sartrian ontology describes the for-itself's relation to 
the world and to others, we should see what Sartre says about masculine 




Although sex is par·t of one's facticity, in this work Sartre 
says nothing specific about how the possession of a masculine or 
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feminine body affects the for-itself. This is in harmony with Sartrev s 
general view of the body for he does not see it as a significant 
determinant of human existence. The body is simply an instrument, a 
tool. Even when Sartre discusses carnal relations with the Other he 
does not comment on the way in which gender affects oneis experience 
of desire or of the sexual relationship which ensues. Thus we must 
suppose that both male and female have the same purpose and intention 
in becoming carnally involved with the Other. It is only when Sartre 
discusses "holes" that he makes a distinction between males and females 
in this respect: 
It is only from this standpoint that we can pass on to 
sexuality. The obscenity of the feminine sex is that of 
everything which. "gapes open". It is an appeal to being 
as all holes are. In herself woman appeals to a strange 
flesh which is to transform her into a fulness of being by 
penetration and dissolution. Conversely woman senses her 
condition as an appeal precisely because she is "in the 
form of a hole". Beyond any doubt her sex is a mouth and a 
voracious mouth which devours the penis - a fact that can 
easily lead to the idea of castration (p.782). 
It is interesting to note that in this passage Sartre describes male 
and female as being both active and passive. Woman "appeals" passively 
to the male; it is he who actively fills her through penetration. Yet 
she is also a "mouth" devouring the penis. But no matter what role 
the sexes are accorded here, one thing is clear - feminine sexuality is 




The idea of woman trying to devour the male is an image which 
recurs in Being and Nothingness. Sartre sees the world of the in-itself 
as menacing; it is chaotic and threatens to engulf us. 14 It is 
particularly the "viscous" with its gluey consistency which makes us 
fear being overwhelmed. And it is such "slimen which Sartre equates 
with femininity: 
The slimy is docileo It is a soft, yielding action, a moist 
and feminine sucking; it lives oboourely under my fingers 
and I sense a dizziness; it draws me to it as the bottom of 
a precipice might draw me (p.777). 
On another occasion Sartre states: nslime is the revenge of the in-
itself; a sickly sweet feminine revenge which will be symbolised on 
another level by the quality 'sugary'" (p. 771 ) • In short, Sartre 
equates femininity with repellant aspects of the world. 
In his book on Sartre, Maurice Cranston argues that Sartre 
generally exhibits a revulsion for the natural world. As he points out 
in Sartre's work natural objects are portrayed as: "'vague,' 'soft,' 
'flabby,' 'creamy,' 'thick,' 'tepid,' 'dull,' Ysickly,' and 'obscene.' 15 
De Beauvoir confirms that Sartre has such a disgust for Nature. In 
16 her memoirs she reports: "He was allergic to chlorophyll." On a 
more serious note she also maintained: nil de teste la campagne. Il 
abhorre - le mot n'est pas trop fort - la vie grouillante des insectes 
et la pulluation des plantes.n17 
Sartre's revulsion for Nature encompasses the female sexo 
Woman's sexuality (her obscenity as a hole) and her bond, through 
reproduction, to Nature means that femininity inspires Sartre with 
horror. It is not surprising, therefore, as Cranston points out, that 
there is "something sickening about all the female characters in 
Sartre's plays and stories.n18 
In Being and Nothingness, then, Sartre occasionally 
equates· between femininity and the viscous but his theory does not 
illuminate differences between feminine and masculine existence. No 
doubt the Sartre of this period would argue that no important 
differences exist - that what can be said of the for-itself applies 
equally to male and female. However, de Beauvoir reveals in The 
Second Sex that differences do exist. The Sartrian for-itself is 
male, for de Beauvoirian woman does not assume an authentically 
subjective attitude; she accepts man's definition of her as "the Other." 
But before we can explicate de BeauvoirYs theory of womanis situation 
we must continue our stuqy of Sartre's thought with an assessment of 
his notion of human freedom. 
IV 
According to Sartre's definition of the for-itself, freedom 
is not something which has been added on to mani s being but is in fact 
the very "foundation" of it. As man is not free "to cease being free" 
(p.567), Sartre maintains that we are all "condenmed to be free" 
(p.186). But Sartre points out that this definition of freedom is 
"philosophical"; that it does not concern morality or politics and 
simply refers to the individual's "autonomy of choice" (po622). In 
contrast to "connnon sense" definitions of freedom, Sartre argues that 
fre~dom does not mean " Yto obtain what one has wishedY " (p.620) for 
it is the ability to choose, not necessarily succeed, which is 
intrinsic to this concept of freedom. "Thus we shall not say that a 
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prisoner is always free to go aut of prison," writes Sartre, "which 
would be absurd, nor that he is always free to long for release, which 
would be an irrelevant truism, but that he is always free to try to 
escape (p.622). 
In Sartreis theory, then, if the individualis physical life 
is curtailed.by the actions of others and if it is dangerous to rebel 
or attempt escape, he is still free to value life and security higher 
than starvation, imprisonment and death (p.672). In Force of Circumstance 
de Beauvoir informs us that Sartre defended this concept of freedom with 
"his morality of authenticity." She tells us that Sartre claimed: 
" from the point of view of freedom all situations could be salvaged 
if one accepted (assumed) them as project." However, de Beauvoir, who 
was never totally convinced of this viewpoint, adds: "This solution 
was still very close to Stoicism, since circumstances often leave us 
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no other way of transcending ourselves than submission." 
T~ concept of freedom has prompted criticism from many 
quarters. In an article on Sartre :1-n 1 948, Herbert MarcuseJ for example, 
claims: 
If philosophy, by virtue of its existential-ontological 
concepts of man or freedom, is capable of demonstrating 
that the persecuted Jew or victim of the executioner are 
and remain absolutely free and masters of a self-responsible 
choice, then these philosophical concepts have declined to 
the level of mere ideology, an ideology which offers itself 
as a most han~ justification for the persecuters and 
executioners. 0 
However, Sartre does argue that there is one possible limit 
to freedom. And that limitation is freedom itself - only the for-itself 
can limit the freedom of the for-itself. But the limitation which 
Sartre has in mind is strictly of a psychological nature. Having 
.51 
"· 
dismissed the idea that torture, imprisonment and slavery are real 
limitations to human freedom ("the autonomy of choice") Sartre posits 
a limitation to freedom which lies outwith the domain of socio-
political freedom. Ultimately he concludes that "the true limit" 
(p.672) the Other imposes on my freedom is that through him my situation 
ceases to be a simple facet of my life and is grasped by him as an 
"objective form." In other words, because the Other sees only my 
attachment to the in-itself1 the meaning of my life escapes me and in 
his presence I am "alienated..'' 
But although Sartre clearly states that one's freedom is 
"truly" limited by the Other in this way, later he refutes the idea 
that this is the case. He maintains that as such alienation depends 
on the recognition of the Other as a transcendence, it is based on a 
free choice. Thus although I am alienated, the fact that this 
alienation depends on my choice means that rrmy freedom in a way recovers 
its own limits" (p.674, emphasis added). But by including "in a way" 
even Sartre does not appear convinced that he has not uncovered 
something which, in his terms, is a true limit to human freedom. 
In Being and Nothingness the only possible limitation to 
freedom is thus an abstract, metaphysical limit. While Sartre at 
points maintains that both '' selfs" hope to enslave the Other, the 
enslavement of which he speaks refers to objectification and not to 
some actual physical limitation to freedom. Thus, unlike Hegel's 
master-slave dialectic where the slave is actually forced to work for 
the master, Sartrevs for-itself appears only to be enslaved in as much 
as he is alienated by the Look of the Other. And, as we have seen, 
even this limit is of a qualified kind. 
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As Sartre 1 s ontological concept of freedom leads him to maintain 
that man is "condemned to be free1' "t'estrictions on an individual's 
liberty are thus not seen as eroding freedom. Indeed for such 
restrictions to be something more than a simple part of the indi vidual 1 s 
situation - the stuff of his projects - Sartre must allow for some 
value to be placed on socio-political freedom. In other words, for 
Sartre to say that an individual is oppressed, as opposed to simply 
existing in a situation in which his freedom of action is curtailed, he 
has to allow for some human situations to be intrinsically preferable. 
But this is precisely what Sartre does not allow for in Being and 
Nothingness. Sartre maintains that it is impossible to derive ethical 
precepts from ontology and that since there is no God - no source of 
absolute value - and no human essence to be realised, the individual 
is the only creator of value. It is only the individual in his project 
of becoming in-itself-for-itself - a project which is doomed to fail -
that value enters the world. It is for these reasons that Sartre 
claims: ".. • all human activities are egui valent it amounts to 
the same thing whether one gets drunk alone or is a leader of nations" 
(p.797, emphasis added). Thus, Sartre does not prefer some human 
situations to others, nor see some human projects of more value, and 
so there is no reason why a slave should want to rebel or a master 
morally condemned for leading a tyrannical existence. 
But, having outlined an ontology in which there is a total 
democracy of values and little reasons for political action, Sartre 
finally draws back from the grimness of his own conclusion. Although 
he previously states that "all human actions are equivalent" and that 
it is all the same whether one gets drunk alone or is the leader of 
nations, subsequently he adds: 
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If one of these activities takes precedence over the other, 
this will not be because of its real goal but because of the 
degree of consciousness which it possesses of its ideal 
goal; and in this case it will be the quietism of the solitary 
drunkard which will take precedence over the vain agitation 
of the leader of nations (p.797)o 
Sartre, for no apparent reason, claims that there is value in leading 
an authentic life - a life where one is aware of the meaning of freedom 
and accepts responsibility for one's actions. Thereafter Sartre 
proceeds to ask a series of questions on how ethics can be linked to 
ontology and concludes by promising that he shall "devote" to such 
questions "a future work" (p. 798) • 
Sartre's uneasiness with the logical conclusion of his ontology 
can partially . be explained by the historical situation. Being and 
the late 
Nothingness was begun in/19309s and published in 1944 during the German 
occupation of Paris. As we have seen, its emphasis on the freedom of 
the individual - freedom resistant even to the activities of the 
torturer - means that individuals, no matter what their situation, are 
and remain completely free. This, combined with the fact that no 
situation or action is intrinsically preferable to ~ other, means 
that Being and Nothingness could be used, albeit unwittingly, as a 
justification for the status quo. 
In The Prime of Life/~V~~uvoir tells us that she was always , 
sceptical of this aspect of Sartre vs theory: 
I maintained that from the angle of freedom as Sartre defined 
it- that is, an active transcendence of some given context· 
rather than mere stoic resignation - not every situation 
was equally valid: what sort of transcendence could a woman 
shut up in a harem achieve? Sartre replied that even such a 
cloistered existence could be lived in several quite 
different ways. I stuck to my point for a long time, and in 
the end made only a token submission. Basically I was right. 
But to defend my attitude I should have had to abandon the 
place of individual, and th~efore idealistic, morality on 
which we had set ourselves. 1 
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It was only the war, his experience of prison c~1ps, the brutality 
of fascism and the need for organised resistance which forced Sartre 
to modify aspects of his theory. Although Sartre has never formally 
rejected his ontology the difference in approach in the post-war 
period is considerable; the major difference being that he consistently 
began to take note of social reality. As Herbert Marc use points out 
with the war the changes in Sartrer s ideas were ones in which "pure 
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ontology and phenomenology recede before the invasion of real history." 
V 
Sartre has never written the promised work on existentialist 
ethics. Indeed, his adoption of Marxism ultimately rendered the question 
23 
of an individualistic ethics irrelevanto However, before Sartre became 
fully absorbed in the project of integrating existentialism and Marxism, 
he did sketch out, albeit inadequately, a framework for existentialist 
ethics. This framework is contained in a lecture he delivered in 1945 
and was published later under the title Existentialism and Humanism. 
It is first and foremost an attempt to defend existentialism against 
popular attack but it also tries to put some of the ideas of Being and 
Nothingness in less technical philosophical language. Although this 
former work is recognisably the philosophical foundation for much of 
his argument in Existentialism and Humanism,Sartre nevertheless redefines 
some of his former theory and gives it an ethical dimension. 
Sartre still begins his discussion of man with the idea that 
"existence precedes essence" - that man is nothing but what he makes 
24 
himself and that he is "condemned to be free." Moreover, Sartreis 
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individual, when confronting the extent of this freedom, still experiences 
"anguish." However, anguish has an added dimension in Sartre is thought. 
We experience anguish, he claims, because in choosing for ourselves 
we are ultimately choosing for allo In other words, our choices -
whether inconsequential or concerning the choice of our very being - is 
25 
always made with reference to an "image of man." Thus Sartre argues: 
"Everything happens to every man as though the whole human race had its 
eyes fixed upon what he is doing and regulated its conduct accordingly." 
To this extent, then, we are responsible for the existence of others. 
In Existentialism and Humanism Sartre upholds the idea that we 
26 
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can only begin a study of man with "the subjectivity of the individual" 
but profoundly modifies the ontology outlined in Being and Nothingness. 
He maintains that the Other is indispensable for a knowledge of a certain 
dimension of existence and that we live in a world of "2intersubjectivity'." 
"The intimate discovery of myself," Sartre claims, "is at the same 
time the revelation of the Other as a freedom which confronts mine, 
and which cannot think and will without doing so either for or against 
28 
me." Thus, the "we-subjec~" dismissed as "psychological" in Being 
and Nothingness, now appears as the starting point for Sartre's 
discussion of the relation between Self and Other. Concomitantly, 
the conflict earlier upheld as "the original meaning of being-for-
others" has disappeared. 
Moreover, although still identifying man with his choices, 
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Sartre defines choice in terms of "commitment.... Thus mant s choice now 
has a moral element and denotes man's freedom with reference to his 
"responsibility" to the Other. In Being and Nothingness "all human 




evaluating human actions: We~ make logical or moral judgements about 
human behaviour.. On the one hand we can judge actions to be wrong if 
they are based on "error" or "falsehood.1130 Authentic action, therefore, 
is logical and based on trutho On the other hand, Sartre claims, if 
someone wilfully deceives himself: 
oo• I can pronounce a moral judgement. For I declare that 
freedom, in respect of certain circumstances, can have no 
other end and aim but itself; and when once a man has seen 
that values depend upon himself, in that state of forsakenness 
he can will only one thing, and that is freedom as the 
foundation of all values.J1 
Thus, we see that Sartre has reworked his notion of freedom. From it 
being a simple foundation of human existence in Being and Nothingness -
something which could never be denied - it now appears as an absolute 
value. Moreover, through the introduction of the idea that oneis 
choices lead to responsibility for the existence of others, Sartre 
maintains that freedom is not something one w.i she s for oneself but for 
all others. "I cannot make liberty my aim, rr he says, "unless I make 
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that of others equally my aim." As the title of the lecture suggests 
Sartre maintains a humanist position. By defining freedom as the 
foundation of all human values, it becomes like an essence to be realisedo 
Therefore, Sartre claims that it is "by seeking, beyond himself, an aim 
which is one of liberation and of some particular realisation, that 
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man can realise himself as truly human." 
In Existentialism and Humanism Sartre is trying to solve one 
of the major problems posed by the ontology of Being and Nothingness: 
If man is free to create his own values on what criteria must he base 
his choices? However, the answer he gives in this lecture is inadequately 
formlated; Far from it being an extension of the ontology of Being 
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and Nothingness, Sartre opts for a position which he had previously 
dismissed. In upholding the notion of inter-subjectivity and in failing 
to mention the previously asserted implacability of conflict, Sartre 
himself appears guilty of the ontological and epistemological optimism 
of which he had formerly accused Hegel. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that Sartre was dissatisfied with this lecture and later considered 
it an "error. " 
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The problem of the relation between existentialist ontology and 
ethics was made redundant for Sartre with his acceptance of a Marxist 
perspective and the concomitant stress on political involvement. However, 
in the intervening period both Sartre and de Beauvoir, realising that 
existentialist ontology could be used to justify any kind of action 
and, conversely, that it is unable to discriminate between different 
types of political organisation, attempted to differentiate between 
ontological freedom and socio-political freedom. It was in the working 
out of the precise difference between these two cDnceptions of 
freedom that de Beauvoir made her mastoriginal contribution to 
existentialism, but with reference to her major work on the subject -
The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947) - a contribution which she too later 
came to regret?
5 
However, it is Sartrei s early flirtation with Marxism 
to which we nrust now turn. 
VI 
In the early period of Sartre 1 s political involvement and 
conrrni tment to Marxism he argued that socialism is "the means which will 
36 
allow for the realization of the reign of freedom," but he did not 
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wholeheartedly accept the philosophy or practice of communism. 
Sartre accepted the spirit of Marx's writings but rejected the dogmatism 
of dialectical materialism, the philosophy underlying the communism of 
the Stalinist era. In 1946 in an essay entitled ''Materialism and 
Revolution" Sartre rejects materialism while attempting to affect a 
reconciliation of Marxism and existentialismo The refutation of 
materialism is based on a number of objections. 
In the first place Sartre argues that although materialism 
rejects idealism and claims to be scientific, it is nevertheless 
metaphysical in its reduction of mind to matter. Thus, according to 
Sartre, materialists may reject idealism because it is metaphysical 
but materialism is merely a metaphysics which repudiates all metaphysics. 
Sartre also believes the fundamental premise of materialism to be 
absurd for, he asks, how can matter give ,rise to the idea of matter? 
Consciousness is not merely an object amongst other objects, as 
materialism would have it, for how then is man able to reflect on and 
grasp the complexity of the objective world? Sartre argues instead 
that mind is not reducible to matter as it is also that which gives 
meaning to the physical world and which is ultimately able to transcend 
it. Sartre further criticises materialism as it eliminates subjectivity, 
gives precedence to material objects and, in its glorification of 
"objective" scientific investigation, denies the interaction of being 
and knowing and reduces the scientist to a mere observer and receiver 
of "facts." Thus Sartre rejects materialism because it is a philosophy 
which gives freedom to things and not to man (seeing man as a prey of 
historical forces), and therefore refuses to recognise that man is a 
being of nothingness and hence the only free being. 
Sartre claims that revolutionary philosophy has no need of 
quasi-scientific theorieso His own acc~ptance of the necessity for a 
socialist revolution is thus an outcome of existentialist ethics; from 
an inspection of the social and economic order he is able to see that 
society must be changed in order to realise human freedom. Thus 
commitment to socialism need not arise from a dialectical materialist 
analysis of the course of historical development and its future outcome. 
But despite these criti~isms Sartre acknowledges that dialectical 
materialism fulfils some of the revolutionary needs of the working-class; 
that it has certain features essential for a philosophy of social change. 
However, he claims that it should simply be seen as an expedient "myth" 
which has revolutionary potential and not as an objective and scientific 
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interpretation of the world. 
These concessions to dialectical materialism notwithstanding, 
Sartre ultimately maintains that it is a flawed theory and should be 
replaced. The new philosophy would be a refinement of some Marxist 
theories yet continue to provide the philosophical basis necessary for 
revolutionary politics. According to Sartre, a revolutionar.y philosophy 
ought to demonstrate the following: that manis existence is contingent, 
not God-given (hence any social order has been established by man and 
as such is changeable by him); that the values of ~given society 
reflect its structure and tends to preserve it; and that these can 
be transcended by a new social order. Sartre proceeds to argue that 
as existentialism is able to fulfil the above criteria, it may be used 
as a revolutionary philosophy; the most important of its ideas in this 
context being, as Raymond Aron in a 1946 essay called "Sartre and the 
Marxist-Leninistsn points out: 
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••• the recognition and reflexive primacy of subjectivity, 
the fact that consciousness is perpetually unsatisfied and in 
a single movement discovers reality and wants to transcend 
itA thought is "in situation", contingent man has no raison 
d'etre, b\t3t is simply "there", values are historical, man 
is freeo 3 
Sartre thus wants to accept the revolutionary aims of Marxism 
but replace dialectical materialism with existentialism. He claims 
that existentialism, by stressing the freedom of man, solves some of 
the problems of contemporary Marxist theory. The revolutionary solution 
presupposes man's freedom to engage in revolt; that is to say, man 
must be free prior to his liberation. However, the historical 
determinism of dialectical materialism fails to take man's freedom into 
account and explains the development of revolutionary consciousness 
in terms of historical events. Man is thus viewed as an object of 
history rather than its subject, and as such even his liberation results 
from circumstances which are almost outside his control. Sartre believes 
that without a different conception of freedom, one which recognises 
the subjectivity of man, the Marxism of dialectical materialism would 
only lead to new relations between objects and at best to a more 
rational organisation of society. Thus, according to Sartre, revolutionary 
philosophy must take man's freedom into account. Instead of showing 
that capitalism is doomed because of its inherent contradictions it 
must show that man is free and creator of society and that as such he 
is able to transcend the present situation towards a different future. 
In using existentialism as a basis for revolutionary action, 
however, one is only faced with the idea that dramatic social change 
is possible because man is free to determine his own social organisation. 
Indeed Sartre's notion of change in this respect is similar to the 
Utopian socialists, criticised by Engels in his book Socialism: Utopian 
61 
(1875) 
and Scientific/ who believe that the force of reason will urge people 
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into changing the society in which they live. Utopian socialists tend 
to view revolution as the result of ideas - in Sartre's case it is the 
idea that man's ontological freedom must be concretised and given true 
expression in a socialist society which is seen as the driving force 
of the revolution. Scientific socialists, on the contrary, claim 
that they analyse histor.y and from the elucidation of its historical 
"laws" are able to see how society is developing. It is the historical 
situation which therefore gives rise to the idea of revolution, not 
the idea of revolution which in itself urges people to revolt. Thus 
we see that in this fundamental respect there is a wide divergence 
between Sartreis notions of revolution and those of historical and 
dialectical materialists. And so there is no reason to believe that 
Sartreis ideas, like those of Utopian socialists, should not be summarily 
dismissed by Marxists, in as much as he is only interested in the idea 
of socialism without understanding history or the mechanics of social 
change. 
For other reasons, Raymond Aron believes that the gulf between 
Sartre and Marxism is so great that one cannot remain an existentialist 
and become a Marxist and that the opposite is true. He maintains that 
any similarities between these two theories are due to little more 
40 
than the "residuum of an anthropology derived from He gel.'' As such 
these similarities are not enough to affect a synthesis of Marxism and 
existentialismo One basic difference between the two which Aron points 
out is that in Marxist thought history is viewed as a creative process 
in which contradictions are resolved. In Being and Nothingness, on the 
other hand, history is viewed as a series of failures. "The history of 




Aron also indicates that in Marxism work is the essence of man 
and the relation between man and Nature is a fundamental and determining 
relationship affecting the mode of production and hence the superstructure 
and relations between men. In contrast, work is of little significance 
in Being and Nothingness. Although work could be integrated with some 
of the ideas there, Aron claims that in one crucial respect it could 
not be accommodated as a key concept. In Marxism work is the source 
of fundamental conflict between men, whereas ±n Sartre' s philosophy 
conflict is due to the "ontological separation" of consciousnesses 
which means such conflict is an eternal feature of human interaction. 
In the 1946 essay Sartre does, however, emphasise the importance 
of work. But this makes him little more than an "ouvrieriste." He 
maintains: ". o. work is, among other things, a direct link between man 
and the Universe. Man~s hold on Nature and, at the same time, a 
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primary kind of relation between men." Moreover, the revolutionary 
(who Sartre defines as one who "belongs to those who work for the 
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dominant class") hopes "that the relationships of solidarity which he 
maintains with other workers will become the very model of human 
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relationships." Work has additional importance, Sartre claims, because 
it is "stolen" from man and prohibits him from feeling ";:;olidari ty with 
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the society for which he produce~" In a word, it is the core of man's 
"oppression." Echoing He gel, Sartre also claims that work "offers 
the beginning of concrete liberation": 
••• it is, first of all, the negation of the accidental and 
capricious order that is the master's. The victim at work ••• 
is no longer at the mercy of someone~s humour. • •• his work 
bestows mastery over things upon him; the determinism of 
matter gives him his first picture of his freedom. • •• by 
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bestowing upon him sovereignty over objects and a 
specialist is autonomy ovE[6 which the master has no power 
(work) liberates him •••• 
But such an emphasis on work is not structurally linked to the ontology 
of Being and Nothingness. It appears to have been tacked on to his 
philosophy because it is necessar.y for his credentials. as a Marxist. 
Likewise the revolution which he urges has little connection to his 
"phenomenological essay on ontology. n It does not appear to solve the 
problems of the conflict between Self and Other or the relations between 
the for-itself and the in-itself. As the central problem for Sartre 
in Being and Nothingness concerns the solitary consciousness and his 
relations to others and the physical world, in his terms socialism 
seems little more than humanist wishful-thinking, a form of bad-faith. 
Moreover in placing such an emphasis on the individual, the 
main tenets of socialism - the notion of collective action and salvation 
by history - do not square with the very basis of Sartre's philosophy. 
His subsequent commitment to revolution is thus not in harmony with 
the early philosophy and as this has not been properly amended or 
discarded, socialism is only an arbitrary goal to be fought for by 
the socially committed individualo 
In later writings, Sartre resolves some of the problems inherent 
in the project of integrating existentialism and Marxism. In Cri tigue 
of Dialectical Reason (1960), he bases the idea of fundamental 
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conflict between individuals on "scarcity." In other words, he maintains 
this idea of conflict but replaces an idealist (ontological) explanation 
with a materialist one. As conflict is something rooted in man's 
natural environment it now may be overcome by human action. However, 
before this later stage in his development, Aron is certainly able to 
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justify the claim: "(Sartre~s) existentialism presents itself as a 
revolutionary doctrine, but it leaves the particular content, the 




The purpose of this assessment of Sartre's philosophical 
development up to the late 1940's has been to provide the theoretical 
background required to analyse The Second Sex. As we shall see, de 
Beauvoiris theoretical perspective is similar to Sartreis in several 
fundamental respects. She uses the ontology of Being and Nothingness 
) 
which means that she equates human existence with freedom and postulates 
a fundamental conflict between individualso However, freedom is not 
simply the foundation of man's being for, in line with existentialist 
ethics, it is also a value which man must realise. Superimposed on 
this ontology and ethics is a commitment to socialism - a coiJI!Oitment 
which is little more than an abstract belief in the idea of revolutionary 
social change. 
As we shall see, in following Sartre in this way de Beauvoir r s 
theory manifests many of the contradictions and problems inherent in 
his thought o 
6.5 
Chapter Four 
Hegelian and Sartrian Concepts in "The Second Sex" 
In this chapter we shall see how de Beauvoir portrays the 
essentially negative aspects of the feminine candi tion in a number of 
different ways. De Beauvoirian woman is not simply restricted by man, 
1 
she is also nalienated" and dehumanised. As we shall also see, in 
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atomising the negative characteristics of woman's situation, de Beauvoir 
borrows a number of concepts from Hegel and Sartre. 
I 
A fundamental premise of The Second.Sex is the Hegelian idea 
that "the subject can be posed only in being opposed - he sets himself 
up as the essential, as opposed to the other, the inessential, the 
object" (p. 1 7) •2 In other words, de Beauvoir claims that "Otherness is 
a fundamental category of human thought" and that there is a 11fundamental 
hostility" (p.17) between erlstents. However, as de Beauvoir argues 
that the Other 11 sets up a reciprocal claim" (po17) to the status of 
sovereign subject there is usually reciprocity between individuals and 
groups. For example, foreigners abroad view the inhabitants as "Others" 
but they are ultimately forced to realise that they too are seen in 
this alien, hostile wayo But although de Beauvoir maintains that there 
is a natural reciprocity between individuals and groups she claims that 
this is not true of the relations between man and woman. She argues 
that the two sexes cannot be viewed as polar opposites both with a 
claim to sovereignty for man is defined as both male and neutral - the 
absolute human type thus being masculine - and woman is defined :in 
relation to him. Aristotle, for example, believed woman to be an 
imperfect male; Rousseau claimed "but for her sex a woman is a man"; 
and more recently Freud defined her as a "castrated" male o And 
these are all definitions which in themselves illustrate de Beauvoir's 
notion that between man and woman "he is the subject, he is the Absolute 
she is the Other" (po16). 
According to de Beauvoir's theory, the peculiarity of the male-
female relationship has its roots in woman's attitude to mano Man Vs 
view of woman is in harmony with what de Beauvoir considers the normal 
aspirations of the subject; it is the absence of woman's corresponding 
claim to the status of essential which is significant. Indeed de Beauvoir 
argues that woman must actually see man as "the Other" but that her 
attitude is not "thoroughly subjective" since she also sees herself as 
the "inessential" (p. 251 ) o Woman vs acceptance of man's claim to 
sovereignty and her relegation to the status of "Other" may be seen in 
the fact that although Aristotle defined woman as an imperfect male, she 
3 
does not view man as an imperfect female. 
For de Beau voir, then, "the drama of woman" is to be found in 
the ontological structure of the subject who always sees the Self as 
essential and the realities of a world in which she "chooses" to define 
herself as the inessential. In other words, one of the tragic aspects 
of the feminine condition is that woman adopts as her own self -image 
something which is alien and at odds with her actual subjectivity. 
The idea that woman sees herself in an alien light brings us 
to the way in which de Beauvoir infuses the notion of woman as "Other" 
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with Sartrian ontology. De Beau voir portrays the feminine condition 
as essentially alienating and suggests that there are two courses of 
action open to woman. On the one hand, woman can try to live in 
accordance with the definition of the "true" woman and accept herself 
as an "alien" Other. On the other hand, she can reject this definition 
of femininity and, being true to her own subjectivity, assert her 
sovereignty. However, since it is across the meaning of femininity 
injected into the world by men in patriarchal society that woman must 
live her life, she is still bound to feel alienated; her actions will 
be transformed into something alien by the "look" of the Other. Thus 
her attempt to assert her sovereignty may simply be interpreted as the 
result of "penis envy" and so her authentically subjective action is 
distorted and she is presented an alien image of herself. 
De Beauvoir defines this aspect of the feminine condition in 
4 
terms reminiscent of Sartre in Anti-Semite and.Jew (1946). In this book 
Sartre describes how the anti-Semite's definition of "Jewishness" 
leads the Jew to assume a "phantom personality, at once strange and 
familiar, that haunts him and which is nothing but himself - himself as 
5 
others see him." Sartre acknowledges that, according to his own 
theoretical perspective, this is largely characteristic of the fundamental 
relation between Self and Other. However, he adds that the Jew is in 
an especially difficult situation in as much as "the Jew has a personality 
like the rest of us, and on top of that he is Jewish. It amounts in 
a sense to a doubling of the fundamental relationship with the Other." 
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And thus, adds Sartre, "the Jew is 'over determined w • " The over-determination 
of which Sartre writes is in a sense "overalienation" in that the Jew' s 
self-image is hideously transformed by the anti-Semitic Other. Indeed 
whether the Jew accepts or rejects this definition is irrelevant, since 
he is nevertheless forced to live his life with reference to it. 
Woman and Jew may be similar in this respect but, according to 
de Beauvoir's theory, the subjugation of woman differs from other oppressed 
groups. It is particularly paradoxical since the couple is really "an 
original Mitsein" (p.67). In other words, it is especially strange 
that women should have an inessential status in a world where the sexes 
are interdependent - dependent on one another for reproduction. De 
Beauvoir claims, however, that despite this reciprocal bond women have 
never made contracts or exchanges with men on an equal basis but, as 
the anthropologist Levi-Strauss maintains, are themselves used as a 
means of exchange between men: '"The reciprocal bond basic to marriage, nr 
quotes de Beauvoir, "'is not set up between men and women but between 
men and men by means of women, who are only the principal occasion for 
7 
it'" (p.103). 
It is this notion of woman as "Other" and the lack of reciprocity 
underlying the male-female relationship which is the keystone of de 
Beauvoir's theory in The Second Sex. Thus, as we shall see, de Beauvoir's 
main purpose is to discover the reason for woman's acceptance of herself 
as "the Other." 
II 
The idea that woman chooses to accept herself as "Other" is 
fnndamental to de Beauvoir' s theory and is Sartrian in so far as she 
defines the individual as a being of transcendence who continually 
manifests his freedom and autonomy of choice. Thus the human being is 
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unable to deny his subjectivity or "to relinquish his transcendence" 
(p o467). Thus when discussing man 1 s desire for woman to be 11 the Other" 
de Beauvoir maintains: " ••• but all existents remain subjects, try 
as they will to deny themselves. Man wants woman to be object: she 
makes herself object)at the very moment when she does that, she is 
exercising a free activity" (p.626). Following Sartre de Beauvoir also 
claims: "An existent is nothing other than what he does; the possible 
does not extend beyond the real, essence does not precede existence: 
in pure subjectivity, the human being is not anything. He is to be 
measured by his acts" (p.287). In other words, in de Beauvoir' s theory 
action is what grounds the human being and his consciousness in the 
world; it is this which reveals him as a free being and which reveals 
the nature of his choice of being. 
De Beauvoir's previously outlined assertion that the fundamental 
relation between Self and Other is one of conflict, not only corresponds 
to an aspect of Hegelian philosophy but is also a premise of Being and 
Nothingness. Thus de Beauvoir echoes Sartre when she writes: "Every 
human relationship implies conflictrr (p.369). However, as de Beauvoir 
wrote The Second Sex in 1947 by this time both she and Sartre had come 
8 
to believe that conflict in human relations could and should be overcome. 
This means that the theory underlying The Second Sex is not simply 
based on Being and Nothingness but is combined with the later existentialist 
ethics of the post-war era? The ethical perspective de Beauvoir adopts 
is one in which freedom is the foundation of all value and in which 
the authentic individual is one who attempts to give concrete meaning 
both to his own freedom and to others'. This reliance on existentialist 
ethics is explicitly, albeit hastily, acknowledged by de Beau voir in 
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her introduction to The Second Sex when she attempts to dismiss the 
arguments of those who, in opposition to herJ would claim that women are 
contented with their lot: 
••• our perspective is that of existentialist ethics. Ever.y 
subject plays its part as such specifically through exploits 
or projects that serve as a mode of transcendence; he achieves 
liberty only through a continual ;·eaching out towards other 
libertieso There is no justification for present existence 
other than its expansion into an i21defini tely open future. 
Every time transcendence falls back into immanence, stagnation, 
there is a degradation of existence into the "en-soi" - the 
brutish life of subjection to given conditions - and of 
liberty into constraint and immanence (pp.28-9). 
For de Beauvoir the past and present situation of women is the 
epitome of such degraded existence. Indeed along with the idea that 
the tragedy of woman is to be found in her status of "Other:.·r• there 
is the notion that the essence of woman's degradation is that she is 
continually confined to a world of immanence and is deprived of the 
opportunity to use her liberty authentically. De Beauvoir argues that 
human existence is composed of transcendent and immanent components 
and that it is in this division which sexual inequality has its roots. 
Therefore while marriage based on woman's domestic servitude allows 
man to confine himself to a world in which he can be totally transcendent, 
in touch with the future, woman's domestic and maternal role imprisons 
her in tasks which merely perpetuate the given. The concept of oppression 
used by de Beauvoir in The Ethics of Ambiguity fits precisely the way 
in which she dichotomises the sexes: "Oppression divides the world into 
two clans: those who enlighten mankind by thrusting it ahead of 
itself and those who are condemned to mark time endlessly in order 
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merely to support the collectivityo ..• ~ 
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Because woman is confined to this kind of ille she becomes 
dependent on man and tries to justify her existence through his. 
Dependence is, in fact, the essential ingredient in de Beauvoir's 
description of woman's relation to man. Thus de Beauvoir claims that 
with woman "dependency is interiorised"; that "she is a slave even when 
she behaves with apparent freedom" (p .,500). De Beau voir argues that 
woman's dependence on man is a further example of the unreciprocal 
nature of the male-female relationship. Man is for woman "the meaning, 
the justification of her existence," but for him she is simply "an 
a.rrru.sement, a pleasure, •o• an inessential boon." As the relationship 
between man and woman has by no means the same significance in each of 
their lives, de Beauvoir adds that "the exchange ••• is not of equal 
value" (p. 731). In an evocative passage de Beauvoir outlines the way 
in which woman's dependence on man is manifest in the fact that she 
spends her life "waiting": 
In a sense her whole existence is waiting, since she is 
confined in the limbo of irrnnanence and contingence, and since 
her justification is always in the hands of others. She 
awaits the homage, the approval of men, she awaits love, she 
awaits the gratitude and praise of her husband or her lover. 
She awaits her support, which comes from man; whether she keeps 
the cheque-book or merely gets a weekly or monthly allowance 
from her husband, it is necessary for him to have drawn his 
pay or obtained that rise. o.. She waits for man to put in 
an appearance, since her economic dependence places her at his 
disposal; she is on~ one element in masculine life while man 
is her whole existenceo The husband has his occupations 
outside the home, and the wife has to put up with his absence 
all day long; the lover - passionate as he may be - is the one 
who decides on their meetings and separations in accordance 
with his obligations. In bed, she awaits the male's desire, 
she awaits- sometimes anxiously- her own pleasure (p.621). 
In harmony with the position she adopted in The Ethics of 
Ambiguity de Beauvoir maintains that if the kind of contingent, immanent 
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existence typical of woman's lot is imposed on a person then it 
constitutes "oppression" and that if it is freely chosen or consented 
to then it "represents a moral fault" (p.29). Moreover de Beauvoir 
follows Sartre and maintains that although this situation is in fact 
the frustration of human freedom, both the "anguish of solitude" 
(p.298) and the terrifying extent of human freedom may lead an individual 
into acts of deliberate self-deception. In other words an individual 
may be tempted to live a life of bad faith in which he tries to flee 
the responsibility concomitant with freedom and be "petrified into a 
thing" (p. 296). Because the kind of life which woman leads can be 
interpreted in two ways - either as oppression or as bad faith - one 
of de Beauvoiris central concerns is to establish the extent to which 
woman is refused the opportunity for transcendence and the extent to 
which she deliberately foregoes liberty and unethically attempts to 
become a thing simply acted upon by others. Conversely de Beauvoir also 
tries to show whether man in his relationship with woman inauthentically 
uses her to flee certain aspects of the human condition. 
In The Second Sex, then, de Beauvoir must account not only for 
why woman accepts herself as "the Othe:r;" but also why she does not rebel 
against the innnanence and futility of feminine existence. In the 
ensuing chapters much of our attention will be focussed on de Beauvoir's 
explanation. Without pre-en:q:>ting such a studY) a preliminary point 
must be made concerning de Beauvoir' s view of the nature of subjectivity. 
De Beauvoir uses a number of different notions of subjectivity. 
On the one hand she argues that the existent must be involved in certain 
forms of action before he comes to see himself as a human being. Thus, 
following Hegel,she asserts: "There is in every consciousness an 
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aspiration towards subjectivity, but it can take affinnative action 
only in risking itself" (p. 240). Elsewhere de Beauvoir argues that it 
is objectification which is necessary for self-awareness: An argument 
most succinctly expressed in the claim: "The existent succeeds in 
finding himself only in estrangement, in alienation; he seeks through 
the world to find himself in some shape, other than himself • • • (p. 88). 
As we shall see, it is this idea that one must alienate oneself in 
something in order to find oneself> which underlies much of the 
significance de Beauvoir attributes to such things as labour, private 
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property, the penis and manYs desire to possess woman. The superiority 
of the male in de Beauvoir's theory is thatJfor a variety of reasons) 
he has been able to gain through the processes of "affirmative action" 
and "alienation" a sense of his own existence as a sovereign individual. 
Conversely various facets of the situation of de Beauvoirian woman 
deprives her of such self-realisation. 
In The Second Sex,co-existing uneasily with this idea that there 
are certain pre-conditions for the emergence of human consciousness 
proper, is de Beau voir 1 s notion that a human being simply is a human 
being; that no development is necessar.y and that it is impossible to 
escape a properly subjective attitude. Thus although the general drift 
of de Beauvoir~s argument is that woman is deprived of the opportunity 
to assert herself as a human being, at other points she maintains 
that "woman is a subject - a fellow human being" (p.283). In this 
light her humanity is defined with reference to the fact that she feels 
an urge "to surpass herself" (p.,96 ) and not that she actual=!-y reaps 
the benefits of such transcendence. 
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III 
So far, then, we have established the tenor of de Beauvoir's 
theory of woman's situation and what she hopes to ex:plain in the course 
of her study. But before we begin the detailed examination of de 
Beauvoir's theor.y, we must know something of how de Beauvoir approaches 
the subject. 
In The Second Sex de Beauvoir divides the subject matter into 
two distinct parts. The first volume entitled "Facts and Myths" deals 
with those factors which make the feminine condition- biology, history, 
myth - and she evaluates the contribution made by psychoanalysis and 
historical materialism to the assessment of these "objective" factors. 
The second volume is called 'rwoman 1 s Life Today" and is concerned with 
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how woman responds to her feminine role. It examines woman's experience 
of childhood, adolescence, maternity and other aspects of feminine 
existence and also how, by becoming a career woman, a lesbian or a 
mystic, for example, individual women choose to deal with their womanly 
roleo Together these two volumes analyse what in the Sartrian sense 
is woman's "situation." 
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Part III 
THE SOURCES OF WOMANWS OPPRESSION 
Chapter Five 
Biology 
In The Prime of Life de Beauvoir claims of The Second Sex: 
••• what distinguishes my thesis from the traditional one 
is that, as far as I'm concerned, femininity is neither a 
natural nor an innate entity, but rather a condition brought 
about by society on the basis of certain physiological 
characteristics. 1 
So let us begin our stuqy of de Beauvoir 1 s theory of the sources of 
woman's oppression by examining what significance she attributes to 
biology. In subsequent chapters we shall look at the relationships 
with men and with children which woman forms as a result of her 
reproductive role~ Therefore in this chapter we shall concentrate on 
the biological givens of femininity and the limitations these place on 
a woman's lifeo To make sense of this, however, we must first know 
something of de Beauvoir's concept of the biological basis for sexual 
division. 
At the very outset of the chapter on biology in The Second Sex 
de Beauvoir devotes a few pages to examining the relationship between 
reproduction and sexual bifurcation. Ultimately she concludes that as 
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both parthenogenesis and hermaphroditism would permit reproduction trthe 
perpetuation of the species does not necessitate sexual differentiation" 
(p.39). Indeed de Beauvoir claims that the division into male and 
female is not biologically necessary and so must simply be taken as 
an "irreducible fact of observation" (p.37) o In other words, sexual 
bifurcation may not be necessary for reproduction but it is nevertheless 
part of the nature of our being. It is because de Beauvoir accepts 
such bifurcation as an "irreducible>" if contingent, aspect of our 
biological existence that she begins her inquiry into the origins of 
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woman as Other by examining the facts of biology. 
Following Sartre de Beauvoir argues that the human body is "the 
instrument of our grasp upon the world" (p.65). The importance of the 
body can be seen only with reference to our freely chosen projects. Thus, 
to use one of Sartre'l s examples, it is only because an individual wants 
to climb a mountain that his or her physiological incompetence for such 
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a task acquires its relevance. Weaimess, like any other aspect of 
human anatomy, gains its meaning within a world of human actions and 
values. Moreover, as the body in such an e.xistentialist perspective is 
simply an instrument, linked inexorably to our projects, it has by 
itself no power to shape or determine our lives. 
Although such a concept of the bod.yis insignificance ostensibly 
underpins de Beauvoir'ls theory in The Second Sex her general attempt to 
understand the relevance of sexual bodies to the human male and female 
runs counter to it; for de Beauvoir tries to see how biology has 
contributed to woman's oppression by examining the roles assigned to the 
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sexes in animal species. In leaving the human realm, where an e.xistentialist 
concept of the body makes sense, de Beauvoir enters a world where it 
is more relevant to discuss what is biologically given than freely 
chosen projects and values. As we shall see, de Beauvoir portr~s woman's 
body not as an "instrument" - the wa:y of acting on the world - but as 
a prison which keeps her at an animal level of life; and as a prison it 
is something which must be broken out of before woman can become a 
proper human being. However, to understand why de Beauvoir adopts such 
a perspective we must first outline what she sees as the distinguishing 
features of masculine and feminine biology o 
I 
Although de Beauvoir concludes in The Second Sex that there 
are no essential differences between the sexe~ in her section on 
biology she uses a rigorous dichotomy of masculinity and femininity. 
Thus de Beauvoir argues that biological masculinity and femininity 
represent two "diverse" aspects of life. In order to express such 
sexual bifurcation de Beauvoir does not use the common dichotomy of 
activity-passivity, but her own one of "maintenance and creation" (po52).3 
It is the female who represents the former aspect of life and the male 
who represents the latter in de Beauvoiris theory. Thus, for example, 
theorising on the role each sex plays in conception de Beauvoir claims; 
"it is the male element which provides the stimuli needed for evoking 
new life and it is the female element that enables this to be lodged in 
a stable organism" (po45). In the higher primates the dichotomy of 
maintaining-creating can, according to de Beau voir, be seen in the 
female's physiological subservience to materni~ and in the maleis role 
in intercourse. In other words, he initiates the act which creates a 
new being while she maintains the existence of the new life which has 
been created. 
De Beauvoir, however, claims that it is really only in "higher 
forms of life" (p.51) that the sexual dichotomy is very clearly defined. 
And for de Beauvoir the major distinguishing feature between higher and 
lower forms of life is that in the former there is some degree of 
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individualisation within the species. Thus although she argues that 
both male and female animals are at one and the same time particular 
individuals and members of a specie~ she also claims that the difference 
between male and female in the higher primates is that whereas he is 
able to act as an individual, the female is frequently required to 
renounce her individuality for the benefit of the race. This means that 
although both sexes participate in reproduction there is a major 
difference in their role. In humans, for example, man "recovers his 
individuality the moment he transcends it" (p.54) in as much as his role 
in procreation need not extend beyond intercourse, whereas for women 
intercourse marks simply the beginning of her"subservience" (p.)2) to 
maternity and hence to the species. Indeed de Beauvoir claims that 
women like most female animals are "victims" (po52) of the biological 
process. 
As we shall appreciate more fully below) according to de 
Beauvoiris philosophical perspective, the male's role in reproduction 
puts him in a privileged position because his subjectivity and indiv-
iduality are integrated with his reproductive role. Although his body 
is also the vehicle for the continuation of Life, and he is thus 
to some extent controlled by external powers, the sexual role which he 
has been assigned actually encourages his transcendence - he has been 
endowed with a superior physique and he can assert his dominance through 
coitus. In short, de Beauvoir claims that manvs sexual role encourages 
him to reach out towards the world and to put his subjective aspirations 
to the test. 
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In de Beauvoir's theory woman's role in reproduction is quite 
different from maniso While he is able to maintain or extend his humanity 
in reproduction, woman feels hemmed in by the fulfilment of her reproductive 
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role. Indeed throughout The Second Sex de Beauvoir continually 
emphasises the negative and alienating features of woman's biology. 
The definition of the concept of alienation used by de Beauvoir in this 
context is best summarised in the statement: nwoman, like man, is her 
body; but her body is something other than herself" (po61)- where what 
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is rralien" and "othern to woman is the invading species. Thus the 
essentially alienating aspect of femininity for de Beauvoir is that 
woman 1 s trphysiological nature is very complex: she herself submits to it 
as to some rigmarole from outside; her body does not seem to her to be 
a clear expression of herself; within it s:h_e feels herself a stranger" 
(p.286)., 
At one point in The Second Sex de Beauvoir implies that woman's 
feelings of alienation are not due to actual physiological conditions 
but to the way in which woman's bodily functions are seen in patriarchal 
society. Woman trbecomes a stranger to herself,rr writes de Beauvoir, 
"because she is a stranger to the rest of the worldtr (p.353). However, 
despite this claimJde Beauvoir does not generally link womanis feelings 
of estrangement to cultural factors for in her theory they emanate from 
woman 9 s experience of her reproductive functions. As such alienation 
is linked to womanis biolog~ it is particularly acute, according to de 
Beauvoir, during woman 9s reproductive years and at various stages of the 
reproductive process., Thus in comparison with the menopausal woman who 
feels at one with her body, de Beauvoir claims that it is the menstruating 
woman who experiences her body trmost painfully as an obscure, alien 
thing" (p.61 ) .. 
However, despite de Beauvoiris claim that alienation is most 
acutely felt in menstruation, her descript~ons of womanYs experience of 
pregnancy indicate that this is by far ·the most alienating experience 
for a womano Indeed de Beauvoir maintains that from the moment of 
conception women "have within them a hostile element - it is the species 
gnawing at their vitals" (p.63). It is important to note here the 
vocabulary which de Beauvoir uses to describe the foetus and woman's 
experience of pregnancy: the woman, a "mere plaything of obscure forces" 
(p .512) is "tenanted,'' "possessed>" "absorbed}' and "ensnared" by the 
foetus which is frequently described as a "little strange~" an "intruder" 
and a "parasite" (pp. 53ff and pp. 512 ff). Indeed de Beauvoir 
particularly takes issue with doctors who "state that the foetus forms 
a part of the motheris boqy, that it is not a parasite living at the 
latter 1 s expense" (p .504). Moreover as de Beauvoir maintains in another 
passage in The Second Sex that "every parasite is an exploiter" (p.626) 
we must conclude that in de Beauvoir's theory woman is not ohly alienated 
but also exploited in her reproductive roleo 
It must be pointed out, however, that although de Beauvoir 
portrays pregnancy as the source of much of the alienation experienced 
by women, she also tries to show how it may be experienced in a positive 
manner. Nevertheless, as the following quotation demonstrates, the 
positive feelings appear to be outweighed by the negative, alienating 
response which de Beauvoir believes is evoked by the pregnant woman's 
condition: 
But pregnancy is above all a drama that is acted out within 
the woman herself. She feels it as at once an enrichment and 
an injury; the foetus is part of her body, and it is a parasite 
that feeds on it; she possesses it, and she is possessed by 
it; it represents the future and, carrying it, she feels 
herself vast as the world; but this very opulence annihilates 
her, she feels that she herself is no longer anything. A new 
life is going to manifest itself and justify its own separate 
existence, she is proud of it; but she also feels herself tossed 
and driven, the plaything of obscure forces •••• The transcendence 
of the artisan, of the man of action, contains the element of 
subjectivity; but in the mother-to-be the antithesis of subject 
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and object ceases to exist; she and the child with which she 
is swollen make up together an equivocal pair overwhelmed by 
life. Ensnared by nature, the pregnant woman is plant and 
animal, a storehouse of colloids, an incubator, an egg; she 
scar~s children who are proud of their young, straight bodies 
and makes young people titter contemptuously because she is a 
human being, a conscious and free individual, who has become 
lifeWs passive instrument (pp.512-513). 
Leaving aside for the moment the question of womanis alienation 
in pregnancy and menstruation, it is important to point out here that 
this concept of alienation also applies in The Second Sex to de Beauvoir's 
descriptions of woman 9s experience of sexual intercourse although this 
is not so specifically spelled out. Thus, whereas the male in coitus 
can use his body actively as a means of expressing his will, of trans-
cending himself in action, de Beauvoir portrays woman as a mere 
receptacle whose "inwardness is violated" (p.53) in the sexual act: 
She submits to the coition, which invades her individuality 
and introduces an alien element through penetration and internal 
fertilisation o •• the sexual adventure is immediately experienced 
by her as an interior event and not as an outward relation to 
the world and to others (p.54). 
Such a description of womanis experience of sexual intercourse seems, 
in de Beauvoir's terms, to be based on a concept of alienation in that 
not only is woman unable to express herself through her body but also 
she is used as a vehicle for another's desireso In menstruation or 
pregnancy it is Nature or the foetus which takes woman over: in sexuality 
it is man. 
For de Beauvoir the negative aspects of feminine biology are not 
simply due to the fact that woman is the "prey" of external forcesJ for 
a number of other factors are involved. For example, de Beauvoir believes 
that females are the weaker sex and that this is quite apparent in both 
Homo sapiens and most animal species. This idea is best summarised by 
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de Beauvoir in her definition of the mal~ for she claims that he is 
"in general larger than the female) st...ronger, swifter, more adventurous" 
(p.56)o Indeed not only does de Beauvoir believe that the ver.y structure 
of masculinity and femininity gives him a physiological advantage but 
also she claims that the reproductive process tips the balance further 
in his favour. Thus de Beauvoir describes gestation as a "fatiguing 
task" (pe62) of no individual benefit to the woman and claims that "in 
natural circumstances" childbirth "often brings about the death of 
5 
either the mother or the child" (po521). Underlying de Beauvoir' s 
comments on womanY s reproductive role is the idea that woman is "handicapped" 
by her biology and that maternity naturally "dooms woman to a sedentary 
e:rlstence" (p.100); that it curtails her activity and subsequently renders 
her dependent on men. Consequently de Beauvoir claims that even if 
women were as strong as men (a question which she does not even raise 
in the section on biology and only later refers to in passing in her 
historical account) "the bondage of reproduction" originally must have 
been "a terrible handicap in the struggle against a hostile world" (p.94). 
The biological disadvantages of being female and their implications 
for a woman• s life are not merely confined in de Beauvoir' s system to 
sheer physical capacity. \Joman is not simply enfe ~bled by an inferior 
physique, she has also what de Beauvoir calls a " 'hysterical' body" 
(po356)- a body which is characterised principally by its instability. 
There is an in-built emotionalism, de Beauvoir claims, which means that 
"women are subject to such displays of agitation as tears, hysterical 
laughter and nervous crises" (p.64). Such alleged instability is closely 
linked in de Beauvoir's theor.y with menstruation which she describes in 
the following way: "Menstruation is painful: headaches, over-fatigue, 
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abdominal pains make normal activities distressing or impossible; 
psychic difficulties often appear; nervous and irritable, a woman may 
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be temporarily in a state of semi-lunacy ••• (p.353). 
With the physical weakness which de Beauvoir believes to flow 
from womanis musculature and condition of pregnancy we have little 
difficulty in interpreting its precise meaning, for it is obviously 
presented as part of the physiological basis of femininity: but with 
the concept of psychological weakness two different explanations are 
possible,and both are given in The Second Sex. In the chapter called 
"The Data of Biology" de Beauvoir explains the physical and psychological 
changes arising with menstruation as the result of hormonal reactions 
and claims that such distressing symptoms affect most of the female sex. 
However, in a later chapter, from which the above quotation is drawn, the 
distressing symptoms of menstruation are claimed to be "brought on by a 
psychic state" (p .356) and it would thus appear that to understand this 
apparent contradiction we should interpret the actual organic conditions 
as evoked by the workings of the mind. Indeed although de Beauvoir 
maintains that biological femininity requires the female to renounce 
her individualit.r, she nevertheless maintains that such renunciation is 
not easily made. The conflict between the female is own interests and 
those of the species lead to organic resistance and hence, according 
to de Beauvoir, to the fragility of constitution associated with 
femininity. De Beau voir in fact maintains that it is in human beings, 
the most individualised of all mammalian species, that the enslavement 
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of the female to reproduction is the most intense and the most unwillingly 
accepted. Thus, for example, in an attempt to interpret the alleged 
higher death statistics of pubescent girls de Beauvoir claims: "Not 
without resistance does the body of women permit the species to take 
... 
over; and this struggle is weakening and dangerous" (p .59). For 
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similar kinds of reasons de B:;auvoir also claims that almost all 
spontaneous miscarriages are of psychic origin" (p .516) and that morning 
siclmess "is the revolt of the organism against the invading species" 
6 
(po62). 
So far we have encountered a number of negative features of fem-
inine existence attributed by de Beauvoir to womanis biology. Leaving 
aside the way in which biology has affected the development of woman as 
a human being, these negative features may be expressed simply as follows: 
alienation; weakness and dependency; and a number of other factors such 
as morning sickness linked to the resistance of woman 1 s body. As de 
Beauvoir does not believe that woman's subservience to man or the species 
is inevitable, we must establish the extent to which de Beauvoir believes 
these negative aspects of biological femininity may be overcome. 
· II 
In the introduction to this chapter it was claimed that although 
de Beauvoir conceptualises the body as an "instrument," her description 
of woman's experience of biological femininity leads us to see womanis 
boqy as a prisono In short, we come to see womanis boqy as something 
which leads to the curtailment of her activities and to a sense of 
estrangement. However, as de Beauvoir follows Merleau Ponty in his 
belief that human beings are not "a natural species but a historical 
idea" (p .. 66), she maintains that woman cannot be defined with reference 
to her biological characteristics) for it is her "possibilities which 
must be considered" (p o 66). In other words, as woman is a human being 
she is a "becoming" (p.66), an existent with no fixed, unchangeable 
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essence. Thus de Beauvoir maintains that even though "the enslavement 
to the species and the limitations of her various powers are extremely 
important facts" (pa69), biology is not absolute. That is to say, 
biology is mediated by conscious acts and so gains significance only 
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in the human context in which it is revealed. The significance of 
femininity and the restrictions which de Beauvoir claims it has historically 
imposed on woman may therefore be altered by conscious human acts. 
However, although de Beauvoir claims that there is nothing "fixed" 
(p. 65ro about woman t s biolog:)lj we must be somewhat sceptical of her 
alleged rejection of the absolute significance of biological phenomena. 
In this instance·manifestations of biology, such as woman's role in 
maintaining the species, are associated too closely with de Beauvoir's 
absolute values of creativity and transcendence. Thus as de Beauvoir 
believes that pregnancy confines woman to immanence arid as, according to 
her existentialist ethics, immanence means "a degradation of existence 
into the en-soi - the brutish life of subjection to given conditions" 
(p.29), then there seems to be little sense in which the actual significance 
of biology in this instance may be radically altered by human values. 
This point is particularly relevant to de BeauvoirY s concepts of 
feminine weakness and maternity. 
At one point in The Second Sex de Beauvoir argues that woman's 
wea.Imess is not in itself "bad" as it is merely part of her biological 
existence and thus part of the basis on which she builds her life 
within a given social and economic context. But despite this claim, 
within de Beauvoir' s framework of existentialist ethics there is the 
view that so long as feminine weakness forces woman into a dependent 
and immanent existence) such weakness will always have negative characteristics. 
Thus de Beauvoiris statement that "the concept of weakness can be defined 
p 
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only with reference to existentialist, economic and moral considerations" 
(p.67) cannot be interpreted to mean that with different human values 
woman'~ s weakness and its manifestations in dependency could become "good..'4 
It merely means that the impact of woman 'l s biology could be changed by 
technological innovation, different economic and social structures and 
a new set of attitudes on the part of both women and men. 
A similar kind of argument is applicable to de Beau voir w s view 
of maternity; that is, although aspects of womanis reproductive role could 
be changed by technology and economics, according to de Beauvoir matenity 
itself will never possess much human value. Indeed in The Second Sex 
de Beauvoir quite clear~ rules out the possibility of childbirth being 
a transcendent and creative act; it cannot, she maintains, make woman 
equal to man. De Beauvoir partially adopts this attitude to maternity 
because it is a natural act outwith the woman's control. Thus she claims --that "giving birth and suckling are not activities, they are natural 
functions; no project is involved" (po94). Moreover, procreation does 
not correspond to de Beauvoir'~s ideas of human development - development, 
as we shall see. in Chapter Six, based on violence and creative labour -
and thus is of no relevance to the progress of mankind. It is for these 
reasons that de Beauvoir writes disparagingly of women who particularly 
enjoy pregnancy and believe it to be a creative act that they are simply 
like "fowls with high egg-production" (p.513)o Indeed de Beauvoir 
maintains that such a woman'~s pleasure does not spring from the experience 
of actual creativity but merely from the "comforting illusion of feeling 
that she is a human being, in herself a value" (p .513). De Beau voir 
in this implicit use of the concept of bad faith, thus dismisses the 
enjoyment of some pregnant women on the basis that they are deluded, for 
according to her existentialist perspective maternity in itself holds 
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little human value. Thus despite de Beauvoir's recent statement that 
when she advises women to avoid "the trap of motherhood" she is not 
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making "a value-judgement/' there is a sense in The Second Sex that 
such a value- judgement is being made. Indeed as Margaret Mead in her 
book review pointed out1 on de Beauvoir 1 s part there is not only an 
"absolute failure to recognise anything creative in maternity," but also 
8 
a tendency to denigrate it. 
But let us leave in abeyance the question of de Beauvoir's 
complete devaluation of womanis reproductive role. For the time being 
let us merely assume that de Beauvoir argues that women should not be 
confined to motherhood but should be free to work and engage in various 
types of human pursuits. This plea for more freedom of choice for women 
would nowadays gain popular support since it is becoming increasingly 
accepted that with a declining birth rat~motherhood cannot be the only 
aim and justification of a woman Vs life. For de Beauvoir, then, if 
maternity is not a human activit~ woman's human development depends on 
her involvement in properly human pursuits • The problem of woman i s 
reproductive role for de Beauvoir thus becomes centred on the control 
of fertility and the integration of maternity with other social and 
economic aspects of existence. Indeed, bearing in mind de Beauvoiris 
avowed position on biology - that it merely furnishes the physical basis 
of oneis existence- we should see whether in de Beauvoiris 
88 
theory womanis biology, a simple facet of her facticity, can be integrated 
with her involvement in transcendent and liberating acts. In other 
words, the merits of de Beauvoiris view of a mediated biology might lie 
in the resolution of the alleged conflict between femininity and indiv-
idualisation, where the emerging synthesis is woman, at once a human 
and a procreative beinge 
We could reasonably expect de Beauvoir to attempt a synthesis 
of the whole woman with reference to three related themes: technology, 
p 
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work and the future of childcare. As far as technology is concerned we 
are not disappointed,for de Beauvoir places great emphasis on the 
liberating potential of technology. Technology is important for de 
Beauvoir for two reasons; it allows a restructuring of production 
techniques and the alteration of woman t s biology itself. Thus, according 
to de Beauvoir, not only will the present trend toward mechanisation 
render womanVs weakness irrelevant and herald her complete entry into 
the world of work) but also various technological advances will extend 
woman 1 s freedom by allowing her to gain masterful control of her own body. 
Of central concern here is, of course, scientific methods of contraception 
which allow women to plan the course of their reproductive lives and 
free them from their previous "slavery" to procreation. There are, 
however, a few other scientific advances which do not spring so readily 
to mind. For example, as de Beauvoir believes that childbirth is 
naturally a very dangerous and painful process for women)she unreservedly 
welcomes the use of anaesthetics to lessen the pains of labour. 
It is only when woman is released from various biological 
constraints that she will be able to be gainfully employed and attain 
in this activity the consciousness requisite for her liberation. Thus 
it is work, not technology, which fills the role in de Beauvoiris 
theory which labour fills for· Hegelis slaveo We shall see in Chapter Tw-
elvethat de Beauvoir sees womanis entry into the world of work as crucial 
but 
for her liberation,/for the time being we must simply ask whether, given 
the tremendous importance of employment to womanis liberation, de 
Beauvoir thinks it possible for woman to be simultaneously a worker and 
a mother. 
In The Second Sex de Beauvoir argues that such technological 
innovations as contraception and abortion are important to women not 
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simply because they permit her to control her bo~ but because they 
allow her to become gainfully employed. Indeed de Beauvoir optimistically 
states that with woman "protected ••• from the slavery of reproduction 
she is in a position to assume the economic role which is offered her 
and will assure her of complete independence" (p.1.52). However, the 
question of womanis employment and her reproductive role does not simply 
involve the control of fertility. Even if women are able to decide if 
and when to have children, there is still the problem of how such 
children should be cared for while their parents work. Nevertheless, 
despite the importance of childcare, as we shall see de Beauvoir not 
only fails to deal adequately with the topi~ but also the few references 
which do exist are somewhat contradictory and obscure. 
At one point in The Second Sex de Beauvoir maintains 
that the co-existence of woman as mother and worker is a simple question 
of social and economic structure. Thus she states that if woman "procreates 
voluntarily and if society comes to her aid during pregnancy and is 
concerned with child welfare, the burdens of maternity are light and can 
easily be offset by suitable adjustments to working conditions" (p.8.5, 
emphasis added). 9 However, de Beauvoir is far less optimistic about 
combining work with motherhood in other sections of her book. For 
instance, in the chapter entitled "The Independent Woman" de Beauvoir 
claims that "there is one feminine function that is actually impossible 
to perform in complete liberty. It is maternity o" (p. 70.5). Even taken 
in context it is difficult to ascertain if this statement refers to 
the actual nature of maternity or to the existing social structure. Given 
the fact that de Beauvoir goes on to examine the situation in France 
and America, we can assume that this is a comment on the present day. 
tp 
However, de Beauvoir adds that the restrictions of maternity exist 
"in spite of convenient day-nurseries and kindergartens" and that such 
restrictions are "enough to paralyse woman's activity entirely" (p. 705). 
The ambivalence of de Beauvoir7s position on whether or not work and 
maternity can be integrated in a woman's life is apparent at another 
point in The Second Sex. And here the outlook for women in de Beauvoir 7 s 
theory seems even more bleak. Outlining how in "a properly organised 
society • • • children would largely be taken in charge by the community 
and the mother cared for and helpedj' de Beauvoir tells us that "maternity 
would not be wholly incompatible with careers for women" (p.540, 
10 
emphasis added)o De Beauvoir, however, does not explain why she has 
reservations on the possibility of completely harmonising work and 
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motherhood. We do not know, for example, if the element of incompatibility 
emanates from the nature of maternity or from the problems of childcare. 
In other words, if it is due to biology or social structure. However, 
given the context of the sentence - a society in which children are 
communally cared for - the reservation probably implies restrictions 
imposed by pregnancy and lactationo 
The problem posed by de Beauvoir's comments on childcare and 
maternity, however, is not simply one of interpretation. The fact that 
we are left guessing de Beauvoir's exact position on these matters is 
indicative of her failure to examine woman's oppression with reference 
to her maternal role. Indeed de Beauvoir may criticise.Frederick Engels' 
(1884) 
Origin of the Family, Private Property and the StatE/for its failure 
to see that woman's "reproductive function is as important as her 
productive capacity no less in the social economy than in the individu.al 7s 
11 




true of de Beauvoiris concept of wamanis future liberation, for most 
of her discussion is set within an economic context, the question of 
the future of procreation and childcare being.almost left untouched. 
It may thus be claimed that de Beau voir does not manage to 
argue coherently that there is aqy easy reconciliation of motherhood 
with other pursuits. This has prompted several commentators to point 
out that the de Beauvoirian woman achieves emancipation only by suppressing 
aspects of her reproductive roleo Albert Memmi, for example, in his 
essay rrA TyrantVs Plea," laments that de Beauvoir does not manage to 
liberate woman within the context of her motherhood and so has set 
woman 1 s liberation at too high a price o In 1974 Judi th Grether in an 
article on The Second Sex also points out that de Beauvoir does not 
manage to liberate woman as a mother. As a feminist Grether subsequently 
maintains: 
Given the society's need for reproduction, it is clear~ 
not possible for all or most women to refuse to bear children. 
At best, this formulation points towards test tube babies as 
the solution. At worst, it negates the possibility of 
liberation for all wameno12 
In other words, in the absence of technology capable of eliminating 
completely woman's reproductive role, Grether believes that emancipated 
women in de Beauvoir 1 s theory can be conceived of only as a childless 
elite. An elite whose emancipation has been gained at the expense of 
childbearing sisters. 
Bearing in mind the material outlined in the last few pages we 
thus see that even if we assume that for de Beauvoir maternity is something 
essentially neutral, neither adding to nor detracting from the human 
dimension of woman's existence, we find nevertheless that de Beauvoir 
never convincing~ shows how the emancipated woman can also be a mother. 
In short there is no obvious s,ynthesis of woman as a human and a 
procreative being in de BeauvoirVs theory. Indeed if we leave the terms 
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of the above discussion, and return to the previous argument that for 
de Beauvoir there are essentially negative features attached to maternity 
and other aspects of woman 7s reproductive role, we shall see how and 
why in de Beauvoir's theory such a synthesis cannot easily emerge. 
III 
Earlier in this chapter we questioned the extent to which de 
Beauvoir thinks the weakness and dependency which flow from woman's 
reproductive role to be amenable to human change. It appeared that in 
de Beauvoir's theory some aspects of woman's physical weakness could 
more or less be eradicated from the economic arena by technological 
change and that some drawbacks of maternity could be neutralised, if not 
completely eliminated, by conscious human acts. It was within this 
context that such matters as contraception and maternal care were 
considered significant. To some extent, then, technology is portrayed 
as h~ving liberating potential. However, we also learned that the 
mediation of woman 7s biology which could result from different attitudes 
and values is much less prevalent in de Beauvoiris theory than she 
often leads us to expect. That is to say, the negative features which 
de Beauvoir thinks are naturally associated with womanis reproductive 
role are bound too closely with some of her own absolute values. So far 
we have examined this only with reference to such matters as weakness, 
immanence and physical dependencyo However, the values inherent in de 
Beauvoiris theory become much more prevalent as we begin to look at 
the two other negative features of woman's biology- alienation and 
organic resistance. 
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In The Second Sex there is a definite idea that women feel 
alienated or unhappy in their reproductive role not because of the 
particular condition of women in patriarchal society but because there 
is what may be termed an ontological conflict between femininity and 
humanisation. Thus despite de Beauvoiris statements that "it is the 
social context that makes menstruation a curse" (p.340) and that 
although biology is of great importance what gives "these facts ••• 
weight is woman's attitude towards them" (po353) a dominant theme in 
) 
The Second Sex is that the negative features of woman's biology do not 
simply spring from woman's particular situation and her attitude towards 
it, but from the generic feminine condition. Even allowing for the 
possibility that many of the negative features of woman's reproductive 
role could be changed by technological and economic innovations, according 
to de Beauvoiris perspective there would still be reasons for woman's 
organic resistance and feelings of alienation. Let us look more closely at 
the factors involved. 
To some extent it can be maintained that de Beauvoir believes 
woman experiences her sexuality in a negative way since she is not in 
control of her body. If, however, she was more aware of the process 
and more able through contraception and abortion to control her fertility 
she would feel less at the mercy of external forces. However, even 
with birth control there is still another factor which de Beauvoir links 
to woman's alleged feelings of hostility and alienation which could not 
be so easily mediated by human change. And that is de Beauvoir' s 
notion that "life cannot be mastered through the use of tools: one 
can only submit to its secret laws" (p.609). In other words, because 
in ovulation, menstruation, conception and pregnancy) woman's body 
becomes "the theatre of a play that unfolds within her" (p.60) she 
) 
will never feel entirely at home i~or in control o~her body, for at 
such times it will always be something "other than herself" (p.61). 
Becoming, as it were, life'~s "passive instrument" (p.51J)her body is 
invaded by the species and her individuality is strictly limited. 
Moreover, the dependency woman experiences during pregnancy is, according 
to de Beauvoir, magnified during labour when she needs help in the 
delivery of her child. For all these reasons, then, de Beauvnir 
maintains that "even if the woman deeply desires to have a child, her 
body vigorously revolts when obliged to undergo the reproductive process" 
(p.315). 
Thus we see how in de Beauvoir's theory there will always be 
negative elements attached to feminine biology as long as reproduction 
is accomplished in a natural manner. That is to say, as long as women 
become pregnant and undergo physiological changes outwith their control) 
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then they will not feel at home in their bodies and will feel "alienated."-
But in order to grasp more fully the significance of de Beauvoir 1s use 
of the concept of alienation one must recall the rudiments of its use 
in Hegelian and existentialist thought. Thus, bearing in mind the 
discussion undertaken in Chapter Thre~we see that de Beauvoir)like 
Sartre and Hegel; but in complete opposition to Marx, identifies 
alienation as part of human existence in the natural, sensuous world. 
In Being and Nothingness, although Sartre accepts the essentially 
Hegelian definition of alienation, he refutes the philosophy which would 
permit its elimination: he rejects He gel 1 s n ontological optimism" and 
the notion that alienation will be overcome by the elimination of 
objectivity. Thus we find in Sartre's thought the notion of despair 
and the permanent futility of human endeavour. However, even though 
de Beauvoir accepts an essentially Hegelian concept of alienation, 
which means in this instance that she simply locates the source of 
alienation in something inextricably linked with our existence in the 
natural world, she is not ultimately faced with the choice of accepting 
the terms of Hegelian elimination or portraying alienation as a 
permanent facet of woman's existence. It is possible that in preference 
to maintaining that alienation will always be a feature of femininity) 
de Beauvoir should conclude that alienation may be overcome i.f the terms 
of femininity itself are suppressed. In short de Beauvoir could argue 
that in order to eliminate alienation as part of woman's experience of 
biological femininit~ it is necessary to remove as much as possible of 
woman's reproductive role. But is this what de Beauvoir actually argues 
in The Second Sex? 
In answering this question we must realise that de Beauvoir is 
never defeatist about womanVs boqy always acting as a prisonnQrevoking 
feelings of estrangemento In other words, de Beauvoir does not state 
that such negative aspects of feminine existence are fixed and unchange-
abl~ and in her conclusion she is optimistic about woman's future as an 
~t 
equal and unoppressed existent./ as de Beauvoir's theory incorporates 
the idea that woman's body profoundly adds to, if not actually causes, 
woman's oppression, in her own terms woman's liberation must involve the 
elimination of woman's reproductive role. Indeed it is because de 
Beauvoir believes there to be such conflict between biological femininity 
and human freedom that she maintains it is the menopausal woman who feels 
most at home in her boqy. In other words, it is the woman who has no 
role to play in reproduction who feels herself to be a human being. 
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It must be understood, however, that this conclusion can be deduced 
from de Beauvoiris theory1 but we cannot find a passage in The Second 
Sex which explicitly upholds this position. Thus although we can illustrate 
how de Beauvoir never manages to synthesise woman as a procreative and 
a human being> and that in her own terms liberation must involve the 
suppression of biological femininit~ we can never find a statement to 
this effect. Like Judi th GretherJ we can only indicate how in de Beau voir's 
theor,YJ test-tube babies may be seen as a pre-requisite for the emancipation 
of all women. Indeed, since in de Beauvoir's theory much of woman's 
inferior physique emanates from the burdens of maternity and the organic 
resistance to the processes associated with her reproductive role, only 
the removal of pregnancy, and concomitantly of ovulation and menstruation, 
would bring woman total relief. 
Having outlined de Beauvoiris theory of sexual bifurcation we 
have thus arrived at the conclusion that the logic of such a theory is 
for woman's reproductive role to be replaced by artificial methods of 
13 
reproduction. The subject of what is popularly called test-tube babies 
is, however, a contentious one. It evokes in many people's minds Aldous 
:14 
Huxley's Brave New World; that is, a society where such technology is 
not used to extend womenis freedom but to introduce selective breeding 
for political purposes. Indeed by removing the right to decide whether 
or not to have a child from the individuals concerned, and by giving 
scientists the task of reproduction, such technology immediately raises 
questions of political control. As de Beauvoir does not openly advocate 
artificial methods of reproduction, she does not address herself to 
these issues. However, let us ignore the matter of political control 
and decide whether or not we should see the elimination of woman's 
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reproductive rol2 as a pre-requisite for her liberation. As this 
question involves the logic of de Beauvoir's theory it leads 
us to leave the terms of the present discussion and evaluate de Beauvoir's 
entire theory of sexual bifurcation. 
IV 
In evaluating de Beauvoiris theor,y of woman's biology at this 
stage of our inquirY; we are immediately confronted with a problem. The 
problem is that de Beauvoiris theory is closely bound up with her notions 
of human development and woman's historic rol~ and so cannot be fully 
discussed until these have also been examined. In effect this means 
combining biology and history in an appraisal of de Beauvoir's theory 
of the origins of woman Y s status as "the second sex." And this we 
cannot undertake until her theory of woman's role in history has been 
outlined. All we can do therefore is summarise de Beauvoirts position~ 
and then assess why de Beauvoir adopts this perspective and whether or 
not we should follow her in this respect. 
When analysing the significance of biology in The Second Sexl de 
Beauvoir attempts in Hegelian fashion simultaneously to affirm and deny 
things their importance. She tries to show that man is not a "natural 
species" but a "historical idea"; that while the body is the physiological 
basis of existence - "our grasp on the world" - it does not establish a 
fixed or inevitable destiny. Thus de Beauvoir hopes in the course of 
her study to show that while woman's body may naturally limit her activities, 
biology may be overcome by human endeavour - that "woman's ovaries do 
not condemn her to live forever on her knees" (p.735). However, 
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de Beauvoir's view of how biology in its natural state affects woman is 
couched in such strong terms that her attempt to overcome in dialectical 
fashion the significance of such biology falls short of what is required. 
We may concede that weakness m~ be rendered irrelevant by technology, 
that reproductive limitations may be minimised by contraception, that 
much of the significance of womanis biology depends on her attitude 
towards it; yet in de Beauvoiris theory an element of negativity in 
woman's biology still lingers on. If de Beauvoir had argued that woman'i s 
alienation in her reproductive role stemmed from the nature of patriarchal 
organisation, then arguments dealing with changes in social and economic 
structure would have allowed, in Marxian fashion, for such alienation 
to be removed. But instead de Beauvoir portrays alienation and other 
negative aspects of womanis reproductive role to be due to a conflict 
between individualisation and femininity. Thus it seems that while 
benefits could arise from different structural arrangements, alienation 
would still result from womanis experience of her, albeit minimal, 
procreative role. Therefore, the notion of femininity as an alienating 
and negative mode of existence will remain in de Beauvoir's theory as 
long as she does not allow for the necessary adjustment to what she sees 
as a root cause of woman'i s alienation and curtailment - feminine biology 
itself. To this extent, in de Beauvoir 1 s theory woman is liberation 
means becoming more like mano It entails the assumption of that harmonious, 
non-alienated condition which de Beauvoir believes to be characteristic 
of male biology. 
De Beauvoir's preference for masculine biology, and her 
determination to make woman man; owes more to existentialism than to any 
biological or anthropological theory. Her masculine preference is 
grounded in the existentialist veneration of individuality which is 
itself a reflection of the experience of Twentieth-century, middle-class 
Europeans. Pregnancy and child-rearing are inherently co-operative 
enterprises which cannot be accomplished by solitary individuals. 
Because de Beauvoir prefers such solitary figures she must suppress 
the activity which by its nature engenders co-operation. Indeed as the 
co-operation and interdependence of humans is nowhere more evident 
than in pregnane~ de Beauvoir reserves her harshest words for it, viewing 
the foetus as a "parasite" living at the motheris expense. 
There is a striking resemblance between de Beauvoiris comments 
on the foetus in The Second Sex and the view attributed to Mathieu in 
(1945) 
Sartreis novel The Age of Reason,/for this is how Sartre describes 
Mathieui s feelings when he finds out his lover is pregnant: 
It seemed to him shocking and grotesque, like the sight of 
an old man kissing an old woman on the lips: ••• "She is 
pregnant" - there was a little, vitreous tide within her, 
slowly swelling into the semblance of an eye. "It is o:gening 
out among all the muck inside her belly, itis aliveon1.? 
As we learned in Chapter Three that Sartre in Being and Nothingness 
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generally displays a revulsion for the physical world and seems specifically 
disgusted with aspects of biological femininity, it is probably fair 
to assume that such an attitude is Sartre 1 s owno Indeed bearing in mind 
the material presented in the chapter on SartreJit seems that de Beauvoir's 
view of woman 1 s reproductive role echoes Sartreis comments on the 
"sickly" and obscene nature of femininity. In other words, de Beauvoir· 
views womanis reproductive role and sexuality not simply as the neutral 
foundation of her physiological existenc~ but more as part of the 
viscous- of the menacing world of the in-itself. 
In echoing SartreYs distaste for reproduction, de Beauvoir is 
out of step with the usual love of Nature manifest in her writings. 
Indeed Claire Cayron in her book La Nature Chez Simone de Beauvoir 
(1973) has sought to show thew~ in which de Beauvoir's writing differs 
profoundly from SartreYs on the very question of the natural world.16 
In this instance, however, it seems that de Beauvoiris personal 
attitudes to reproduction predispose her to the Sartrian position. In 
The Prime of Life de Beauvoir tells us that as a young girl she found 
babies abhorrent because they were "red-faced, wrinkled, milky-eyed," 
and that childbearing seemed to her "no more than a purposeless and 
unjustifiable increase in the world's population.n17 Such an attitude 
did not disappear with adolescence it seems for Mme. Nizan, a later 
acquaintance of de Beauvoir, claimed: "When de Beauvoir met me pushing 
my baby along in its pram she was appalled. She found the whole idea 
of children incredible and terrible." 
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In evaluating de BeauvoirYs view of woman's biology a number of 
points must therefore be borne in mind. First there is the fact that 
the situation and attitudes which de Beauvoir ascribes to "woman" must 
be understood not simply with reference to western culture, but more 
particular~ with reference to existentialist ethics and ontology. If 
we also take into consideration that at points it appears to be 
de Beauvoir's own attitudes to reproduction which are·elevated to those 
allegedly common to the female sex, we begin to see the limitations 
of her perspective on feminine biology. 
The limitation of de Beauvoir's theory in this respect is 
apparent in the response her theory evoked from women. In a recent 
interview de Beauvoir tells us that while she received many letters 
from women gratified that she had written such a book, many were 
unsympathetic to her views on maternity. While the attitude of many 
men who attacked de Beauvoir for her views on this subject can be seen 
as potentially anti-feminist, in that it has been a common ploy to 
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glorify woman as mother so that her role in the universe may be 
restricted, we can infer from the response of women, otherwise sympathetic 
to her views, that de Beauvoir 7s theory of womanvs reproductive role 
did not ring true. Like many recent feminists, such women readers 
reject the devaluation of woman's reproductive role in patriarchal 
society; a rejection which inevitably leads to a questioning of 
de Beauvoir 7s entire theory of womanis biology and the values on which 
it is founded. And it is the assessment of these values which is our 
task in the coming chapters. This requires illustrating how de Beauvoir 
links the biological oppression of woman with her status as "the Other." 
Some of these links have already been made in our discussion of the 
restrictions imposed by woman's reproductive role where we encountered 
the notion that woman~s biology impedes her development as a human 
beingo However, we must now develop the material already presented 




In analysing woman 7 s emergence as "the second seJSn de Beauvoir 
evaluates the contribution which has been made to the discussion by 
psychoanalysis and historical materialismo Ultimately she concludes 
that we must reject both "the sexual monism of Freud" and "the economic 
monism of Engels" (p.91) and undertake a more complex analysis of the 
origins of womanis oppression. On the face of it, de Beauvoir 1 s own 
analysis seems to be based on two factors: economics and what may be. 
termed the ontological advantage of the male sex. On closer inspection, 
however, it becomes apparent that the economic factors are subsidiary -
that de Beauvoir too is monistic. In recent years de Beauvoir has 
emphasised the importance of economics to her theory of womanis oppression 
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in The Second Sex but from the material in this chapter it will become 
evident that it is ontology which is of primary importance in her theory. 
In order to make clear the role which ontology and economics play in 
de Beauvoiris theory, in this chapter we shall leave aside factors like 
private property, which have apparent economic significance, and 
concentrate on revealing how in de Beauvoiris theory man has managed to 
translate his biological advantage over woman into acts which ensured 
him a place in the universe as the human, hence historic, sex. The 
assessment of the economic factors will be the subject of Chapter Eighto 
Although de Beauvoir does not specifically acknowledge the 
Hegelian master-slave dialectic as a source of inspiration for her ideas, 
it will also be shown in this chapter that de Beauvoiris notion of man's 
ontological advantage over woman can best be understood in the context 
of Hegelian principles of human development. Nevertheless while such 
principles allow us to understand the devel~ent of de Beauvoir's 
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argument, the concepts which she employs do not exactly correspond 
to Hegel's. The difference between de Beauvoir and Hegel in this 
respect will be dealt with in the following chapter. 
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Bearing in mind our discussion of de Beauvoir's views of feminine 
biology, we may be tempted to assume at the outset of this investigation 
that the ontological advantage of man in de Beauvoir's theory is just 
the simple product of his exclusion from the type of alienation and 
limitations experienced by woman in her reproductive role. In other 
words, that not being female is in itself an advantage. However while 
such an assumption is correct, it nevertheless misrepresents the nature 
of the relationship between masculinity and human development in de 
Beauvoir's theor.y. It is not some static quality or characteristic of 
biological maleness which de Beauvoir portrays as important in her theory 
of the origins of woman's oppression. On the contrar.y, de Beauvoir 
argues that it is male members of the race who are better equipped to 
enter the competitive and challenging struggle which she sees as 
constituting the process of humanisation. 
In essence, then, to understand de Beauvoir 1 s notion of male 
advantage one must understand her concept of humanisation; that is, 
her view of what raises man from animal life to human existence o 
For example, at the most basic level of sexual differentiation, de 
Beauvoir believes that males have an inherent ontological advantage over 
females in that male sexuality is a medium through which man can assert 
his sovereignty. Such assertion of sovereignty in sexuality, according 
to de Beauvoir, can be seen in man's relations with both males and 
females. With reference to his relationship with a female, de Beauvoir 
maintains that even when she is willing she is undoubtedly "taken" (p.53) 
by the male and that her sexual subservience is symbolically expressed 
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in her "naturally" supine position in coitus. Indeed whereas the de 
Beauvoirian female is passive and "alienated" in the sexual act, man 
is active and assertive - able to use the situation for his own 
transcendence. Although de Beauvoir does not believe that the sexual 
act itself is necessarily based on violence or struggle between the 
partnersJ she does maintain that it provides the opportunity for males 
to gain confirmation of their sovereignty in a quasi-Hegelian way. De 
Beauvoir thus attempts to explain the aggression of rutting males as 
a "will to combat" in that "it might be said that before procreating, 
the male claims as his own the act that perpetuates the species, and 
in doing battle with his peers confirms the truth of his individuality" 
From this passage from The Second Sex we thus learn that the 
advantage attached to male sexuality in de Beauvoiris theory must partly 
be seen in the context of confirmation of sovereignty. As we have 
already learned how the notion of sovereignty in de Beauvoir 9 s theory 
is related to the emergence of human consciousness, what must be 
demonstrated here is de Beauvoir's notion of the relationship between 
sovereignty and violence. Indeed as we may expect, from earlier 
comments on de BeauvoirVs use of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, 
the significance of violence in her theory is not confined to an analysis 
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of the aggressive nature of male sexuality but permeates The Second Sex. 
I 
De BeauvoirVs reasons for emphasising the importance of violence 
to human behaviour are threefold.4 At the most simple level, violence 
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is considered significant because it is a means of self defence - a 
way of resisting the transcendence of others. Thus de Beauvoir maintains 
that the aggression exhibited by men towards each other is important 
because it shows that "against any insult, any attempt to reduce him 
to the status of object, the male has recourse to his fists, to exposure 
of himself to blows" (p .3)4). 
The question of self-defence, however, presupposes the importance 
and likelihood of attack: It only makes sense in de Beauvoir' s theory 
with reference to her conception of violence as a lucrative means of 
attaining objective proof of one's self-aspirations. Thus it is when 
we realise that de Beauvoir claims: "each conscious individual through 
challenge, struggle and single combat can endeavour to raise himself 
to sovereignty" (po67), that we simultaneously grasp the constant sig-
nificance of violence in de Beauvoir's theory to manis interaction with 
his fellowso In other words, violence is an important aspect of 
behaviour for de Beauvoir because she views it as a way in which the 
individual can demonstrate his sovereignty and status as a human being. 
Indeed this leads us on to the third reason for de Beauvoiris 
emphasis on violence: she believes it has significant existential 
content not just because it affects man in his interpersonal relations, 
but also because it is a precondition for the emergence of man as human 
being and hence historic force. In other words, in Hegelian fashion 
de Beauvoir argues that it is in risking oneis life that humanity is 
asserted over animality - that violence, in giving human life meaning 
and dignity, raises it to the level of Existence. 
The Hegelian principle of mastery, then, may be seen to underlie 
de BeauvoirVs notion of the origins of self-consciousness; it is 
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violence which, for de Beauvoir, is a basis for historical development 
and an individual 2 s attempt to gain a sense of self-esteem. And, as 
we are about to see, it is at both the individual and historic level 
that violence has profound implications for de Beauvoiris theory of the 
nature and origins of woman's oppressiono 
At the level of the individual, de Beauvoir believes that the 
benefits of violence, in terms of the confirmation of sovereignty, may 
be attained by males through their sexual activi tyo Thus males in 
competition for mates, and to some extent in the sexual act itself, 
forcibly assert their sovereignty. According to de Beauvoir's definition 
of female sexuality this is not, however, also true for women. Indeed 
de Beauvoir claims that woman'is weakness and biological role mean that 
in~ interaction with her peers has she been able to learn "the lessons 
of violence" (p.357)o 
The notion that woman has failed to benefit from an important 
process of humanisation becomes of special significance when we move 
from the realm of individual relations and begin to examine de Beauvoir's 
conceptualisation of wider sexual roles. Taking into consideration 
both de Beauvoiris belief in the ontological significance of violence 
and the traditional concept of labour which, as we have seen in the 
preceding chapter, clearly emanates from her dichotomy of male and 
female into maintaining-creating roles, it is not surprising that through-
out The Second Sex de Beauvoir continually emphasises the dangerous 
aspects of man' s traditional role o Thus de Beauvoir thinks it significant 
that in primitive society man "hunts, goes fishing and makes war" (p. 1 00) • 
Indeed de Beauvoir explicitly maintains that it is in his roles of 
hunter, warrior, explorer and inventor that man, encountering dangers 
and risking his life, gives human action positive meaning. 
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Likewise it comes as no surprise to find that as de Beauvoir 
continually emphasises the limitations imposed upon woman by her 
reproductive role, she latterly maintains that woman has been excluded 
from the humanising effects of such a risk of life. In other words, 
de Beauvoir claims that primitive woman, unlike her male counterpart 
who was daily engaged in dangerous, exciting activity, was confined to 
the boring safety of the home. Indeed in line with her belief in the 
necessity of asserting humanity over animality by risking one's life, 
de Beauvoir maintains that "the worst curse that was laid upon woman was 
that she was excluded from (man's) warlike forays" (p.95) o 
In The Second Sex the ontological disadvantage imposed upon 
woman by her biology is not offset in the context of a risk of life by 
de Beauvoiris belief in the dangers confronting woman in the fulfilment 
of her reproductive role. That is to say, the danger which de Beauvoir 
claims woman experiences in her childhearing function does not aid 
her development as a human being. This risk which woman knows is not 
the assertion of freedom and humanity but merely the result of a natural 
process outwith her control. It is the fusion of the.notion. of womanis 
exclusion from "warlike forays" with that of the uncontrollable and 
animal nature of reproduction which thus underlies de Beauvoir 1.s claim: 
"It is not in giving life, but in risking life that man is raised above 
the animal; that is why superiority has been accorded in humanity not 
to the sex which brings forth life but to that which killslf (ppo95-96). 
The significance of de Beauvoiris use of ~he principle of 
mastery in her historical sections is thus that she claims violent, 
aggressive activity and its humanising effects to have been the 
prerogative of the male sex. This means that de Beauvoir 1 s woman)not 
having gained the benefits of a risk of life,remained at a more primitive 
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level of developmento Indeed it is this kind of assertion which seems 
to lead de Beauvoir, in one of the few explicit references to the 
master-slave dialectic in The Second Sex, to state: 
Certain passages in the argument employed by Hegel in defining 
the relation of master to slave apply much better to 
the relation of man to woman. The advantage of the master, 
he says, comes from his affirmation of Spirit as against 
Life through the fact that he risks his own life; but in 
fact the conquered slave has known this same risko Whereas 
woman is basically an existent who gives life and does not 
risk her life eoe (p.96)o 
In other words, de Beauvoir claims that in "confronting woman, man 
assumes mastery" (p.97) because by risking his life he introduces 
values which question the importance of maintaining simple animal 
existence - the very activity to which woman has been confinedo 
However, although de Beauvoiris definition of the male-female 
relationship may, in her terms, correctly lead to the notion that man's 
consciousness becomes that of the masteris while womanis consciousness 
does not even attain the level of the slaveis, her interpretation of the 
Hegelian scenario is questionable. While it is certainly the case 
that both master and slave were locked in deadly combat the significant 
differentiation between them emerged only because the slave was not 
finally prepared to risk his life fighting for an ideal. De Beauvoir 
is, however, probably well aware of this point and seems to have 
emphasised that master and slave share an identical risk so she may claim 
that woman7s failure to participate in the battle for recognition means 
that her consciousness in this period of early history remained more 
slavish than the slaveis. 
But de Beauvoir need not have resorted to such an argument in 
the attempt to give weight to her idea that womanis consciousness and 
condition at this stage of history were of an essentially abased nature, 
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for if we leave the subject of violence and examine the other aspect 
of the Hegelian dichotomy we shall see that, according to de Beauvoir, 
man not only used the principle of mastery to consolidate his raw 
biological advantage over woman) but also that of slavery - creative 
labour a 
II 
The significant existential content of creative labour in The 
Second Sex, like that of violence, can best be understood within the 
context of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic. Thus de Beauvoir believes 
creative labour not only to be a means of affording man recognition of 
his sovereignty>but also a way in which he could develop and discover 
his individualityo It is for essentially Hegelian reasons, then, that 
de Beauvoir claims: 
ooo man in the experience of hard and productive labour 
(was enabled) to discover himself as creator; dominating nature, 
he was no longer afraid of it, and in the fact of obstacles 
overcome he found courage to see himself as an autonomous 
active force, to achieve self-fulfilment as an individual (p.87). 
The significance of labour in de Beauvoir1s theory is not confined to 
the fact that it is an efficient means of objectifying one 1s self-
consciousness and attaining recognition. It also involves the notion 
that in teaching man science and technique it allows him to dominate 
Nature and become master of his own fate. Thus de Beauvoir thinks it 
important that man "furnished support for the group, not in the manner 
of worker bees by a simple vital process, through biological behaviour, 
but by means of acts that transcended his animal nature" (po95). 
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The important aspect of creative labour in the context of de 
Beauvoiris theory of the origins of womanis oppression is, however, 
that like violence it is seen as being the prerogative of the male 
sex. The assumption that man has been historically involved in this 
process and that woman has been excluded is not an incidental aspect 
of de Beauvoir's theory but is rooted in her very concept of the basis 
of sexual division. That is to s~, in de Beauvoir 1 s theory it is the 
very nature of woman's biological role which confines her to the non-
creative aspect of existence. As we have already seen, de Beauvoir 
believes that the basic role of woman as mother and producer has been 
that of maintaining the species - repeating the same life in more 
individuals - and this is what she stresses throughout the history 
sections of The Second Sex" Referring to woman in primitive agricultural 
societies, for example, de Beauvoir writes: "In no domain whatever did 
she create; she maintained the life of the tribe by giving it children 
and bread, nothing more" (p.1 0.5). 
I 
According to de Beauvoir, then, historically women have been 
insignificant producers and creators whose main contribution to society 
has been confined to reproduction, care of children and the routine 
chores of cooking and cleaning within the home. Although these activities 
are necessary for the continuation of life, in de Beauvoir 7 s terms they 
do nothing to elevate the status of human existenceo 
By illustrating de Beauvoir~s use of the principles underlying 
the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, in the course of this chapter we 
have been able to advance the contention that for de Beauvoir man 
is the ontologically advantaged sex. Now, however, we must consider 




As de Beauvoir argues that woman has never taken part in 
significant human activity) she maintains that historically it was only 
through her procreative function that she could hope to gain any 
dignity or respecto This was not always possible however, for de 
/ 
Beauvoir argues, it depended on socio-economic organisationo In Nomadic 
times, for example, when the tribe lived only for the moment, infanticide 
was commonly practised and woman's reproductive role was little valued. 
Giving birth was not seen as an act of creation or value but was merely 
viewed as an additional burden on the tribe. Imprisoned in the 
maintenance of biological existence when human life had little value, 
women were thus deprived of finding, in de Beauvoir's terms, adequate 
justifications for existence. Indeed de Beauvoir maintains that the 
tragedy of woman's situation is that although she has been biologically 
destined for the reproduction of life, woman realises that Life in 
itself has no inherent justification. Thus as man became more brave 
and creative in his activity - woman enslaved as ever to her biological 
role - she was forced to acknowledge that it is man alone who can create 
reasons for human existence. And it is because de Beauvoir believes 
this,that at one point she maintains: 
In setting himself up as sovereign he (man) is supported by 
the complicity of woman herself. For she, too, is an existent, 
she feels the urge to surpass, and her project is not mere 
repetition but transcendence towards a different future -
in her heart of hearts she finds confirmation of the masculine 
pretensions (p.96). 
In essence, then, de Beauvoir claims that because maternity and the 
other tasks to which woman was confined have no inherent justification 
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or value, she was prepared to acknowledge the supreme human value 
attained by man in his creative activities. 
The notion that woman, in aspiring to male values, acknowledged 
the sovereignty of the male sex is what de Beauvoir calls "the key to 
( " " the whole mystery" p.96) of the origins of woman as Othero However, 
woman's complete acceptance of her devaluation (as the corollary to her 
recognition of the sovereignty of the male sex0although important in 
de Beauvoir's theory,neither marks the actual beginnings of woman's 
oppression nor constitutes the entire reason for the subordination of 
women. Indeed in de Beau voir 'is theory woman 1 s recognition of man's 
sovereignty appears only to create the foundation for a sexual hierarchy 
for, paradoxically, during the period between woman 7s recognition and 
her complete subjugation, she was elevated to a position of supreme 
importance in the primitive group. But to understand why this was the 
case we must return to the historical significance of woman?s maternal 
function" 
De Beau voir argues that the N.omadic period in which woman? s 
reproductive role was little valued gave way to agricultural communities 
based on communal land ownership. Given the importance of posterity 
and continuity to this kind of social structure, the community thus 
sought identity in its children and this, coupled with ignorance of 
the male'ls part in procreation, led to maternity being revered as 
sacred and to a matrilineal society in which descent and communal 
property passed through the mother 7 s lineo 
However, according to de Beauvoir, the existence of such 
matrilineal societies in which the Mother Goddess is revered as sacred 
indicates neither the prior existence of matriarchal societies nor a 
period of sexual reciprocity. Indeed de Beauvoir argues that although 
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woman's status improved in such societies, the existence of Mother Goddess 
was based simply on the importance and the mysteries of maternity. 
In short, feminine deities do not reflect a situation in which women 
have real social or economic power" Following a Feuerbach-like theory, 
de Beauvoir thus maintains that the worshipping of the Mother Goddess 
exhibits little other than the workings of the male mindo Indeed de 
Beauvoir claims that in primitive societies woman's reproductive role 
is so closely associated with the existence of a hostile and dreadful 
Nature that manJ 11 terrified by the dangerous magic of woman o•o sets 
her up as the essential, it is he who poses her as such and thus he 
really acts as the essential in this voluntary alienation" (p.104)o 
In arguing that the period of woman 1 s elevation as Mother Goddess 
was closely associated with man's subservience to and fear of Natur~ 
de Beauvoir also argues that it was irrevocably tied to 11 the reign of 
agriculture, the reign of irreducible duration, of contingency, of 
chance, of waiting, of mystery" (p.107), and thus, in her terms, to a 
primitive level of development. In fact de Beauvoir not only argues 
that the reign of Mother Goddess was a negative period in history) but 
also that She had to be dethroned before mankind as a whole could progress. 
"The devaluation of woman represents a necessary stage in the history 
of humanity" writes de Beauvoir, "for it is not upon her positive value 
but upon manis weakness that her prestige is founded" (pp.106-7). 
As the question of woman's elevation in primitive society is 
linked to man's fear of Nature, it is not surprising that in discussing 
how the reign of woman is replaced by patriarch~ de Beauvoir concentrates 
on those factors which allow him to conquer such fear. And it is in 
raising the subject of the development of man's consciousness that we 
begin to examine the vital stage in the process which de Beauvoir argues 
led to woman's complete subordination to man. 
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As de Beauvoir emphasises throughout The Second Sex the importance 
of creative labour to the development of man 1 s consciousness of himself 
as a sovereign individual, she maintains that it was the introduction 
of the bronze tool which had profound implications for the relationship 
between the sexes. In essence she claims that as husbandman man was 
subject to the vicissitudes of NatureJ but that as workman, wielder of 
the tool, he became master of his own fate. Thus in the context of 
science and technique, and in the ensuing conquest of Nature, man was 
able to rid himself of the fear which originally led him to worship 
both Nature and woman. 
With woman dethronedJhurnanity entered the reign of Homo faber 
which, for de Beauvoir, means "the reign of time manageable as space, 
of necessary consequence, of the project, of action, of reason" (p.107). 
In de Beauvoiris Manichean conception of the world, the fall of Mother 
Goddess and the subsequent "triumph" of the "male principle" marked 
sirmlltaneously the prevalence of "Spirit over Life, immanence over 
transcendence, technique over magic and reason over superstition" (p.107). 
Indeed de Beauvoir considers such a take-over so important to the 
subsequent development of human progress that she maintains: "The 
people who have remained under the thumb of the Goddess mother, those 
who have retained the matrilineal regime, are also those who are 
arrested at a primitive stage of civilisation" (p.1 08). 
However, although the use of the bronze tool may explain in 
de Beauvoir's theory the demise of the Mother Goddess and the triumph 
of the male principle, she claims it still leaves unsolved the problem 
of womanvs oppression. That is to say, the triumph of patriarchy need 
not have led to woman's subordination to manJ but could have led to 
"friendly association" (p.88) between the sexes. In de Beauvoiris theory, 
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then, there are some other factors involved in the development of woman's 
oppressiono And it is these which we shall now consider. 
According to de Beauvoir, the use of the bronze tool was not 
merely important to the origins of woman~s subordinate status because 
it allowed man to dethrone woman, but was also significant because 
womanYs weakness prevented her from being man's accomplice in the use 
of the tool and in the subsequent exploitation of Nature. As the inter-
pretation which de Beauvoir places on this fundamental sexual division 
of labour involves ontology,it sets her in opposition to a historical 
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materialist approach. Thus whereas Engels would argue that woman's 
failure to participate in creative and productive labour meant she was 
disadvantaged as a result of changes in "the equilibrium of the forces 
of productionn (p.107) de Beauvoir claims that womaa was· disadvantaged 
because her consciousness remained essentiallY. the same. In other 
words, for de Beauvoir the unfortunate implications of the bronze tool 
were that woman in "not becoming a fellow workman with the labourer ••• 
was also excluded from the human Mitseinn (p.109)a Indeed not only 
did woman fail to benefit from the use of the tool,but als~because she 
n did not share (man is) way of working and thinkingn - remaining in 
"bondage to lifeis mysterious processes" (po109) -man was unable to 
recognise her as a fellow human being. Woman Vs previous disadvantage 
was therefore consolidated - no longer afraid of her mysterious powers 
and yet still having the qualities of"the Other,"man according to de 
Beauvoir ncould not be otherwise than her oppressorn(po110)o 
The inevitability of man's oppression of woman is further 
compounded in de Beauvoiris theor.y by her continual insistence on what 
she calls "the imperialism of the human consciousness" (po89)o That 
is to say, de Beauvoir argues that man would always have wanted to 
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dominate woman and so concentrates attention on what objective situation 
would have facilitated the realisation of his desires. It is for this 
reason, then, that de Beauvoir states: "If the human consciousness had 
not included the original categor.y of the Other and the original 
aspiration to dominate the Other, the invention of the bronze tool 
could not have caused the oppression of women" (p.89). 
The discovery of bronze is, however, link~d to yet another 
ontological explanation in de Beauvoir's theory of the origins of 
woman's oppression. And that is the idea that the use of the tool 
stimulated manvs desire for private property and, in the economic 
imbalance which ensued, allowed some individuals to impose their will 
on their fellows; to realise the omnipresent desire for domination which, 
according to de Beauvoir, is usually kept in check by a natural equality 
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between individuals and groups(\ Indeed de Beauvoir seems to maintain 
that with the development of private property man was not only more likely 
to succeed in his attempt "to fulfil himself by reducing the other to 
slaver.y" (p.171 ); but also as the economic system developed; his incentive 
to enslave increased. Thus de Beauvoir claims that man in his attempt 
to exhaust the possibilities afforded by the new techniques resorted 
to slavery - used other people in his "project for enrichment and 
expansion" (po88)o 
For de Beauvoir the significance of slavery to the oppression 
of women lies in the fact that at this stage in manYs development "the 
master found a much more radical confirmation of his sovereignty" in 
his relation to the slave "than in the limited authority he had over 
woman" (p o 11 0). In other words, de Beau voir maintains that at this point 
in history, man1s lingering fear of woman and her procreative powers 
not only led him to seek the recognition he desired in the enslavement 
of his fellow man1 but to some extent also meant a reciprocal relation-
ship between the sexes: 
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• o • being other than man and having the disturbing character 
of the other, woman in a way held man in dependence upon her, 
while being at the same time dependent on him; the reciprocity 
of the master-slave relation was what she actually enjoyed and 
through that fact she escaped slavery (p.110)o 
In other words, de Beauvoir, apparently maintaining nothing more than 
the interdependence of both moments of the dialectic, claims that there 
was at one stage some kind of reciprocal relationship between man and 
womano But in so doing, she contradicts a more important tenet of her 
thesis - that reciprocity between the sexes has never existed. 
Such reciprocity as existed between the sexes was nevertheless, 
according to de Beauvoir, shortlived for the changes wrought in man's 
consciousness by his mastery led to woman's gradual declineo That is 
to say, in gaining confirmation of his sovereignty man was able to cast 
off his dependence on womano Thus "everything he gained he gained 
against her, the more powerful he became, the more she declined" (p.110)o 
However, as we know the master-slave relationship is of a 
transitory nature as the slave, coming to sense himself as the essential, 
will eventually fight for recognition. Thus, although de Beauvoir has 
previously argued that man finds "a much more radical confirmation of 
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his sovereignty" in the relationship with a slave than in his relationship 
with a woman, she now claims, presumably as a result of conflict, that 
it is through her that man hopes to escape "the implacable dialectic 
of master and slave": 
eoo she is the wished-for intermediar,y between nature, the 
stranger to man, and the fellow being who is too closely 
identical. She opposes him with neither the hostile silence of 
nature nor the hard requirement of a reciprocal relation ••• 
(p 01 72) • 
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These then are the major asp;cts of the process which de Beauvoir 
claims underlies the development of woman's subordinate role. For de 
Beauvoir successive historical development as r::gards the position 
of the sexes has been merely the consolidation of these early gains. 
Ideology and all forms of organisation have been put in harmony with 
the reality of male dominance and> according to de Beauvoir, provide a 
mechanism for its perpGtuatione Political, economic and legal debilities 
are thus, for de Beauvoir, symptoms and not causes of woman 1 s inferior 
status. 
A main conclusion to the sections on history in The Second Sex 
is that nthe whole of feminine history has been man-maden (p.159); 
that it is man who has shaped woman~ s destiny. Indeed de Beauvoir is 
so sure that women have never been significant historical actors that 
she maintains that even previous outbursts of feminism have not been 
due to genuine demands for autonomy but have only been actions in 
accordance with''masculine perspectives" (po 160) n Thus de Beauvoir claims 
that even those reforms which have benefited woman - contraception 
for example -have not been the result of womanis independent actions 
but have simply been the product of changes in masculine ideologyo 
Throughout this chapter, then, we have seen how de Beauvoir 
argues that man became superior to woman because he was able to assert 
his humanity through violent and creative acts. Now, however, we must 
begin to assess de Beauvoiris portrayal of the role each sex has played 
in history., 
Chapter Seven 
Critique of De Beauvoir 1 s Historical Account 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate de Beauvoir 1 s 
historical account. This evaluation will be undertaken from three 
different perspectives. First we shall compare de Beauvoir 1 s and Hegel 1 s 
use of violence in human progress; second we shall ask if de Beauvoir 
can justifiably maintain that women were historically excluded from 
creative labour; and lastly, we shall reveal the assumptions and values 
underlying de Beauvoiris account of the origins of woman's oppression. 
In order to explicate further de Beau voir Is idea that man Is advantage 
over woman was partly due to his ability to compete, an alternative 
theory of human development will be outlined. 
I 
At the beginning of Chapter Six it was argued that de Beauvoir 1 s 
reasons for viewing man as the ontologically superior sex can best be 
understood within the context of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic. 
But it was also suggested that de Beauvoir's use of such ideas does not 
exactly correspond with Hegel's. Later in this stu~ Hegel's notion 
of the link between the mast.::;r' s self -assertion and human development 
will be questioned. However, accepting at this stage, as de Beauvoir 
does, that such a link can be made, it is possible to criticise 
de Beauvoir because she does not adequately define the context in which 
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violence has ontological significance. In short, she does not illustrate 
properly why violence would make man more "human" than his feminine 
counterpart. 
The most important difference between Hegel 1 s and de Beauvoir's 
emphasis on violent activity is that whereas Hegel defines precisely 
the situation in which aggressive activity has significant human 
potential, Simone de Beauvoir does not. For Hegel the Fight takes place 
between two self-consciousnesses at a certain stage of their development 
and, to have meaning, must engender a master and a slave. It is a life 
and death struggle for recognition on which the fighteris entire 
human status depends. For de Beauvoir, however, the significance of 
violence is not limited in any way and she tends to elevate all events 
involving physical aggression. As we have seen, de Beauvoir eulogises 
the rutting male and extols activities such as hunting, but there are 
other instances in The Second Sex where de Beauvoir indiscriminately 
portrays violence as a human act. For instance, de Beauvoir continually 
emphasises how fortunate boys are in being able to fight with their 
companions and approvingly claims: " many kinds of masculine 
behaviour spring from a root of possible violence" (p.354). 
From the last chapter we lmow that de Beauvoir asserts: "Each 
conscious individual through challenge, struggle and single combat 
can endeavour to raise himself to sovereignty." However de Beauvoir 
does not defend her position when she states it,for she gives no 
comprehensive explanation for this assertion. Thus, leaving aside the 
notion of a risk of life, in the last chapter we had to piece together 
from occasional statements why de Beauvoir considers violence to be 
important. Subsequently it was argued that for de Beauvoir violence 
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is existentially important because it is a means of self-defence and 
a way of gaining objective proof of one's sovereignty. However, de 
Beauvoir's notion of how objective proof of sovereignty is achieved 
differs radically from Hegel's: 
Violence is the authentic proof of each oneis loyalty 
to himself, to his passions, to his own will; 
radically to deny this will is to deny oneself any objective 
truth, it is to wall oneself up in an abstract subjectivity; 
anger or revolt that does not get into the muscles remains 
a figment of the imagination (p.354). 
This position contrasts with Hegel'~ for whom the proof of sovereignty 
was the recognition granted by the slave to the master. According to 
de Beauvoir the individualis sovereignty is confirmed in violence simply 
because he is prepared to act to prove his subjectivity. Thus de 
Beauvoir claims: "On every street corner squabbles threaten; usually 
they flicker out; but for a man to feel in his fists his will to self-
affirmation is enough to reassure him of his sovereignty" (p.354, 
emphasis added). The irrelevance of another individual's response is 
also illustrated by de Beauvoir's comments on the relationship between 
girls and their dolls, for de Beauvoir writes: "o•• (the girl) exercises 
upon it (her doll) her sovereign authority, sometimes even tears off 
its arms, beats it, tortures it. Which is to say, she experiences 
subjective affirmation and identification through the doll" (p.310)o 
The act of kicking a wall thus seems to have as much significance in 
de Beauvoiris theory as confronting an opponent in a bloody fighto By 
playing down the exaction of recognition - recognition necessary in 
Hegelian terms to obtain objective proof - de Beauvoir is able to 
underline the importance of violence without simultaneously positing 
1 
the inevitability of inequality. Inequality leads to dominance and as 
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such is at odds with de Beauvoir 7 s emphasis on freedom and the importance 
of reciprocity. 
For Hegel the fight between Self and Other is significant for 
two reasons: on the one hand it shows that man is prepared to risk 
his life for an idea; on the other, through recognition, it allows man 
to gain objective proof of his sovereignty. So far we have shown that 
de Beauvoir does not elevate man to master using the idea of recognition) 
but now we should see if she uses the idea of a risk of life as an 
explanation for male supremacy in a way which is closer to the Hegelian 
master-slave dialectic. Since de Beauvoir does not portray the aggression 
between individuals as a matter of life or death, essentially this 
means inquiring about the significance man's hunting role would be 
given in Hegelian philosophy. 
In the foregoing chapter it was shown that de Beauvoir emphasises 
the significance of hunting to man 7s emergence as a human being. 
Superficially in Hegelian terms, hunting could benefit the hunter in 
that such an activity involves a risk of life and may confirm sovereignty. 
The second of these reasons, however, can be immediately dismissed. 
After all, if confirmation of sovereignty cannot be gained in the 
Hegelian master-slave dialectic by the death of oneis oppo11ent, it 
certainly cannot be attained in hunting by the death of a mere animal. 
Therefore, for de Beauvoir to make hunting significant, in Hegelian 
terms its humanising significance must be based on the idea that it 
entails a risk of life. However, as the significance of the risk of 
life in Hegelian philosophy is that it shows man risking his life for 
an idea
1
it is impossible to see how hunting - part of a simple project 
to survive - can be interpreted in such a way. Indeed, given the 
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existence of natural predators, it could be argued that hunting, far 
from being an activity which demonstrates man1s status as human being, 
, underlies his specifically animal nature. Thus when de Beauvoir states 
that it is in hunting and fishing that man "proved dramatically that 
life is not the supreme value for man, but on the contrary it should 
be made to serve ends more important than life itself" (p.95), she 
cannot expect the backing of Hegel. 
So far, then, we have seen tha~ de Beauvoir 1 s notion of violence 
is different from its Hegelian equivalent in a few fundamental respects • 
. But the important point to be grasped is that de Beauvoir fails to 
define precisely why she considers violence to be a human act. Thus 
she elevates acts ranging from hunting to street corner brawls simply 
because they are based on physical aggression. In many cases de Beauvoir's 
notion of combat between two individuals corresponds to what Hegel 
expressly dismisses as "duelling~" Indeed Hegel, anxious that some 
might misinterpret the Fight, specifically states: "Duelling must 
definitely not be confused with the fight for recognition which constitutes 
a necessary moment in the development of a human spirit." In short, 
Hegel does not want to give significance to violent acts which, "like 
the barbarism of the Middle Ages,." merely demonstrate "the shamefulness 
of a desire, which, in spite of its vileness, was ambitious for outward 
2 
honour." This is because such acts do not involve a life and death 
struggle for recognition on which the fighter's human status depends. 
From a comparison between de Beauvoir and Hegel we thus see that 
a major aspect of her theory is simply stated and not justified. We 
never fully know why de Beauvoir believes violent, life-risking acts 
make man superior to woman, and accordingly de Beauvoir's whole theory 
of the origins of woman's oppression is in doubt. 
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Before evaluating de Beauvoir's use of creative labour in her 
historical account we should note an intriguing feature of de Beauvoir 1 s 
use of violence. Although violence is an important aspect of the 
process leading to womanis subordination, de Beauvoir never argues 
that the relationship between the sexes has involved physical aggressiono 
Thus the confirmation of sovereignty man acquires from violence is gained 
from male opponents, from hunting and from woman's recognition of his 
achievements. But his advantage over woman was not obtained because 
he beat her in combat. This is what underlies de Beau voir is assertion 
that "the couple is an original Mitsein" in as much as this is premised 
on the idea that unlike the relations between men, the sexes do not 
have an urge to dominate one another, to become engaged in combat. 
In arguing that violence between males and females has been 
insignificant in the origins of woman's oppression;de Beauvoir differs 
from many feminist theorists. Man's ability to dominate women physically 
is often advanced as the main reason for woman's oppression and the 
mechanism which perpetuates such subordinationo For example, Susan 
Brownmillar in Against Our Will argues that rape was man 1 s first act of 
dominance over woman and the way in which such dominance is maintained: 
••• rape became not only a male prerogative, but man's basic 
weapon of force against women, the principal agent of his 
will and her fear. His forcible entry into her body, despite 
her physical protestations and struggle, became the vehicle 
of his victorious conquest over her being, the ultimate 3 test of his superior strength, the triumph of his manhood. 
Brownmillar subsequently adds: "(rape) ••• is nothing more or less than 
a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in 
a state of fear. n4 It is interesting to compare Brownrnillar' s view with 
de Beauvoir' So The former apparently believes that such sexual violence 
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confirmed man's sovereignty while de Beauvoir argues that in the early 
dawn of civilisation, the significant violence in the sexual act was 
between "rutting males" and not between the sexual partners. 
In place of the idea that man came to oppress woman because he 
is physically stronger, de Beauvoir argues that "the key to the whole 
mystery" of the origins of woman as"the Other 11is that she voluntarily 
recognised man and accepted her own devaluation. However, having done 
so, it was the bronze tool which permitted this devaluation to be 
transformed into subordination. In other words, in de Beauvoir's theory 
man's exclusive participation in creative labour led to woman's oppression. 
It is de Beauvoir's idea that woman was excluded from the use of the 
bronze tool which will now be assessed. It is useful to bear in mind 
that the criticism which will be advanced against de Beauvoir's use 
of creative labour is quite different from that against her use of 
violence. We did not dispute her idea that the sexes were differentially 
involved in violent pursuits but in the following section we shall 
question whether de Beauvoir can justifiably maintain that women have 
historically been excluded from creative labour. 
II 
Unfortunately de Beauvoir is not as consistent on the subject 
of woman's labour as our examination in the previous chapter may have 
suggested. The general conclusion of de Beauvoir's survey of women's 
no 
work in primitive societies is that "inj domain whatever did she create: 
she maintained the life of the tribe by giving it children and bread 
} 
nothing more" (p.1 05). But only a few pages earlier de Beauvoir makes 
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a contradictory claim. Referring to the role of woman in early 
agricultural societies she maintains that even though womanfs maternal 
function more or less restricted her to a sedentary existenc~ she was 
nevertheless able to take an active part in agricultural productiono 
Moreover, de Beauvoir even claims that wamen were not only the main 
cultivators but also that they were at the heart of domestic industry: 
They wove mattings and blankets and made pottery. Frequently 
they took charge of barter; commerce was in their hands. 
Through them, therefore, the life of the clan was maintained 
and extended; children, flocks, crops, utensils, all the 
prosperity of the group, depended on their labour and their 
magic powers; they were the soul of the community (p.102). 
This is not the only statement on the subject of womanis work which 
opposes her general line of argument. For example, her claim that 
women in post-feudal society "played an economic and social part of 
real importance" (p.133) cannot be squared with her general historical 
conclusion that women have never "brought their influence to bear upon 
technique or economy" (p. 1 62). 
The major criticism of de Beauvoir's account of the history of 
woman's labour is not, however, that she contradicts herself but that 
the general line of argument is weako That is to say, de Beauvoiris 
minority references to the work undertaken by women - references which 
emphasise the important and productive nature of such work - may be 
borne out empirically while her main argument may not. Indeed while 
anthropologists disagree about the universality of patriarchY; there 
is nevertheless common agreement that in primitive societies women's 
5 
labour is economically necessary and awards them some social esteem. 
The economic and social importance of womenYs activities is but 
an extension of de Beauvoir's notion of a rigid sexual division of 
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labour. That is to say, if we accept her assumption that man's 
traditional role is one where he goes hunting and fishing and makes 
war, then we must simultaneously assume that his absence from home 
means that women are the ones mainly responsible for all other forms 
of social and economic organisation. This indeed is the kind of argument 
employed by anthropologists such as Evelyn Reed, but instead of it 
leading in Reed t s account to a denigration of woman is activities) it 
means an emphasis on the productive and creative labour traditionally 
undertaken by women. 
Reed, for example, in her book Woman 1 s Evolution: From Matriarchal 
Clan to Patriarchal Family, maintains that in primitive agricultural 
societies it was the women as vegetable gardeners, aimed with their 
"digging sticks" who were the main providers of the staple diet of 
the group: a diet which was very occasionally supplemented by the 
6 
meat gained by men in their hunting expeditions. Moreover, Reed maintains 
that in collecting, preparing and later cultivating vegetables, certain 
collateral equipment and techniques were required and that it was in 
the use of fire, the baking of bread, the conservation of food, and 
activities like the making of vessels - all activities of women - that 
we must locate the basis of human production and the origin of science 
and technique. Reed also argues that other articles made by women 
in their domestic and agricultural functions - textiles, cordage, 
leather-goods, pottery and so on - combined with the tradition of 
women as both house-builders and "medicine men~" gave them significance 
and status in the primitive social groupo 
However, although most anthropologists, even those in the 
dominant patriarchal school, acknowledge the extent of women's labour 
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in primitive societies, this acknowledgement may go hand in hand with 
the notion of the dominant male and subservient female. Often the 
tendency to minimise the status of womanis labour, despite its magnitude, 
stems from its domestic character. Again as Evelyn Reed points out, 
The impressive labour record of women is obscured by the 
usual description of it as "household" work. This gives 
the impression that primitive women, like housewives today, 
were preoccupied with the small chores of individual homes, 
isolated fror one another and having no part in social 
production a 
There is, however, another major reason why some anthropologists 
simultaneously accept the importance and volume of such women's labour 
but maintain it has little social standing. And this is to be found 
in the prevalent tendency to glorify man's hunting role; to concentrate 
on the flamboyant activities and ceremonies often associated with 
hunting and to see the work of women, despite its importance, as 
8 
drudgery. Indeed it is sometimes argued that even though women in 
such societies are the main producersJthis is not through choice but 
because men appropriate the dangerous, exciting activities leaving 
the hard, uninteresting work to the women. This interpretation is based 
on the notion of female inferiority, and as this notion is itself 
based on the idea of woman 7 s economic dependency on man, it does not 
square with the evidence that suggests women were once the most productive 
sex. Much more interesting arguments can, however, be made regarding de 
Beauvoiris tendency to denigrate womanis labouro 
It is difficult to believe that de Beauvoir is simply ignorant 
of the nature of women 7s lives in primitive societies and of the weight 
of evidence accumulated against her description and conclusion. Indeed, 
when we take into consideration the passages in which she contradicts 
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her own conclusion and the fact that she summarises Engels' theory -
a theory in which woman's economic role is emphasised- then it does 
seem that, despite the labour record of women, de Beauvoir decided 
that such labour was neither economically significant nor of real human 
value. While some anthropologists may come to similar conclusions, 
there seems to be little justification in de Beauvoir's own philosophical 
terms for adopting such an approach. 
For example, anthropologists may emphasise the importance of 
hunting in a primitive society because this is the activity which the 
inhabitants say has real value and dignity. However, de Beauvoir 
rarely accepts things as they appear but, on the contrary, she tries 
to analyse them according to their essential and inessential elements. 
Thus de Beauvoir later claims that even when the male in modern society 
seems to be dominated by the female, it is she who is really the 
inessential and the slave in this relationship. De Beauvoir is not 
likely to accept that hunting makes man more significant just because 
this is what hunting society believes. Following Hegel, she may 
attempt to demonstrate that the apparently dominant mode of existence 
is present~ supported by its inferiors and is also about to be surpassed. 
Moreover, even if we accept the idea that man historically 
forced woman to do the work he himself did not want, this should not, 
in de Beauvoir's terms, automatically lead to a denigration of woman 1 s 
role. It would mean that woman occupied the position of Hegel's slave -
forced to take part in labour. Such a perception would be confirmed 
by the fact that the kind of labour reputed to be traditionally undertaken 
by women satisfies the requirements of Hegelian creative labour in that 
it yields products which externalise the consciousness of their creator 
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and teach the important lessons of science and technique. In this 
light we can see the sense of Evelyn Reed's belief that, given man1s 
preoccupation with hunting and related occupations, through their 
"manifold labour activities, the minds of women developed at a more 
9 
rapid pace than those of the men. n 
It is possible that de Beauvoir, anxious to forestall such a 
conclusion, deliberately equates creative labour in her theor,y with the 
use of the bronze tool. She thus rules out the possibility that 
activities like pottery, weaving, leathermaking are creative acts which 
humanise the labourer and, when listing these as the activities of 
women, associates them with woman 1 s "magic powers" and not with 
science and technique. Indeed it is almost possible to believe that 
de Beauvoir latches on to the bronze tool as the beginnings of creative 
labour proper, and hence, the dawn of civilisation, only so that she 
can disassociate women from the process. That is, de Beauvoir chooses 
a labour activity from which she believes woman1s weakness would 
naturally exclude her. However, even if we accept de Beauvoir's idea 
that it is the bronze tool which marks the era of creative labour and 
hence a new stage in human development, there is little reason for us 
to accept her claim that women would automatically have been excluded. 
The primitive woman of m~ anthropological texts certainly does not 
look too weak to use the bronze toole In more recent times women 
10 
have worked in coal mines and taken part in arduous agricultural labour. 
However, de Beauvoir does not seem too eager to establish her 
theory as verifiable. Although she states that her aim is to review 
relevant "data of prehistoric research and ethnography in the light 
of existentialist philosophy" (po93) within five pages of such a review 
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she has come to definitive conclusions. Thus on the basis of scant 
evidence and little argument de Beauvoir maintains: "An existentialist 
perspective has enabled us, then, to understand how the biological and 
economic condition of the primitive horde must have led to male 
supremacy" (p.97). But it is the perspective rather than the data 
which lead to de Beauvoir's conclusion. Indeed there are a number of 
theoretical reasons why an existentialist should construct a theory 
of this kind - a theory in which it is man, not woman, who is seen as 
a more human being. And it is the se which we shall now examine. 
III 
While looking at Being and Nothingness we saw that for Sartre 
man is a solitary being, in the sense of being imprisoned in his own 
subjectivity; he lives in a world in which all others are potential 
enemies to his desires. It is conflict, not Mitsein, which Sartre 
believes is the original meaning of being-for-others. Although 
Sartre later modified this aspect of his theory, he nevertheless 
retained the view that the Other is usually seen as an enemy and that 
it is the individual who must be taken as the starting point for any 
ontological inquiry. In short, Sartre 1 s existentialism is individualistic 
and, by emphasising conflict, inevitably characterises human relations 
as based on a competitive struggle. 
Although Sartre in Being and Nothingness did not attempt a 
metaphQrsical interpretation of being, in The Second Sex de Beauvoir is 
faced with the prospect of outlining how the for-itself aquires the 
consciousness and mode of existence which differentiates it from the 
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in-itself. Essentially it is this which she attempts to explain in 
her historical account. Using Sartre's ontology the process of humanisation 
for de Beauvoir is the process through which man becomes a complete 
and competitive individuale To this extent, de Beauvoir is able to 
latch on to Hegelis principles of human development for he too conceives 
of the origins of self-consciousness in terms of competition and 
individualisation. If we now relate this notion of humanisation to 
male and female roles we shall see why de Beauvoir, without any 
recourse to historical "facts," was led to denigrate woman and elevate 
man. 
At one point in The Second Sex de Beauvoir maintains: "It is 
not as single individuals that human beings are to be defined in the 
first place; ••• the couple is an original Mitsein and as such it 
always appears as a permanent or temporary element in a large collectivi tyn 
(pp.67-8). However, despite this statement de Beauvoir does discuss 
human development and the origins of woman's oppression in individual 
terms. Instead of outlining the significance of male and female 
biological roles in the context of a group, de Beauvoir discusses 
their significance only with reference to ~ man and .2.!!§. woman. For 
example, de Beauvoir uses the nuclear family as the model relationship 
between the sexes when she writes: "··· it requires a male for every 
female to ensure the survival of the offspring after they are born, to 
defend them against enemies, to wrest from them the wherewithal to 
satisfy their needs" (p.68). Even though social organisation helps 
women to reduce, if not eliminate, the restrictions of reproduction 
and the dependency of young, de Beauvoir' s individualistic starting-
point makes such measures irrelevant. Not surprisingly we find no 
place in her theory for discussion of such practices as communal 
childcare and lactation prevalent in primitive societies which allowed 
women as a group to defend and feed themselves and their offspring.11 
Thus because de BeauvoiiJ as an existentialist, does define human 
beings as indi vidualsJ and because individual man is not limited by the 
process of reproduction)his position is much preferred to individual 
womanis. 
According to this existentialist perspective..,woman's further 
disadvantage is that as an individual she must compete with other 
individuals and in this struggle feel herself to be a human being. 
Any restriction on her independent, self-affirming action - any barrier 
to competition- blocks her human development. Accordingly woman's 
maternal role keeps her at a more primitive level of existence in as 
much as it leads to dependence on others and co-operation. In this 
way she is more bound to animal life. This is not to say that de 
Beauvoir equates co-operation with animality, merely that she believes 
the distinction between humans and animals to involve individualisation 
and conceptualises individualisation in terms of conflict and struggle. 
The notion that competition is the basis of human development 
is abstract and theoreticalo De Beauvoir takes it as a starting-point 
because it is in harmony with her wider philosophy. Using a different 
set of definitions -of "human" behaviour one could equally well begin 
from the assumption that it is co-operation which underlies human action, 
and in so doing come to a completely different conclusion on the nature 
of woman's role in human development. In Woman's Evolution the 
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evolutionary anthropologist Evelyn Reed has indeed used this point of 
departure and not surprisingly her work contrasts sharply with de Beauvoir 1 s. 
By briefly comparing de Beauvoir's theory with Reed's it may be possible 
to explicate more clearly the values and assumptions on which each 
is based. Reedis theory is well suited for such a comparison because 
her emphasis on co-operation and the human nature of woman 1 s reproductive 
role places her in opposition to de Beauvoir whose emphasis on aggression 
12 
and individuality leads her to favour the male. 
IV 
Like de Beauvoir, Reed emphasises the importance of the activities 
of the rutting male in animal life. However, Reed urges us to see that 
such rutting, far from illustrating the superiority of the male, 
demonstrates that masculine biology acts as a check on his potential 
for involvement in humanising pursuits. Reed maintains that the 
rutting male exhibits the violent nature of male sexuality which 
inhibits his ability to co-operate with his fellows. And as Reed 
argues that it is co-operation, not competition, which is the basis 
for human development) she claims that male sexuality confines males to 
an animal type of life. 
Such aggression and individualisation is not, according to Reed, 
to be found in females who, because of their reproductive function 
and the dependency of off-spring are required to co-operate with young 
and at times with one another for the purposes of survival. Thus in 
comparison with the "combatitive sex" - a term which here has negative 
connotations -the co-operative features of femininity become in Reed's 
terminology "the starting point for the modification of animal traits 
and the development of new habits required for socialising the species.n13 
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Drawing on a wide range of material Reed attempts to show 
that although in the animal kingdom males fight one another} they do 
not dominate the females; no sexual restrictions are placed on females 
and they copulate as and when they desire. Moreover, Reed argues that 
female dependency on males, a basic premise of de Beauvoir's work and 
those theorists positing the universality of the father-headed family, 
is not to be found in mammalian species. Indeed Reed maintains that 
females' contact with males is usually limited to copulation
1
for after 
the event the female separates herself from the males and maintains 
this segregation throughout pregnancy and the period of lactation. 
In monkey, ape and other animal species the father does not provide for 
mother or yonng and the female is totally independent of him. Reed 
argues, in fact, that the compulsive separation of females from males 
during and after the period of pregnancy is due to the aggressive 
characteristics of the male who will often injure and/or eat both mate 
and off-spring if in contact with them. 
Thus, Reed maintains, within animal groups females and young 
are often preserved from the violent males by dint of their exclusion 
from them. Where contact does take place, it is not on the basis of 
equal numbers of adult males and females, for the latter far outnumber 
males in animal groups. In opposition to those who claim that the 
superior strength of the male is a sign of his dominance and worth, 
Reed maintains that male physical strength is rendered worthless in a 
natural environment because f~males "with a capacity for co-operation 
and collective action had a strength superior to that of any single 
14 
individual." 
According to Reed's interpretation of animal behaviour, it is 
female animals who tend to band together in groups in co-operative 
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association while the males, as outsiders, fight for access to them 
during the mating seasono The successful male may thus be allowed 
access to the female group to act as "stud" for them, while the weaker 
males are forced into a solitary existence. Without the protection 
of the group and often in violent competition to become the dominant 
maleJ their chances of survival are limited. The contrast between the 
picture of the male animal, epitordsed in the description of the rutting 
male affirming his sovereignty through violence. offered us by de 
J 
Beauvoi~ and the unflattering portrait which emerges from Reed's work; 
could hardly be more stark: 
At best he is a tolerated member of a female group; at worst 
he is an outcast relegated to a solitar,y life. Far from 
being the superior and ruling sex, as men are in our society, 
animal males are the secondary sex, the incidenta~~ex, and, 
where males are too numerous, the expendable sex. 
Not only does Reed argue that women.were the more co-operative 
and hence, in her terms, human sex, but also that they were able to 
evolve a social structure. In being ahead in this way, it was ultimately 
women who brought about the necessary socialisation of men. According 
to Reed this socialisation was accomplished once women had instituted 
the controls of totemism and taboo. Thus before males were admitted 
to the community of women and children; certain rules had to be observed. 
The aim of these rules was to preserve the unity of the group by 
forcing men to "hunt out" for both sex and food. In order to make 
the male members of the group "brothers" in close co-operation with one 
another - a prerequisite for the development of human economic and 
social life - they had to be prevented from fighting for sexual access 
to the women in the group. This meant that within the kin group sexual 
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relations between males and females were forbidden. This is not, Reed 
maintains, a taboo against incest as it covers relations between males 
and females not biologically related. Indeed throughout the book 
Reed argues that the incest taboo found in all societies, generally 
explained as the result of the knowledge of the nweakening'' effects 
of in-breeding, is usually not an incest taboo at all but a rule 
promulgated to preserve the solidarity of the male members of the group. 
According to Reed, it was the women who, having laid the 
foundations for human action, were originally most active in the 
development of social and economic life. As we know, Reed claims that 
it is in womanis activities of cooking, cultivating, making vessels 
and so o~ that tools and techniques were first required. Concluding 
her survey of the productive record of primitive women Reed thus 
maintains: 
They were, so to speak, the first farmers and industrialists; 
the first scientists, doctors, nurses, architects, and 
engineers; the first teachers, artists, linguists, and 
historians. The households they managed were not merely 
kitchens and nurseries; they wer, 6the first factories, laboratorie& and social centers. 
In support of her claim that eo-operatic~ not competition,is 
the basis of human developmen~Reed illustrates the co-operation which 
underlies the social and economic structures of civilised societies 
and shows that there is an important distinction to be made between 
the highly individualistic competition institutionalised in our society 
and that competition and individualisation instinctively based in 
"Nature~ s Jungle. 1' She urges us to see that "long before men could 
become enmeshed in their awn social competition, they first had to win 
total liberation from the competitive struggles characteristic of 
animals and become socialo"17 
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It is interesting to note how de Beauvoir's and Reed's 
different assumptions lead to radically different theories of the 
significance of woman's reproductive role. Though they agree that 
maternity is somewhat limiting to woman's activities and that there 
is something inherently aggressive in animal males 1 sexuality, these 
theorists endow womanw s biological role with different historical 
meanings. Thus Reed sees woman's maternal function as the bridge 
between animal and human behaviour in as much as it leads to the 
co-operation of mother and child and engenders socially based co-operation 
between femaleso Reed also maintains that male aggression and rivalry, 
romanticised by de Beauvoir and such defenders of male supremacy as 
Desmond Morris and Robert Ardrey, are barriers and not means to 
18 
humanisation. De Beauvoir, on the other hand, sees woman's biological 
role as a handicap in the process of humanisation in as much as it 




In the last two chapters it has been argued that even though 
de Beauvoir does not rigorously or accurately apply Hegelian concepts, 
her theory of the origins of woman's oppression can, nevertheless, be 
best understood in the light of the master-slave dialectic. In order 
to bring out this Hegelianism, however, it has been necessary to 
underplay the other ideas bound up in de Beauvoiris theory. This 
emphasis on de BeauvoirVs Hegelianism is at odds with her own assertion 
that woman's oppression is based on economic necessity; with the claim: 
"Woman was dethroned by the advent of private property, and her lot 
through the centuries has been bound up with private property" (p.43). 
How are we to come to terms with this apparent contradiction between 
de BeauvoirV s Hegelianism and such "historical materialism"? 
It is tempting to assume that de Beauvoir simply tries to 
combine the two elements. This is the position of Juliet Mitchell who, 
in her book Woman vs Estate maintains: "Concurrent ••• with the idealist 
psychological explanation, de Beauvoir uses an orthodox economist 
1 
approach,'' But the temptation to take this road must be avoided/ 
for the fusion of the two bases is not a meeting of equals: in 
relation to ontological "factsi" economic factors are not given equal 
weight. It is only when de Beauvoir has outlined what she, as an 
existentialist, believes is the structure of human existence, that 
secondary factors, such as economics, are introduced into her account. 
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This is why we elaborated de Beauvoir's theor,y of the origins 
of woman's oppression without recourse to her notion of the rol'~ of 
economic factors. With the knowledge gained from the preceding analysis 
of de Beauvoir's theory we are now in a good position to examine the 
context in which she thinks economic factors like private property 
important. We begin this assessment of de Beau voir vs "historical 
materialism" by surrrrnarising Engels r theory of woman's oppression and 
de Beauvoiris criticisms of it. 
I 
EngelsW Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, 
as its title suggests, is not exclusively about women. 
2 
His theory 
of the origins of woman's oppression is undertaken with reference to 
the development of the state and class society. And it is this grounding 
in the development of economic and political factors which makes 
Engels' theory of women w s oppression "historical materialis~' A 
basic premise of Engels'l work is that woman's oppression is not 
natural but is the result of an historical event. Engels argues that 
early societies were matriarchal; that the transition to patriarchal 
society was induced by economic factors such as the development of 
private property. To understand this transition it is necessary to 
understand Engels' conception of the sexual division of labour in 
primitive societies. 
Engels maintains that in primitive societies man was responsible 
for hunting and fishing and that woman was engaged in gardening and 
household tasks. Each sex was supreme in its own sphere and owned 
the instruments and tools for its labour. As the economy developed 
and there was an increase in the areas of production, notably livestock, 
3 
undertaken by man: "to him belonged the cattle" and all the ensuing 
wealth. At this stage women may have shared the enjoyment of such 
surplus, claims Engels, but did not own or control it. Engels argues 
that as man was now responsible for the most important aspects of 
production he was elevated to the status previously held by woman. 
Engels also argues that manYs wealth did not simply raise him 
above woman but also "created a stimulus to utilize this strengthened 
position in order to overthrow the traditional order of inheritance in 
4 5 
favour of his children!' Thus man abolished "mother-right" (descent 
and inheritance reckoned through the mother) and introduced monogamy 
so that he could bequeath his property to children of "undisputed 
6 
paternit~" It is this transition in society which Engels refers to 
7 
as: " ••• the world historic defeat of the female sex." Man subsequently 
took charge of household affairs and, -with woman reduced to servitude, 
she soon "became the slave of his lust and a mere instrument for the 
8 
production of children!' In Engels' theory the oppression of women 
is something which arose from the development of productive forces. As 
the oppression of woman coincided with the transition from communal 
to private propert~it also coincided with the app2arance of social 
classes. 
From this summary it is possible to see a number of factors 
common to de Beauvoir and Engels. There is, for example, in both their 
theories an emphasis on woman being naturally weaker than man but a 
simultaneous rejection of the idea that this is enough to explain the 
origins of woman's oppression. Both theorists claim that we must look 
outside of Nature to explain why woman came to be oppressed. For 
Engels this explanation is found in the significance the sexual 
division of labour came to have as productive forces developed and the 
institution of private property emerged. For de Beauvoir it is the 
bronze tool and the emergence of man as a sovereign individual which, 
among other factors, are important. In short, de Beauvoir emphasises 
ontology and Engels emphasises economics. And it is this difference 
9 
in emphasis which underlies de Beauvoiris critique. 
In The Second Sex de Beauvoir claims that the very premise 
of historical materialism is inadequate; that it cannot deal with the 
problems of woman's oppression in as much as these "concern the whole 
man and not that abstraction: Homo oeconomicus" (p.87). In other words, 
de Beauvoir maintains that Engels overemphasises economic factors and 
consequently glosses over many problems. He cannot, for example, 
explain how private property, the pivotal factor in his theory, came 
about. Indeed de Beauvoir argues that a major shortcoming of Engels 1 
theory is that he discusses private property only with reference to 
such factors as the division of labour and the surplus engendered by 
new techniqueso Thus she takes issue with Engels because he deals 
with the subject only in terms of the mechanics of the economic system 
when, she claims, the real debate should focus on how we can account 
for the very idea of personal possession. 
In The Second Sex de Beauvoir does not challenge Engelsi 
emphasis on the link between woman 1 s oppression and the development of 
property relations. Indeed de Beauvoir wants to retain this emphasis 
in her own theory but can do so only once this has been grafted onto 
a different philosophical base. Thus de Beauvoir aims to explain the 
rise of private property and its relationship to the oppression of women 
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not by concentrating on the economic factors involved in such a social 
transitionJbut by examining the development of subjectivity. 
In the attempt to integrate the importance of private property 
with her own existentialist ontology, de Beauvoir maintains that 
personal possession implies an inherent desire for individuality on the 
part of the existent but that this desire may remain unfulfilled 
unless the objective conditions for individualisation are present. In 
his most primitive stages, de Beauvoir claims, man lacks such objective 
conditions; he is a universal creature, daring to think of himself 
only as a member of a tribe or group. However, as we know, following 
Hegel,de Beauvoir maintains that it is through creative labour that 
man can begin to differentiate himself from the mass and forge his own 
particular personality. The objective conditions which de Beauvoir 
believes necessary for creative labour and individualisation are 
arguably more materialist than is the case in Hegelis theory in that 
they are expressed by de Beauvoir in terms of techniques and do not 
refer to manis immediate inter-personal relations. Thus it is not the 
institution of slavery and forced. labour which have profound significance 
in de Beauvoir's theory, but instead it is the discovery of bronze. 
The link made by de Beauvoir between creative labour and 
individualisation on the one hand, and the drive for personal possession 
on the other, is made on the basis of Hegelian philosophyo Thus as 
de Beauvoir claims that the subject always strives to find the recognition 
of his sovereignty in the objects of his labour, she subsequently 
maintains: " ••• it is therefore understandable that he places upon 
them a value no less fundamental than upon his very life" (p.88). 
Indeed de Beauvoir implies that primitive communism may be an appropriate 
form of property-holding for the undifferentiated members of a tribe 
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but that once man as tool-user comes to find the truth of his subjective 
certainty of himself as a human individual in the products of his 
labour, he needs to claim such objects as his own. 
Having established in her own philosophical terms why the 
institution of private property must be seen as an important stage in 
human development, de Beauvoir does not then adopt Engels? account of 
why this was a causal factor in the origins of woman 1 s oppression. 
Instead she maintains that Engels fails to provide such an account; 
that we must not follow him and simply "deduce the oppression of woman 
from the institution of private property" (p. 88). As we have already 
seen,in de Beauvoir's terms Engels' approach is inadequate because his 
analysis is restricted to the consideration of economic factors. 
At one point de Beauvoir claims that although Engels: 
••• saw clearly that woman's muscular weakness became a 
real point of inferiority only in its relation to the bronze 
and iron tool; ••• he did not see that the limitations of 
her capacity for labour constituted in themselves a concrete 
disadvantage only in a certain perspective (p.88, emphasis 
added). 
In the context of this criticism of Engels, de Beauvoir claims that 
it is only "because man is a being of transcendence and ambition (that) ••• 
he projects new urgencies through every new tool"; that is, it is only 
with the discovery of bronze that man's ambitions were spurred on> 
causing him to view woman and her labour activities as part of his 
"project for enrichment and expansion" (p.88). 
But de Beauvoir claims that although this desire is significant> 
it is not in itself enough to explain why man was bound to become 
womanis oppressor. Inde~d de Beauvoir believes that it is only when 
we take into consideration "the imperialism of the human consciousness" 
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that we can begin to understand why man would wish to exploit his 
' powerful position vis a vis the opposite sex. In other words, de 
Beauvoir disputes Engels 7 theory partially on the grounds that it 
cannot explain why manis economic power did not, nevertheless, lead 
to "friendly association of the sexes" (p.89). 
II 
Leaving aside for the time being her notion of an inevitable 
desire for domination, let us trace the route taken by de Beauvoir 
from her ontological assumptions to her conclusion that "woman was 
dethroned by the advent of private property". Returning to those 
factors alreaqy encountered in Chapter Six, relevant to the origins 
of man's oppression of woman (i.e. not Nature's), we see that many of 
these indirectly relate to the development of private property. De 
Beauvoir's notion of the ontological advantage gained by males through 
creative labour (self-consciousness, recognition, domination of Nature 
and thus,by definition,woman) and the link between this and her emphasis 
on personal possession leads her ipso facto to the institution of 
private property and to the origins of woman's oppression. 
This connection, however, is made even more explicit in the 
later sections of her historical account: the institution of private 
property becomes in itself a reason for man 1 s desire for woman 7 s 
subordination and ceases to be significant in de Beauvoir's theory 
only in as much as it is linked to man's ontological advantage. This 
direct link between private property and waman's oppression is made by 
de Beauvoir on the basis of her notion that as man progressed he 
became preoccupied with paternity and the inheritance system: 
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It is easy to grasp the fundamental importance of this 
institution (private property) if one keeps in mind the fact 
that the owner transfers, alienates, his existence into 
his property; he cares more for it than for his very life; 
it overflows the narrow limits of this mortal lifetime, and 
continues to exist beyond the body1 s dissolution - the earthly 
and material incorporation of the immortal soul. But this 
survival can only come about if the property remains in the 
hands of the owner: it can be his beyond death only if it 
belongs to individuals in whom he sees himself projected, who 
are his. To cultivate the paternal domain, to render worship 
to the names of the father - these together constitute one 
and the same obligation for the heir: he assures ancestral 
survival on earth and in the underworld (p.11J). 
Thus de Beauvoir maintains that to gain what he desired man not only 
had to deprive woman of the right to own and bequeath property, but 
also had to restrict womanis freedom so that he could be assured 
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children of "undisputed paternity;" 
This theory echoes Engels' claim that the overthrow of "mother-
right" constituted "the world historic defeat of the female sey," But 
once again we must realise that Engels and de Beauvoir reach their 
shared conclusion via fundamentally different theoretical routes. 
Engels claims that it was the economic power and wealth enjoyed by 
man which in themselves created "a stimulus" to use his position in 
order "to overthrow the traditional order of inheritance in favour 
of his children." De Beauvoir holds that wealth and paternity confirm 
man's sovereignty but that they can hardly account for his ontological 
pretensions. 
De Beauvoir is certainly able to point out that there is a 
missing link in Engels' theory between private property and woman's 
oppression in as much as he never manages to show convincingly that 
to man 
economic factors would in themselves be a "stimulus"/to change the 
inheritance system and hence to dominate woman. And it is an attempt 
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to make the link in terms of ontology which de Beauvoir undertakes in 
The Second Sex.. It is interesting to note, however, th'at de Beauvoir 
herself is open to a similar attack. The idea of "the imperialism of 
the human consciousness" is a pivotal factor in her theory, yet this 
.. 1 t d d •t . . . di d 11 1s s1mp y asser e an 1 s or1g1n 1s never scusse • 
The difference between de Beauvoir's and Engels' theory of the 
relationship between private property and woman's oppression reflects 
the most basic opposition of idealism to materialism. In Engels' 
theory we are led to see the development of patriarchy and the sub-
ordination of women within the context of changes in the forces of 
production and the resultant shift in the balance of economic power. 
His is a theory based on economic and material factors of existence 
and it devalues th·3 role of ideas in social change. The point of 
departure for de Beauvoir, on the other hand, is extentialist ontology -
in which light, economic factors gain significance only within the 
realm of ideas. Transposed from a materialist to an idealist philosophical 
base, private property in de Beauvoir 9 s theory is important not for 
economic reasons but because it confirms the individual's ontological 
pretensions" The significance of de Beauvoir's switch in emphasis 
from ontological to historical materialist factors is that ultimately 
she concludes that a socialist revolution - a change in the economic 
order -will lead to woman's liberation. In other words, de Beauvoir 
gives a materialist solution to something which she originally posed as 
12 
an ontological problem. 
Nevertheless, in de Beauvoir's theory it appears that once 
woman has been dethroned, economic factors come to have great significance 
in the evolution of her role in history. That is to say, having outlined 
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the essentially ontological reasons for woman's emergence as "the Other," 
de Beauvoir subsequently emphasises the importance of economic factors 
like the inheritance system and the requirements for woman's labour 
to her historical role. She writes: 
In human history the equilibrium between the forces of production 
and reproduction is brought about by different means under 
different economic conditions, and these conditions govern 
the relations of male and female to offspring and in consequence 
to each other (p.68). 
It is only to the extent that de Beauvoir begins to portray changes in 
woman's situation as a "by-product of the economic evolution of the 
masculine world,n13 that Mitchell is correct in calling this aspect of 
de Beauvoir' s analysis an "orthodox economist approach." 
Part IV 
CONTEMPORARY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SEXES 
Chapter Nine 
The Development of a Girl's Life 
The foregoing chapters have been concerned with de Beauvoir 1 s 
theory of womanis emergence as "the second sexn. Now we must examine 
de Beauvoiris portrayal of the contemporary relations between the 
sexes. Our main purpose will be to look at de Beauvoiris theor.y of 
the development of a girlis lifeo In other words, we shall elucidate 
how de Beauvoir believes the oppression of women, founded in history, 
is maintained in contemporary society. In order to illustrate the 
originality of de Beauvoiris theory it is necessary to begin by 
indicating the usual feminist approach to the perpetuation of sex 
roles. 
I 
The use of biological reductionist explanations to account 
for the differences between males and females is not accepted by most 
feminists. They generally reject the idea that there are innate masculine 
and feminine urges which induce certain patterns of behaviour or 
attitudes in individuals. Instead most feminists maintain that men 
and women are socially conditioned into behaving according to rigidly 
defined sex roles. To this extent, many feminist books on the development 
of a girl 9s life concentrate on describing the various social processes 
which condition her into fulfilling a feminine role. Ann Oakley, for 
example, in an impressive survey of studies of sex and gender formation, 
tries to illustrate how sexual identity is formed through such things 
1 
as toys, games and parental attitudes. It is largely within the 
1.50 
framework of sociology and psychology that Oakle.y seeks to show how 
"children are transformed into adults who are not only conscious of 
their gender roles but have, through long years of learning, internalised 
2 
them and made them part of their own personalities." 
There are various comments in The Second Sex which could be 
interpreted to mean that de Beauvoir too believes that females are 
quite simply "conditioned" into acting as women. Indeed one of the 
most frequently quoted passages of The Second Sex - the passage which 
opens Book Two - asserts such a view: 
One is not born, but rather becomes a woman. No biological, 
psychological, or economic fate determines the figure that the 
human female presents in society; it is civilisation as a 
whole that produces this creature, intermediate between 
male and eunuch, which is described as feminine (p.295, 3 
emphasis added). 
The notion that femininity is socially manufactured and then 
transmitted to girls, who are acted upon like mere objects in the 
process, is also the impression given by de Beauvoir elsewhere in 
The Second Sex. For example, she occasionally uses such words as 
"indoctrinate," "shape," "mould" (pp.296 ff) and claims 
that femininity far from being a "biological datum" is in "fact a 
destiny imposed upon (woman) by her teachers and by societyn(p.307, 
4 
emphasis added)o 
In recent years de Beauvoir seems to have become even more 
attracted to the idea that women are conditioned into accepting their 
feminine role. In a recent interview with Caroline Moorhead she 
maintained that differences between the sexes begin at birth for "even 
such a ridiculous thing as choosing a pink or blue blanket means that 
that parents start discriminating. o o o By the age of one the little 
boy has already been turned into a boy, the little girl into a girl." 
Recently de Beauvoir has also claimed that the current research which 
demonstrates the socially "conditioned" nature of sexual behaviour 
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"proves" that one of the leading ideas in The Second Sex is "correct-" 
In other words, it adds empirical weight to the notion advanced by 
her in 1949 that "one is not born but rather becomes a womano" 
But despite de Beauvoir 1s later adoption of what may be termed 
a "sociological" approach to the development of sex roles,and. despite 
the various comments which accord with this in The Second Sex, the 
main thrust of the argument in her book is contrary to such a view. 
If we bear in mind de Beauvoir's use of existentialist ontology we see 
that it is difficult for her, except in the most superficial way, to 
maintain that an individual's behaviour and attitudes are determined 
by the social situation in which he is placed while simultaneously 
5 
upholding the notion of immutable subjectivity and freedom. Indeed t.-/ 
the behaviourist element of the sociological approach, both in its 
implicit reduction of the individual to passive object and in its 
tendency to determinism, is basically at odds with the emphasis on 
freedom and subjectivity which lies at the core of Sartrian 
existentialist thought. 
For similar reasons de Beauvoiris existentialism is at odds 
with a psychoanalytic conception of individual developmen~ but this 
she states quite clearly in The Second Sex. However, although de 
Beauvoiris existentialist ontology inevitably leads her, like Sartre, 
to reject the major premises of psychoanalysis, in the chapter she 
devotes to tBe subject she claims not to attack psychoanalysis head ono 
For example, she does not follow Sartre and criticise the concept of 
the unconscious mind. She maintains that, instead of attempting to 
take issue with psychoanalysis as a whole, she merely hopes to evaluate 
its contribution to the study of woman's situation. 
(1974) 
Juliett Mitchell in her book Psychoanalysis and Feminism1claims 
I 
that in The Second Sex de Beauvoir does attempt to set up "a counter 
psychological philosophy;"~· Indeed Mitchell is critical of de Beauvoir's 
treatment of psychoanalysis_, claiming that de Beau voir's attack on this 
"scientific method of investigation" is made from the standpoint of 
philosophical belief. Moreover, Mi tchell claims that de Beau voir, in 
her attempt to make existentialism and psychoanalysis "meet on the 
same terrain ••• has confused Freudian psychoanalysis with Jungian 
7 
metaphysics." Mitchell subsequently attempts to unravel the various 
strands of Freud, Jung and Adler which she claims merges in de Beauvoir 1 s 
critique of psychoanalysiso However what Freud and other psycho-
analysts "really" said is outwith the scope of our study. But Mi tchell 
----
is correct to point out the philosophical nature of de Beauvoir's 
treatment of psychoanalysis; for despite de Beauvoir's.claim that she 
is not going to attack psychoanalysis per se, she quickly leaves the 
evaluation of Freud on the subject of women and begins to make 
general philosophical objections to his methodo Thus after describing 
in very superficial fashion the Oedipus complex, the Electra complex, 
the notion of libido and the clitoral and vaginal stages of female 
sexuality, de Beauvoir objects to Freud's method partly on the basis 
that he uses what is essentially a "masculine model" (p.73) to analyse 
8 
woman's sexuality and situation. Moreover, de Beau voir maintains that 
while it is true that girls are attracted to their fathers}this is 
based more on emotional attachment than sexual desire and emanates from 
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the nature of the father~s sovereignty- a sovereignty which de Beauvoir 
claims is socially basedo Indeed throughout this critique de Bea:uvoir 
accepts many of Freud?s descriptions of woman's feelings and behaviour 
but disputes the interpretation placed on them, criticising Freud for 
his alleged failure to explain the origins of what he sees4 Thus de 
Beauvoir accepts the existence of "penis envy." but only in as much as , 
the penis has symbolic worth "Within a world of concrete male dominance. 
She believes Freud?s thesis inadequate in that, by concentrating on 
anatomy, he fails to explain why male dominance has arisen. 
In Sartrian fashion one of de Beauvoir?s main objections to 
psychoanalysis is that it takes sexuality as an "irreducible datum" 
when in the existent there is "a more original ~quest of being', of 
which sexuality is only one of its aspects" (po77). To make sense of 
this 'iquest of beingw• de Beauvoir explicitly refers to Sartreis 
thesis in Being and Nothingness but swmmarises it as manis aspiration 
"to be at one concretely with the whole world, apprehended in all possible 
waysn (p. 77). For this reason, then, de Beauvoir claims: 
To work the earth, to dig a hole, are activities as original 
as the embrace, as coition, and they deceive themselves who 
see here no more than sexual symbolso The hole, the ooze, 
the gash, hardness, integrity are primary realities; and the 
interest they have for man is not dictated by the libido, 
but rather the libido will be coloured by the manner in which 
he becomes aware of them (p.77). 
De Beau voir is thus arguing that the individual's erotic urges can be 
understood only with reference to what Sartre calls his "fnndamental 
project"; that the erotic dimension of life can be understood only 
within this "unity of choice" (p.78). 
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For de Beauvoir the terrible weakness of all ps,ychoanalytic 
systems is that in favour of "determinism" they systematically11 reject 
the idea of choice and the correlated concept of value" (p.76). 
De Beauvoir thus takes issue with psychoanalysis because it maps out 
the individual's existence; it sees life as the mere "interplay of 
determinate elements" (p.75) and portrays the individual as the prey 
of external forces. This leads to another reason why de Beauvoir rejects 
a psychoanalytic view of woman's situation. De Beauvoir claims that 
in eschewing an explicit acceptance of values, and concomitantly a 
definition of what constitutes nhurnan" existence, psychoanalysis views 
any attempt made by woman to assert her sovereignty as "inauthentic" 
In short, it sees woman's attempt to escape the mutilation 
and restrictions of femininity as a "masculine protest" and not as a 
way to become a more human being. 
In place of the psychoanalytic tendency to portray the female 
child as divided between identifying with the mother or the fatheJ de 
Beauvoir hopes to show that for the girl the problem is that she is 
"enticed by two modes of alienation" (p~82 ). On the one hand, she 
can assert herself as subject and play at being a man, which will 
inevitably be a source of frustration, or she can accept her womanly 
lA .. 
destiny by adopting the role of object and Other. In this latter role 
she will also be frustrated since to accept oneself as such is, according 
to de Beauvoir, to go against one's original subjective aspirationse 
The most important point about de Beauvoir's scheme, however, is that 
she sees the girlVs development to maturity as involving a number of 
choices and values; that it is acted out at a conscious level. This 
is amply illustrated by de Beauvoir in the statement tha~contrary to 
ps,ychoanalysis: 
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••• I shall pose the problem of feminine destiny quite other-
wise. I shall place woman in a world of values and give her 
behaviour a dimension of liberty. I believe she has the 
power to choose between the assertion of her transcendence 
and her alienation as an object; she is not the plaything 
of contradictory drives; she devises solutions of diverse 
values in the ethical scale (p.82). 
Bearing in mind how de Beauvoir seeks to pose the problem for 
women, let us now examine how she outlines the development of a girl's 
life. In such a description of the development of the female child 
from birth to maturity there are two discernible phases which the child 
goes through. The first of these is outlined in the chapter entitled 
"Childhood"; the second in the chapter "The Young GirJ..n Let us look 
at the features of these two stages in turn. 
II 
De Beauvoir argues that up to about the age of three or four 
there is not much difference between boys and girls. "The dramas of 
birth and of weaning," writes de Beauvoir, "unfold after the same 
fashion for nurslings of both sexes" (p.295). The dramas to which 
de Beauvoir refers are essentially ones in which the infant, who 
originally feels immersed "in the bosom of the Whole" (p.296), comes 
to see itself as an autonomous subject. Bearing in mind de Beauvoir• s 
idea that the subject finds himself in external objects, in Freudian 
fashion, she claims that the child at this stage of its development \ 
requires to see itself reflected in an image. Such an image can be 
achieved either through a mirror or through the objectification gained 
from relations with parents. Although the child comes to see itself 
as a separate subject, de Beau voir claims that the very young child 
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attempts to deny such separation; to fight against this "original 
abandonment!' Such denial tends to be manifest in two basic ways: 
either by clinging physically to parents or by gaining approbation 
from adults in order to feel justified. 
At first, de Beauvoir claims, girls are privileged in this 
process. The "second weaning" - the withdrawal of intense body contact 
from the child - is less dramatic and brutal for girls than it is for 
boys and so to some extent she is protected from the "anguish of 
solitude" (p.298). However, according to de Beauvoir, the boy receives 
much compensation for this withdrawal of physical contact. By virtue 
of his possession of a penis, he is a member of the dominant group 
and so he soon comes to see himself as superior to girlso 
Although de Beauvoir takes issue with Freud and maintains that 
the value of the penis is dependent on the value accorded to masculinity 
in patriarchal society, she nevertheless maintains that the penis 
always "incarnates" (p.79 ) transcendence. In other words, the possession 
of a penis gives man some ontological advantage. De Beau voir is argument 
is based on the idea that because the subject always searches for 
himsell in things, the boy is fortunate because he can regard his penis 
11 as at once himself and other than himself" (p. 79). That is to say, he 
has a double, an alter ego, which helps him assume a subjective attitude. 
Moreover, de Beauvoir claims that because the penis is: 
••• the very object into which he projects himself (it) 
becomes a symbol of autonomy, of transcendence, of power; 
he measures the length of his penis; he compares his urinary 
stream with that of his companions; later on, erection and 
ejaculation will become grounds for satisfaction and challenge 
(p .306). 
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It is because the penis represents transcendence that de Beauvoir 
believes men have a castration complex. In short, they fear the frus-
tration of their transcendence. 
Having no penis, girls do not have this double and so they 
find it more difficult to find themselves in a material thing which 
can act as an alter ego o Although de Beau voir argues that this can 
lead the girl "to make an object of her whole self, to set herself up 
as the Other" (p.80 ), she more frequently maintains that it is the 
doll which can perform the function of penis for her. De Beauvoiri s 
comments on the usefulness of the doll in this respect are, however, 
somewhat ambiguous. At one point de Beauvoir claims that the doll' 
"incarnating the promise of the baby to come" (p. 80)' could, in a 
society not built on male-dominance, be more precious than the penis. 
Later, however, she seems to maintain that the doll will alw~s be of 
less value than the penis in presenting the subject with an alter egoJ 
for the doll represents the whole body and is also a "passive objeci:J' 
For these reasons, then, de Beauvoir writes: "the little girl will be 
led to identify ·her whole person and so regard this as an inert given 
object" (p.306). In short, identification with the doll tends to lead 
to narcissism and passivity in as nruch as in cuddling and dressing the 
doll the girl acts out how she herself wishes to be treatedo 
De Beauvoir vacillates between two views of the importance of 
9 
the penis for the boy. On the one hand, it is a simple representation 
of his value in patriarchal society and a convenient tool for reflecting 
his subjectivity. On the other hand, it has a more prestigious 
ontological value. Despite the ambiguity on this point in de Beauvoir' s 
theory it is, however, clear that where girls do experience penis envy, 
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it is the result of restrictions and limitations placed on them in 
more important spheres of life. In other words, feeling thwarted in 
her human development the girl does not envy the penis per se but 
simply projects her frustrations onto her lack of a penis. 
De Beauvoir does in fact describe the girl Vs "apprenticeship" 
as a time when she is constantly deprived of the opportunity to realise 
fully herself as an independent human being. In short, she is often 
prevented from indulging in self-affirming action and is therefore 
"oriented" towards a life of passivity. The passivity which is 
characteristic of the female sex is also, according to de Beauvoi~ 
engendered in these early years by the fact that she is taught that "to 
please she must try to please" (p.308); that is to say, she quickly 
learns that her success does not depend upon self-affirming and 
independent actionJbut upon the presentation of her self as a charming, 
seductive object. Thus because girls are led to objectify themselves -
become creatures who do not act but are acted upon by others - they 
find it increasingly difficult to reject the role of object which is 
held out as their feminine destiny. 
The gradual abdication of sovereignty - the process which de 
Beauvoir describes as the child's route to femininity- is further 
encouraged by a number of other factorso At the most obvious level, there 
is the fact that mythology, history, religion and the contemporary 
relations between the sexes present her with an image of woman as "Othe!!" 
In other words, by virtue of her sex, her future as an inessential 
object seems to have been "willed in heaven" (p.22). 
De Beauvoir claims that at first the young girl may not under-
stand the significance of her sexual status o For the young child it is 
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the mother who initially appears as the important sex. As the girl 
identifies with her mother and is encouraged to take part in domestic 
duties, for a while she may believe her gender bestows on her a certain 
authority. Later, however, she learns that the authority of the mother 
is more apparent than real; that it is males who are the dominant sex. 
From then on, the little girl attempts to feel justified through her 
father. It is in her relationship with him that she hopes to feel 
"fulfilled and deified" (p.315). It is in this way that de Beauvoir 
hopes to explain the Electra complex. Thus in opposition to Freud who 
interprets the girlis attitude to her father partly in terms of sexual 
desire, de Beauvoir maintains that it is through the approbation of 
the powerful father that the girl hopes to justify her existence. At 
the time when the girl is attracted to her father she is often in the 
process of revolting against her mother - fo~ sensing the completely 
dependent and inferior position which is in store for he~ she rejects 
her mother who is an embodiment of this dreaded future. 
So far we have covered the essential features of the first 
stage in the child 9s development towards her feminine "destiny.." Before 
looking at how de Beauvoir describes the second stage of the proces~ 
it is important to emphasise one thing: although de Beauvoir claims 
that "throughout her childhood the little girl suffered bullying and 
curtailment of activity" she maintains that during the early period 
of "apprenticeship" the girl "none the less felt herself to be an 
autonomous individual" (p.J60). 
III 
The point at which the girl makes the transition from stage 
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one to stage two in her development is quite clearly defined by de Beauvoir -
it coincides with her entry into adolescence. The young girl acutely 
experiences this break with her childhood past in social and sexual 
ways. De Beauvoir suggests that the very young girl is aware of the 
chronic passivity and dependency which characterises her feminine 
future. However, while for the child it seems merely like a dream, 
the adolescent girl finds herself plunged into the midst of this 
realityo To some extent de Beauvoir describes the post-pubescent girl's 
situation as a more intense form of the restrictions imposed upon her 
as a child. But what is significant is that the two sexes are growing 
increasingly apart in this respect. 
De Beauvoir maintains that i:b is particular~ in puberty and 
early adolescence that boys are encouraged through "games, sports, 
fights, challenges, trials of strength" to view their bodies as a ttmeans 
of dominating nature and as a weapon for fightingtt (p .307). In short, 
they go through what in de Beauvoiris terms is an important "apprentice-
ship in violence" (p.3.53). Moreover, it is in these activities that 
boys learn to become competitive which, as we know, for de Beauvoir is 
an important existential component of the assertion of subjectivity. 
Girls, on the other hand, are not allowed to learn "the lessons 
of violence!' Thus de Beauvoir maintains that girls lack confidence 
in themselves because they lack confidence in their bodies. While 
boys become conscious of themselves as a force in the world, girls feel 
dependent and aware of the need for a masculine mediator. It is for 
these reasons that de Beauvoir claims the difference between adolescent 
boys and girls to be that whereas she feels passive and takes the world 
as something "fixed)' "he can at any moment, rise up against whatever 






it" (p.355). To a great extent, then, it is the notion that the female 
is at once deprived (and consequently does not feel able to make use) 
of any opportunities to engage in transcendent pursuits - to act upon 
and change the world- which underlies most of de Beauvoir's comments 
on the development of a girl's life. Thus it is partly these experiences 
which lead, according to de Beauvoir, to woman's desire to make the 
passive and dependent existence of marriage and motherhood her career. 
However, de Beauvoir maintains that while the girl is more and more 
oriented towards her essentially passive feminine desti~ she is aware 
of the "mutilation" (p.351 ff) this implies. In other words, the girl 
is aware of the acute conflict between being a "true" woman and 
asserting one's subjectivityn But before we can examine de Beauvoir's 
explanation for woman's acceptance of such mutilatio~it is necessary 
to introduce the sexual aspect of the adolescent girl's development. 
In the chapter on childhood de Beauvoir discusses the very 
young girl's attitude to menstruation and the first stirrings of 
sexualityo However, the difference between the child and the adolescent 
is that whereas the former simply "scents danger in her alienated 
flesh"(:p. 453~her~· mature counterpart comes to have a much more ambivalent 
and negative attitude towards her erotic role. Indeed, in her book 
(1977) 
Femininity as Alienation,/ Ann Foreman claims that de Beau voir believes 
the onset of mature sexuality in woman to be a contributing factor 
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to her passivity. Thus, Foreman writes that in The Second Sex de Beauvoir: 
••• considered the young girl who has not yet experienced 
sexual urges to be equal to boys of her age. She stressed 
the similarities between them in their ability to make rational 
choices and to act upon themo But with the onset of mature 
sexuality a qualitative change takes place. Instead of 
stressing the girl's potential for action, de Beauvoir 
stresses the womanis passivity. 10 
However, is Foreman right to claim that de Beauvoir puts so much 
emphasis on sexuality? In order to find out it is necessary to digress 
slightly and examine de Beauvoir~s notion of the development of both 
male and female eroticism and how woman experiences her sexual roleo 
IV 
De Beauvoir maintains that for man the transition from his 
infantile sexuality to his mature sexuality is a relatively simple 
process. It is a process which simply requires him to cease. seeking 
sexual satisfaction within the confines of his own body and to project 
his erotic desires towards another p8rson. In other words, his 
mature sexuality essentially involves reaching out towards the other 
and allows him to retain his sovereign integrity. Moreover, as we 
have already seen, the sexual act is one in which he can assert himself 
as subject. Indeed de Beauvoir maintains that "anatomically and 
conventionally" (p.401) it is always man who is the initiator of the 
sexual act and it is he who decides its form and duration. Thus for man 
intercourse is completed when he has an orgasm and although he may not 
be totally satisfied "With this, nevertheless, "a definite act has 
been consummated and the man~ s body retains its integrity: his service 
to the species is combined with personal enjoyment" (p.393). 
Feminine eroticism, on the other hand, is Imlch more complex. 
According to de Beauvoir this complexity is the result of the "opposition" 
(p. 393) of woman 1 s two sexual organs - the clitoris and the vagina. The 
clitoris is the centre of infantile sexuality and although it remains 
of some importance to woman throughout adulthood, de Beau voir maintains: 
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"(it is) only indirectly connected with normal coition, and it plays 
no part in procreation" (p.394). The vagina, on the contrary, only 
becomes an erotic centre in sexual maturity through relations with a 
male. Although de Beauvoir admits that there is not necessarily a 
difference between vaginal and clitoral orgasms, she maintains that 
vaginal pleasure is important for most women. To this extent, de 
Beauvoir claims that woman must make a "choice" between these two 
erotic centres: "one of which perpetuates juvenile independence 
while the other consigns woman to man and childbearing" (p o395) • 
As de Beauvoir maintains that the vagina becomes an erotic 
centre only through intercourse, the break with juvenile· eroticism 
results only from penetration. And this penetration, according to 
de Beau voir, "always constitutes a kind of rape" (p .394, emphasis 
11 added) o Moreover de Beauvoir explicitly maintains that "the normal 
sexual act in effect puts woman in a state of dependency upon the male" 
(p.395), for it is he who initiates and she who merely respondso Even 
if she is unwilling she may be "taken" at any time for, de Beau voir 
points out, it is possible for man even to "copulate with a corpse" 
(p.395). 
De Beauvoir maintains that not only is the "anatomic destinyn 
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different for the two sexes, but so too is the "social and moraln (p.39.5) 
situation. For example, whereas a sexual encounter for a man is 
always seen as something which enhances his prestige, for woman it 
often represents her "fall" or loss of "honouro" It is for these kinds 
of reasons then, that de Beauvoir maintains that "the environment, the 
climate, in which feminine sexuality awakens is quite different from 
that which surrounds the adolescent male" (po397)o 
Having thus laid the foundation for de Beauvoiris notions of 
female sexualit~we must now examine how she accounts for the transition 
which most girls allegedly make between clitoral and vaginal eroticism. 
De Beau voir maintains that the virginal young woman emerging from the 
sexually dormant period of childhood experiences sexual desire but 
is not completely sure of what she desires. To some extent, like the 
male, she wants to recreate the pleasurable childhood experiences of 
her mother 1 s flesh. She wants to possess those soft, gentle things 
which are essentially part of a feminine world. In short, she wants 
"to possess a treasure like that which she gives the male" (p.423). 
It is for this reason that de Beauvoir maintains that the young girl 
confronting the male: 
eoo feels in her hands and her lips the desire to caress 
a prey actively. But crude man, with his hard muscles, his 
rrugh and often hairy skin, his strong odour, his coarse 
features, does not appeal to her as desirable; he even seems 
repulsive (p.398)o 
De Beauvoir maintains, moreover, that if woman finds a man whom 
she does find attractiv~ she is unable to possess him carnally as he 
may possess her; not only will he be unlikely to accept a passive role 
but more important~: 
••• she lacks the means for taking these treasures; 
her anatomy compels her to remain clumsy and impotent like 
a eunuch; the wish for possession is fruitless for want 
of an organ in which it is incarnated (pp.398-9)o 
For these reasons, then, the virgin who feels actively erotic either 
towards males or females is inevitably frustrated because she lacks 
the organ which will allow her to express her sex-hunger. 
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The "normal" young girl, however, is one who comes to desire 
a passive role. But this desire is always ambivalent fo~de Beauvoir 
claims) the girl "simultaneously longs for and dreads the shameful 
passivity of the willing prey" ( p • 346) • To some extent, it is longed 
for because it appeals to the narcissistic tendency which is often 
prevalent in girlhood, yet despised because she does not see herself 
as a thing to be taken. At any rate, the young woman reaches her first 
sexual encounter with an ambivalent attitude towards her sexual roleo 
Although de Beauvoir maintains that the nature of womanYs first 
experience of intercourse depends very much on the man's attitude and 
behaviour she, nevertheless, tends to describe it as quite a traumatic 
experience. The traumatic aspect of defloration for de Beauvoir is 
not due to ~ pain the woman may experience but to the fact that she 
feels "trespassed" (p.40.5) upon by the male. Moreover in the passive 
role assigned to her in the sexual act she "feels she is an instrument" 
(p.406); man "takes" his pleasure from her in the act of intercourse 
and the pleasure she experiences is "given" by him. Thus de Beauvoir 
is led to conclude that the sexual act is essentially a relationship 
not based on reciprocity. 
According to de Beauvoir, passivity and dependency are the 
ingredients of womanis role in intercourse and it is experienced by 
her as such. Thus not only does the girl in the process of transition 
from clitoral to vaginal eroticism require the male to reveal her body 
to he~ but even at the height of her sexual desire she feels herself 
to be passive. Indeed, although de Beau voir maintains that woman may 
experience more intense sexual desire than man and that her "sex hunger 
is in a sense active" (po399), it is interesting to note how de Beauvoir 
compares male and female sexual desire; for it is reminiscent of 
Sartre's portrayal of the viscious nature of female sexuality: 
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Feminine sex desire is the soft throbbing of a mollusc. 
Whereas man is impetuous, woman is only impatient; her expectation 
can become ardent without ceasing to be passive; man dives 
upon his prey like the eagle and the hawk; woman lies in 
wait like the carnivorous plant, the bog, in which insects 
and children are swallowed up. She is absorption, suction, 
humus, pitch and glue, a passive influx, insinuating and 
viscous: thus at least she vaguely feels herself to be (p.407). 
Woman may experience other negative feelings in her sexual 
encounter with man. For example, even though the young girl may have 
narcissistic tendencies, she often feels ashamed to reveal her body 
to the gazes of a man; she resents the fact that she will be judged. 
There is also the fact that women may be terrified of impregnation. 
This often leads to mistrust and resentment of men. 
De Beauvoir, however, maintains that some of the negative 
aspects of womanis sexual initiation could be removed if it happened 
in a much more spontaneous and natural way than is often the case. That 
is to say, if it happened outwi ththe ritualistic formality of the 
nuptial bed. Moreover, it can be rid of maqy of its negative aspects 
if the woman can feel herself subject in the midst of her objectivity -
in other words, if it is she who makes herself a carnal object. Thus 
while giving herself to him she can seek satisfaction of her own pleasure 
:md_, instead of abdicating her sovereignty.> she can simply transcend 
herself towards another. But de Beauvoir believes this is possible 
only if the male both desires and respects the womano "If he lusts 
after her flesh while recognising her freedom," writes de Beauvoir, 
n she feels herself to be the essential, her integrity remains unimpaired 
the while she makes herself object". And thus, adds de Beau voir, 
woman "remains free in the submission to which she consents" (pp.421-2)o 
However, it seems quite apparent from this statement that 
de Beauvoir believes even quite a "liberated" sexual relationship 
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between man and woman would involve for woman an element of submission 
and passivity. This goes some way to justifying Foremanis emphasis 
on the importance of sexuality to womanis experience of passivity 
and dependency in de Beauvoiris theory. However, Foreman goes too 
far when she tries to make out that this is the crucial feature of 
womanis development in The Second Sex. It may be of permanent concern 
in as much as one can plausibly infer that it can never be removed, 
(and as such is a permanent feature of womanis biology) but it is 
subsidiary to other factors in de Beauvoir's theory. 
V 
The post-puberty phase of womanis development is so important 
in de Beauvoiris theory not simply because it marks her sexual maturity) 
but because it coincides with the beginnings of psychological maturity. 
Thus to understand fully de Beauvoir's notion of the development of 
womanVs life from birth to maturity, the most significant thing to be 
borne in mind is that the girl child sees herself, albeit dimly, as a 
sovereign subject but is encouraged to abdicate in favour of the male 
sex; to abandon this position and accept herself as the inessential 
object. It is thus the reason for abdication which de Beauvoir must 
outline in the pages of the second volume of The Second Sex. At the 
very beginning of the book de Beauvoir lays the foundation for her 
subsequent argument that it is woman who consents to her position. 
There she maintains that "along with the ethical urge of each individual 
to affirm his subjective existence, there is also the temptation to 
forego liberty and become a thing" (p.21). In Sartrian terms, this 
simply means that everyone is tempted to deny his freedom and live in 
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bad faith; to turn his back on the fact that he is really a for-itself 
and pretend he is either only an in-itself or totally for-others. 
Having accounted for the fact that the individual, although sovereign 
and free, may be tempted to reject this fact, de Beauvoir must still 
explain why woman, more than man) is led in this direction. 
One of the major explanations advanced by de Beauvoir for womanis 
resignation has substantially been encountered in previous material. 
For drawing on the argument that females throughout their lives are 
deprived of acting - that "for a great many women the roads to trans-
cendence are blocked" (p.288) - de Beauvoir maintains that it is 
extremely difficult for them not to renounce their freedomo It is for 
this reason that de Beauvoir writes that for the young girl "a vicious 
circle is formed; for the less she exercises her freedom to understand, 
to grasp and discover the world about her, the less resources she will 
find within herself; the less she will dare to affirm herself as 
subject" (p.308). 
De Beauvoir also maintains that a vital difference between 
the oppression of women and that of blacks, for example, is that 
whereas the latter have nothing to gain from their oppression and 
submit "with a feeling of revolt" (p.325), women are bribed into 
complicity: 
To decline to be the Other, to refuse to be a party to the 
deal;this would be for women to renounce all the advantages 
conferred upon them by their alliance with the superior casteo 
Man-the-sovereign will provide woman-the-liege with material 
protection and will undertake the moral justifications for 
her existence ••• (p.21). 
Thus de Beauvoir argues that the economic security and moral justification 
provided by man appeal to women not only because there is in every 
existent "the longirg" for such resignation and escape_., but also because 
the prohibitions against women's assertion of their freedom are so 
great. Thus because women find it too difficult to become transcendent -
to use their freedom in a positive manner - they are "more fatally 
bound to yield" (p. 325) to the temptation of an inau then tic existence 
than is the case with their male counterparts. 
By emphasising the idea that it is woman who, for whatever 
reason, abdicates in favour of the male, de Beauvoir reiterates the 
kind of argument she advances in the historical sections. There is a 
definite parallel to be drawn between the woman who in the dawn of 
history accepted her own devaluation and the contemporary woman who 
likewise· makes a conscious choice to accept the mutilation implied 
in femininity. The major difference in de Beauvoir 1 s approach is that 
whereas she believes that prehistoric woman had to make this choice 
she argues that now such a sacrifice is unnecessary. Indeed in de 
Beauvoir 1 s theory, this sacrifice constitutes a barrier to the 
establishment of reciprocal relations between the sexes and thus to 
the further progress of humanity. 
VI 
De Beauvoir's emphasis on woman's conscious acceptance of her 
inferior position gives rise to a number of significant :points. On 
the one hand, such an emphasis is a direct result of de Beauvoir 1 s 
existentialist ontology; that is, of the notion of immutable freedom 
and subjectivity of the individual. Thus man may want woman to be 
object, he may even make it very difficult for her to refuse the role 
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which is offered her, but it is ultimately woman who consciously 
decides to make herself Other. Indeed throughout the section on 
adolescence de Beauvoir describes the young girl as hesitating between 
accepting and rejecting this role. She may make various symbolic 
protests and vacilate between "desire and dread" (p ·379 ) of the 
fulfilment of her feminine role but, according to de Beauvoir, "she 
does not choose in spite of everything, really to repudiate her feminine 
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destiny" (p.377, emphasis added). Thus de Beauvoir ultimately presents 
us with the following picture of the act which marks the girl's entrance 
into womanhood: "The young girl slowly buries her childhood, puts 
away the independent and imperious being that was she, and enters 
submissively upon adult existence" (p.J88, emphasis added) •13 In other 
words, she enters it freely, if with resentment, conscious of what it 
implies. 
In arguing this de Beauvoir echoes Sartre' s work. As we know, 
in Being and Nothingness Sartre portrays the individual' s life as the 
product of his free choices. As it was this aspect of Sartre's theory 
which led Marcuse to claim that this ontology is an "insult" to the 
oppressed, we should inquire if this is also true of de Beauvoir's 
ideas. Certainly there are points in The Second Sex where de Beauvoirian 
woman appears more as a martyr than the victim of oppression. But 
de Beauvoir differs from the Sartre of Being and Nothingness in one 
fundamental respect; unlike him she shows how an individual's situation -
in this case woman's - may deprive her of the opportunity to act and 
thus of making authentic choices. As de Beauvoir illustrates how 
modern woman is deprived in this WaJlj she is able to show how woman, 
although involved in the process, is oppressed. The major difference 
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between de Beauvoir and early Sartre is thus that she is able to show 
how an individual 1 s situation may radically curtail his freedom. 
By concentrating on revealing how 11 situation" may limit woman, 
de Beauvoir also escapes the idea that the existent is fully "responsible" 
and therefore to be blamed for her life. In their early work both 
Sartre and de Beauvoir implicitly blamed the oppressed for their 
14 
inauthentic existence. The change introduced by the use of a more 
developed concept of "situation" can be seen clearly if we compare 
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The Ethics of Ambiguity with The Second Sex. In the earlier work de 
Beau voir maintains that woman 1 s life is but a reflection of her "choice." 
Indeed in this book de Beauvoir 1 s existentialist ethics even lead her 
to castigate woman for this choice: as she maintains that wcmen have 
the understanding and opportunity to reject their subordinate rol~ she 
claims that their "resignation of freedom ••• implies dishonesty and ••• 
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is a moral fault." In The Second Sex, however, de Beauvoir has dropped 
much of this moralising and chastising tone and is less critical of 
the fact that most women accept a subordinate, inauthentic kind of life. 
Indeed even though she elsewhere emphasises the idea that wamen are 
conscious of what they do, when discussing the fact that women are 
often deceptive, cowardly, emotional and so on de Beauvoir claims that 
woman is often "baffled" and not a totally "clear-headed person" 
(p.273). Thus she maintains that although feminine characteristics may 
be faults "they ?-re sufficiently accounted for by the situation in 
which women are placed" (po273). In this way, then, de Beauvoir is 
less insulting to the oppressed than either she or Sartre had been in 
earlier works o 
In an article on de Beauvoir Colin Radford argues that her 





















de Beauvoir herself runs the risk of bad faith. However, de Beauvoir 
does not actually minimise the extent of woman's compliance; she simply 
excuses woman for such submission. But what is true is that de Beauvoir 
apportions blame to man; it is he who creates woman's situation and who 
therefore leads her to make inauthentic choices. Thus de Beauvoir 
writes that woman "does wrong in yielding to the temptation" of 
inauthentici ty but that "man is in no position to blame her, since he 
has led her into the temptation" (p.730). Indeed as Sartre and de 
Beauvoir developed an existentialist ethic and sympathised with the 
vanquished, they shifted the blame and responsibility from the oppressed 
to the oppressor. Thus, for example, in Anti-Semite and Jew it is the 
Jew whose situation is used to explain and excuse his lif~ but the 
anti-Semite whom Sartre holds morally to blame for his "free" choice; 
a choice apparently undetermined by his situation.
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This leads us to question another aspect of de Beauvoir's 
theory in The Second Sex - does she discuss the constituent parts of 
man's situation? The answer is no. De Beauvoir accounts for the 
development of a girl's life from birth to maturity but she does not 
give us a parallel account of man's development. We do not know, for 
example, if there are pressures on man which restrict his choices, and 
what the se may be. But de Beauvoir is largely justified in omitting 
this discussion; she sees man's life as harmonious with subjectivity, 
therefore his development is the norm and there is nothing peculiar 
about it. What is noteworthy about wanan 1 s development in de Beauvoir 1 s 
theory is that she comes to accept a life which is at odds with her 
subjective aspirations; as the boy is encouraged to be transcendent 
his development is less complicated and poignant. Moreover, as we shall 
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see, de Beauvoir does not have to account in detail for what man tries 
to attain in his relationship with woman since she also explains this 
with reference to existentialist ontology and ethics. 
Although de Beauvoir portrays man's situation and attitudes 
as normal, there are points when, discussing how men would actually 
benefit from woman's emancipation, she argues that his situation is 
not actually what he desires. In such circumstances, however, there 
is little he can do: "... a man could not prevent h.llnself from being 
a man • • • culpable in spite of himself and labouring under the effects 
of a fault he did not himself commit" (p. 732). In short, de Beauvoir 
claims man's situation may not be what he desires. However, since she 
predorniilantly argues that man's position arises from fundamental 
human aspirations, and not from socio-economic structures, its 
constitution remains ill-defined in de Beauvoir 1 s theory. All that is 
clear is that like Sartre 1 s .anti-Semit~ it is a product of his free 
choice and so something for which he is responsible. 
But to return to the factors of significance in de Beau voir's 
portrayal of woman's situation, we see that, as in her historical 
account, there is a certain tension between the notion that woman "is" 
a human being and the idea that she only comes to be one through certain 
humanising acts. In other words, at points woman is portrayed as a 
human being who acts in full consciousness of events, fully experiencing 
herself as subject, whereas on other occasions she is shown as not in 
full possession of such awareness. It is because she lacks such 
awareness that she is easily led into a position of dependence. What 
is consistent in both perspectives, however, is that woman's situation 
creates a feminine consciousness which is different in maqy respects 
from masculine consciousness. 
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But despite the tension and ambiguity inherent in de Beauvoir's 
theory of woman's development, she provides a more convincing explanation 
than do many feminists. In using conventional sociological and 
psychological explanations, which are largely devoid of explicit 
assumptions about human behaviour other than it is learned, such 
theories are crudely behaviourist. They implicitly conceptualise 
human consciousness as passive and base their explanation of the 
development of boys and girls on such processes as parental identification, 
role-play and reinforcement. While these certainly contribute to woman's 
acceptance of a secondar,y role, one strength of de Beauvoir's theory 
is that she does not begin from behaviourist assumptions. She argues 
that there are certain preconditions of proper human development. We 
need not accept de Beauvoir's emphasis on individualisation and 
competition to see the strength of her argument that to become confident, 
active human beings, children must come to see themselves as a force 
in the world; they must be able to translate their aspirations and 
intentions into reality. Thus, leaving aside criticisms of de Beauvoir's 
view of human development, we see how she may help us evolve a theory 
of haw woman comes to be passive and see herself as an object acted 
upon by others. 
There is one very dubious aspect of de Beauvoir's theory of a 
girl's development however, and that is the way in which she uses 
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sexuality as something which reinforces woman's feelings of passivity. 
Certainly one can argue that at present woman's sexuality is defined 
as passive and that it does not lead woman to assert herself. But 
de Beauvoir's argument involves the idea that woman's sexual role is 
essentially passive. Echoing Sartre' s equation of femininity and 
viscosity and "gaping holes," de Beauvoirian woman feels unable to 
assert herself in coitus. In arguing this de Beauvoir has accepted 
wholesale the way in which woman's sexuality is represented by men. 
But the question of de Beauvoir's masculine perspective will be 
discussed in a subsequent chapter}9 
Bearing in mind the kind of development undergone by girls 
let us now look at how, in de Beauvoir' s theory, woman attempts to 
justify and compensate for the "mutilation" involved in the assumption 




Justifications and Compensations for Woman's Oppression 
In the previous chapter we saw how de Beauvoir, in her 
account both of history and the development of a womanis life, emphasises 
that it is woman who ultimately consents to her subordinate position. 
In the historical section this was bound to the idea that woman accepts 
manis values; that she realised the necessity for her own devaluationo 
Although de Beauvoir believes such martyrdom is no longer required of 
women, she does nevertheless maintain that they still subscribe to the 
values of the masculine world. Thus she states: 
·In truth women have never set up female values in opposition 
to male values. o•• Men have presumed to create a feminine 
domain - the kingdom of life, of immanence - only in order to 
lock up women therein. But it is regardless of sex that the 
existent seeks self-justification through transcendence ••• 
(pp.96-7). 
In other words, de Beauvoir claims here that woman has never sought to 
see the feminine domain to which she is confined as a source of value; 
that she has always turned towards the masculine world to find 
justification for her existence. But although this notion is a dominant 
theme in The Second Sex de Beauvoir does, however, at points contradict 
herself o For example, she claims of some women that they are "in 
league to create a kind of counter-universe, the value of which will 
outweigh masculine valuesn (p .556). De Beauvoir is also later to claim 
that the difference between modern woman and her predecessor is that 
whereas the latter rejects man 1 s values and wants to drag him into the 
prison of immanence, the former accepts man's values and wants to 
enter his world so she may act in accordance with them. 
To some extent the contradiction in de Beauvoiris argument may 
be explained by the idea that woman)although ultimately accepting her 
feminine destiny, does so nevertheless with a feeling of resentment. 
Such resentment may in some way spill over into a rejection of men and 
the male universe. More commonly, however, according to de Beauvoir 
women turn against themselves and their relations contain an element of 
hostility. Indeed because women are so dependent on men and because 
their success depends on appearing as an attractive object, women are 
destined to become competitive with one another for menis attentions. 
Moreover, to the extent that women are rarely engaged in common 
transcendent pursuits they seldom know the "joys of comradeship" (p .556) 
On the other hand, because they are not so dependent on each other for 
existence women, de Beauvoir claims, are often more truthful with one 
another than they are with men. They may even feel a certain solidarity, 
although this is often precarious since it is always the male who they 
see as their liberator and so their friendships with one another are in 
this way incidental or contingent. 
What is at stake in de Beauvoir's discussion of woman's attitude 
to values is two fundamental points. The first is that mani s values 
are human values. Woman, confined to the realm of the inunanent and 
incidental, is thus not able in this domain to find anything which could 
challenge these values. This leads to the second point. Woman, as a 
human being, does not seek to challenge mani s human values. Instead 
she seeks either to use others as intermediaries in the transcendent 
world or to find in her own world something equivalent to what man 
attains in his. For example, woman can attempt to find in her home some 
fulfilment. In entertaining, decorating her house according to her 
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taste, she can attempt to express her individuality and establish herself 
as a person. Indeed de Beauvoir maintains that because woman does not 
manage to attain self-realization in her pursuits she often tries to do 
so in what she "has". Moreover, in surrounding herself with attractive 
objects which appeal to her feminine sensibility, woman often tries to 
find the sensations of which, as a woman, she is deprived. That is to 
say, she hopes to find in her possessions the kind of pleasures which 
she gives to man and which, in being doomed to passive eroticism, she 
is herself unable to takee "Thanks to the velvets and silks and 
porcelains with which she surrounds herself," writes de Beauvoir, "woman 
can in some degree satisfy that tactile sensuali~ which her erotic 
'life can seldom assuage" (p.469). 
In essence de Beauvoir maintains that woman hopes to find in her 
home the world which, in assuming her feminine destiny, she has foregone 
in favour of man. However, for reasons that will become more apparent 
later, in her domestic work woman is not able to achieve the fulfilment 
which she desires. Although she may be continually engaged in tasks, 
her mind is never fully occupied - she finds no real aim. Indeed de 
Beauvoir maintains that even if woman takes up activities in her spare 
time which are often beneficial to man - reading and water colours, 
for example - her frame of mind is still a barrier to their significance 
for her. That is to say, engaging in sporadic action only to eliminate 
boredom, such activities are unable to "extend her grasp on the world.n 
De Beauvoir describes a number of other ways in which woman 
attempts to justify her existence. The first to be examined here is what 
woman seeks in the relationship with her childo As we have covered 
elsewhere woman's attitude to pregnancy and the foetus what we shall 




According to de Beauvoir, woman's attitude to the birth of her 
child and the relationship which follows is dependent on a number of 
factors - her relations with her own mother and the father of the child, 
her economic and social situation, her own attitude to herself and life 
in general are all involved. Indeed de Beauvoir does describe "woman'sn 
attitude to her child as highly variable. There are nevertheless a number 
of factors which she mentions which have general applicability. 
De Beauvoir maintains that "unless the circumstances are positively 
unfavourable the mother will find her life enriched by her child" 
(p.526). Such enrichment, however, it seems in de Beauvoir's theory, 
' merely compensates for her previous disadvantaged position vis a vis 
the male. Indeed although de Beauvoir does not exactly follow Freud 
on this point, she maintains that for a woman a baby can be "equivalent 
to a penis" (p.527). The child's function of penis for woman in de 
Beauvoir's theory is basically twofold. 
In Chapter Nine it was shown that de Beauvoir argues that although 
young girls desire to possess another carnally, their hopes for such 
possession are inevitably frustrated because they lack the means to 
make manifest such active eroticism. In short, they suffer a sense 
of frustration because they lack a penis. De Beauvoir subsequently 
maintains that woman does not envy man his penis (the tool which 
enables him to possess) but "the prey he takes possession of" (p.527). 
Thus because the baby represents, like woman does for man, "an other, 
combining nature and mind, who is both prey and double," de Beauvoir 
maintains that through her child woman manages to possess "the mistress 
whom she relinquishes to the male" (p.527). 
The second way in which the infant functions as a substitute 
penis for the mother is less clearly defined by de Beauvoir yet linked 
to a central idea of what woman hopes to gain in her relationship with 
a child. And that is the notion that for the mother 11 the child is a 
double, an alter ego" (p .528). In other words, de Beauvoir defines the 
baby as she defines the penis for the male. However, whereas for man 
such alienation in an external object has only beneficial effects, it 
is this attitude which can lead to a complex and dangerous relationship 
between mother and child. 
Through her baby, woman seeks to find herself in another being 
who is really independent; though he may appear as an extension of her 
he is really a sovereign subject with a mind and a will of his owno 
If she is'tempted to project herself entirely" on to him then the child, 
who may seem at one point a "treasure", is destined to become latterly 
"a tyrant" (p.528). In other words, she projects herself onto an 
individual who through time is destined to rebel, to act independently, 
and in so doing shatter her hopes for self-realization. This situation 
may lead woman to a number of "cruel devices" (p • .529), claims de 
Beauvoir. For example, she may restrict the child's liberty, deny its 
subjectivity or:, in "masochistic devotion" (p • .529)_, she may attempt to 
tie the child to her through feelings of guilt. 
De Beauvoir argues that the womanis attitude to her child is 
also dependent on its sex. If it is male her attitude towards him is 
much less ambiguous and complex than it is towards a daughter. As males 
are the dominant sex she hopes to become transcendent through his 
transcendence: "he will give her the houses she has not constructed, 
the lands she has not explored, the books she has not read" (pp.531-2). 
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However de Beauvoir claims there is an unsolved paradox in this attitude; 
because it is "through him she will possess the world" (p.532) it is 
essential that she possess her son. Thus in the attempt to keep him 
she is led to deny him the opportunity for transcendence - the very 
thing which she hopes to obtain through him. Despite the mother's 
attempts, however, de Beauvoir maintains that at most her activities are 
simply "injurious" to the boy; that he is usually able to escape since 
he is encouraged in other ways to assume a masculine, hence independent, 
way of life. The mother thus knowing what a struggle is in store for 
her usually resigns, consoling herself with the proud notion that she 
has "engendered one of her conquerors" (p.532). 
According to de Beauvoir, the relation between mother and child 
is much more dramatic when it is a daughter; not only is the girl 
"given over to her mother" much more than the boy, but more importantly 
"in her daughter the mother does not hail a member of the superior 
caste; in her she seeks a double" (p.532). In other words, it is the 
child of the same sex who is more likely to attract the mother to see 
in it an alter ego. Moreover the ambivalence and resentment which de 
Beauvoir claims all women have to their situation is projected by the 
mother on to her daughter. Thus, for example, de Beauvoir claims some 
women achieve the bitter pleasure of "self-recognition in another victim" 
(p.533). The conflict also tends to increase as the girl becomes older 
and potentially more independent, for her mother "cannot bear to have 
her double become an other" (p.534); she becomes jealous of the girl's 
relationships and irritated by the bodily changes which mark the start 
of her child's maturity. 
De Beauvoir claims therefore that because the vast majority of 
women do not gain satisfaction independently in their activitie~ they 
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seek justification and self-realization through their children. And 
it is precisely this whichJde Beauvoir claims, gives maternity its 
dangerous aspect. From the woman's point of view it is not beneficial 
to her because it can never provide the kind of things she seeks from 
it. De Beau voir maintains: 
Even when the child seems a treasure in the midst of a happy 
or at least a balanced life, he cannot represent the limits 
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of his motherYs horizon. He does not take her out of her 
immanence; she shapes his flesh, she nourishes him, she takes 
care of himn But she can never do more than create a situation 
that only the child himself as an independent being can transcend; 
when she lays a stake on his future, her transcendence through 
the universe and time is still by proxy, which is to say that 
once more she is doomed to dependency (p.539). 
In short de Beauvoir claims that maternity can never be the.raison d 1 ~tre 
of a woman's life; vicarious existence is no substitute for authentic 
action. 
As we have seen alrea~de Beauvoir argues that the present 
intense relationship between mother and child is also not advantageous 
to the childo It is for this reason that de Beauvoir frequently paints 
a very pessimistic portrait of the relationship which is formed between 
them. Such a view is epitomised in the following statement: 
When it is realized how difficult woman's present situation 
makes her full self-realization, how m~ desires, rebellious 
feelings, just claims she nurses in secret, one is frightened 
at the thought that defenceless infants are abandoned to her 
care • • • A mother who punishes her child is not beating the 
child alone; in a sense she is not beating it at all: she is 
taking her vengeance on a man, on the world, or on herself. 
Such a mother is often remorseful and the child may not feel 
resentment, but it feels the blows (p.529). 
For this reason, then, de Beauvoir maintains that for the child's sake 
it is better if the mother is an "unmutilated" person, able to work 
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and find self-realization in her own independent pursuits. Thus what 
must be substituted for the intense involvement between mother and child 
at present is a system whereby children spend more time with each other 
and with other adults with whom the bonds would be trimpersonal and 
pur en (p .539). 
It is interesting that de Beauvoir in the section called "The 
Mothern is consistently optimistic about the possibility of a good 
relationship being formed between mother and child if it were not her 
" only raison d' etre o Thus while she maintains that at present motherhood 
is "usually a strange mixture of narcissism, altruism, idle day-dreaming, 
sincerity, bad faith, devotion and cynicism" (po528), she nevertheless 
believes that some women who are fulfilled in other ways can love their 
children in their generosity and in their strength. The1r relationship 
with their off-spring is thus not based on demands or the need to 
restrict the child's freedom. It is for this reason that de Beauvoir 
claims: 
••• the child brings joy only to the woman who is capable of 
disinterestedly desiring the happiness of another, to one 
who without being wrapped up in self seeks to transcend her 
own experience. To be sure, the child is an enterprise to 
which one can validly devote oneself; but no more than any 
other enterprise does it represent a reaqy-made justification; 
and it must be desired for its own sake; not for hypothetical 
benefits (p.537). 
To this extent de Beauvoir believes it possible to have a good 
relationship between mother and child. However, even though de Beauvoir 
mentions here that in certain circumstances it is valid to devote oneself 
to this relationship, elsewhere she seems to argue that in authenticity 
it can ever only be seen as an addition to a woman is life. Thus she 
maintains that through maternity, woman does not trbecome the actual 
equal of manu (po540). 
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In The Second Sex de Beauvoir outlines womanis role as mother 
in the section entitled 11 Si tuationr but in the next section called 
IV Justifications 11 she describes a number of ways in which women individually 
attempt to "justify their existence in the midst of their immanence" (p. 644). 
In other words, she illustrates how a -w-oman may sometimes try "to 
transform her prison into a heaven of glory, her servitude into sovereign 
liberty" (p.639)o As we shall see, these attempts are essentially 
1 
modes of bad faith; what Sartre would call "avenues of flight~n The 
first to be examined is contained in the chapter entitled "The Narcissist." 
II 
De Beauvoir claims that whereas man is able to find himself in 
his engagement in the world, woman is often "forced to find her reality 
in the immanence of her person" (p.642). In other words, because her 
actions do not produce objects of value,she may turn in upon herself 
and view her own person as a valuable object. Moreover, the woman who 
embarks on this project of self-love tries to find in herself "a double" 
in which she can reach herself. Narcissism, then, according to de 
Beauvoir, is a "well-defined process of identification" (p o642). It is 
a process, however, which may often lead narcissistic women into 
insanity: feeling themselves to be lovable, beautiful and so on such 
women may believe this is the way they are actually perceived. But 
there is often a gap between their perception and reality. Believing 
themselves to be the centre of the world, their illusions of grandeur 
can, as de Beauvoir documents, easily pass into the opposite - delusions 
of persecution. 
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But even if narcissism does not lead women into the realms of 
insanity it is inevitably experienced with frustration. The narcissistic 
woman will often attempt to have her views of herself confirmed and so 
she tries to ensnare men on whom she will later be totally dependent. 
That is to say, like the master she is dependent on the Other for 
recognition. She also tends to become dependent on what de Beauvoir 
calls "the tyranny of public opinion" (p .652) o For a number of reasons, 
then, de Beauvoir claims that the narcissistic woman inevitably experiences 
the failure of her project: 
• o o the woman who does nothing makes nothing of herself and is 
burning incense to a non-entity. 
Her misfortune is that, despite all her insincerity, she is 
aware of this nothingness. There can be no real relation between 
an individual and her double because this double does not 
exist. The narcissist encounters a fundamental frustration. 
She cannot envisage herself as a totality, she is unable to 
keep up the illusion of being pour-soi-en-soi (p.651). 
The second avenue of flight described by de Beauvoir is "love." 
In some respects de Beauvoir 1 s analysis of love is similar to Sartre 1 s 
in Being and Nothingness. However, it seems that what de Beauvoir 
writes is complementar,y to Sartre 1 s thoughts. That is to say, despite 
the inherent male bias in Sartre's descriptions, he attempts to analyse 
love in a general way. Thus we are not explicitly led to believe that 
what he writes applies to one sex more than another. De Beauvoir, on 
the other hand, openly states that "love means different things for 
both sexes" (p.652), Thereupon she seems to extract from Sartre 1 s 
analysis of love certain elements and claims these to be characteristic 
of either manis or womanis attitude. 
De Beauvoir maintains that the man in love never forfeits his 
sovereignty, He may see woman as a value and wish to possess her but 
what he desires is to integrate his love for a woman into his existence, 
and not simply to abdicate his life and sovereignty to it. For wom~n, 
on the other hand, "to love is to relinquish everyth..ing for the benefit 
of a master" (p.653). 
The essential ingredient of de Beauvoir's analysis of love is 
the notion that because woman is deprived of acting she attempts to seek 
justification for her existence in a male; in a member of the sex wno 
appears to her "the Absolute.". Instead of accepting passively her life 
as an inessential object, through her love for a man she comes actively 
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to choose and value her dependence. In serving him, for example, she 
feels "she will be integrated with his existence, she vrill share his 
worth, she will be justifiedtr (p.660). In essence, then, de Beauvoir 
maintains that the woman in love is one who freely gives up her trans-
cendence to the Other "to whom she makes herself vassal and slaven (p.661). 
De Beauvoir also maintains that for woman love is a "desire 
for annihilation" (p.659) and may thus sometimes be confused with 
masochism. Indeed de Beauvoir, after quoting a definition of masochism 
from Being and Nothingness, claims that there is a fundamental difference 
between these two attitudes; whereas the masochist is fascinated by her 
own objectivity and desires to be humiliated, the woman in iove 
"abandons herself to love first of all to save herself" (p.660). That 
is to say, for de Beauvoir woman's love appears simply as a more radical 
expression of what Sartre describes in Being and Nothingness in as much 
as it is an attempt to justify one's existence through becoming the 
raison d'~tre of another's freedom. Moreover, unlike the masochist who 
desires to experience herself in a degraded condition, the woman in 
love wants to lose herself completely in the loved one: it is a dream 
of "ecstatic union" (p.660). Thus through love "woman," writes de 
Beauvoir, "thinks she is the incarnation of her loved one his reflection 
' ' 
his double: she is he" (p.663). 
Again like Sartre, de Beauvoir maintains that this attitude, 
this avenue of flight, contains the seed of its own destruction and is 
doomed to failure.. For example, although the man whom she loves is 
simply human and therefore filled with anxiety, she wants to treat him 
as a God. Thus when she discovers his weakness, his human frailty, she 
may despise him: "if he is no longer adored," writes de Beauvoir, "he 
must be trampled on" (p .665). Moreover, in making herself totally 
dependent on man, woman "creates a kind of hell for herself" (p .. 654). 
Thus in seeking to justify her existence~ through a man for whom she is 
really inessential1 woman must attempt to possess himo In short, she 
becomes his "jailer" (p.668). Imprisoning man, robbing him of his 
transcendence, is what woman often attempts but what she knows is doomed 
to failure and frustrationo Like Sartre ~ s lover, woman attempts the 
impossible - the possession of freedom as freedom. However, unlike 
Sartre's lover, de Beauvoir's woman is conscious of the futility of her 
project; that is, woman knows "very well that this attempt is foredoomed 
to failure" (p.668). 
Instead of woman finding in love the security, warmth and 
justification which she desires, de Beauvoir believes that she may often 
experience the opposite. That is to say, instead of the union which 
she desires, she may find herself before a free being who "holds her 
destiny in his hands" (p.678). Thus in place of the desired co-operation 
and union with the Other she may experience "the most bitter solitude 
there is" (p o678) o She may find herself confronting a man on whom she 
has made herself totally dependent and in place of "ecstatic union" 
she experiences "struggle and not seldom hate" (p.678). Moreover 
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whereas man often seems to want women to give herself, in reality he 
often does not want to accept the gift. Thus woman may be "left in 
embarrassment with her useless offerings, her empty life" (p.679). The 
self loathing which often results may indeed tempt woman into masochism. 
De Beauvoir later describes another way in which woman may 
attempt to deal with the situation in which she is placed. It is 
"mysticism" and is more or less a variation on the woman in love. De 
Beauvoir claims that if woman is very particular or denied love for 
any re as or;, she may seek love in God himself. That is to say, in place 
of a human man who will adore her and justify her existence, woman may 
turn to God. Like secular love, in divine love woman attempts to 
annihilate herself to find herself in her lover. In the mystic such 
annihilation often takes brutal and masochistic forms. Like love, as 
a mode of salvation, mysticism is doomed to failure. 
To return, however, to the "woman in love>tl it must be pointed 
out that de Beauvoir believes the frustrations inherent in the loving 
woman's situation may be dispelled if woman is able to love "not in her 
wealmess but in her strength" (p.679). In other words, she will benefit 
from love if she ceases to see it as a "mode of salvation" and views it 
simply as an enriching human interaction. Such strength would be gained 
only by woman accepting herself as subject and justifying her existence, 
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not vicariously through man's, but in her own independent acts. Indeed 
through these sections of The Second Sex de Beauvoir maintains that 
"authentic" love is possible. It must be distinguished from inauthentic 
love by the fact that it is founded on "the mutual recognition of two 
liberties" (p.677), where both lovers experience themselves simultaneously 
as self and other. Thus de Beau voir not only sees authentic love as 
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possible but also describes it as that mode of interaction explicitly 
dismissed by Sartre in Being and Nothingness as nontological optimism.u 
In another context de Beauvoir describes lesbianism as the way 
in which woman may attempt to come to terms with her situation. De 
Beauvoir views lesbianism as having no relation to an individualts 
nanatomical faten (p.424) and claims that there are lesbian tendencies 
in all young girls. Indeed de Beauvoir maintains that women are attracted 
to other women in as much as it is an easy way nto reconcile her autonomy 
with the passivity of her flesh" (ppo426-7)o Thus the characteristic 
mark of a lesbian is not an attraction to other women but a dislike of 
men. De Beauvoir's attitude to lesbianism is, however, somewhat 
ambivalent. It is certainly the case that de Beauvoir does not tend to 
follow Sartre and maintain that sexuality has nothing to do with 
reproduction and it is heterosexuality which underlies her concept of 
"normal" sexuality. Moreover, although de Beau voir claims that an 
assessment of lesbianism can only be made within the context of a 
particular woman's life - that is, with reference to its "authenticity~ -
she nevertheless tends to portray it in a negative light. Thus, for 
the 
example, she talks of jlesbian being both "unfulfilled as a woman>n and 
yet "impotent as a man" (p o432) • In other words she is unable to find 
any satisfaction in a passive sexual role and yet unable to assert 
herself in masculine fashion because she lacks the tool necessary to 
appropriate the sexual object she desires. Furthermore, because 
lesbianism is often the result of resentment and bitterness at men, it 
is rarely an attempt to live one's love in a genuine and authentic 
fashion. Indeed de Beauvoir claims that lesbian behaviour is often 
the result of "empty playacting" and that "nothing gives a darker 
impression of narrow mindedness and of mutilation than these groups 
of emancipated women" (p.443)o 
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One reason why de Beauvoir is led to denigrate lesbianism in 
this way is that in the act of avoiding intimate relations with men, 
such women do not come to terms with their feminine situation. That 
is to say, they do not authentically confront the situation in which 
they are placed and attempt to transcend its limitations. Indeed, de 
Beauvoir like Sartre tends to maintain that one must fully assume oneis 
situation before one can transcend it. Thus de Beauvoir argues the 
authentic woman is one who does not deny the passive eroticism of her 
femininity; but who attempts to "remain free in the submission to which 
she consents" (po422). 
De Beauvoir'i s conclusion about womani s avenues of flight is 
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essentially that "there is only one way to employ ••• liberty authentically 
and that is to project it through positive action into human society" 
(p.687)o In short, there is no escape for woman since attempts to 
seek justification in men, children, domestic life and so on are doomed 
and 
to failurE/since there is no substitute for independent, transcendent 
action. De Beauvoir frequently maintains that women are aware of this -
that they realise the mutilation their feminine condition contains 
and that they daily experience the frustrations of ita Moreover) while 
not openly rejecting man is values or wanting to annihilate hill) women 
do nevertheless feel resentful at their positiono Indeed de Beauvoir 
claims this is natural since "resentment is the reverse side of dependence" 
(p.618). In fact de Beauvoir argues that the brooding hostility-
the "impotent revolt" (p.619) - of women is manifest in the frequency 
of hysterical scenes, tears and suicide attempts in which they indulge. 
Because de Beauvoir argues that woman cannot escape the 
frustrations inherent in a life of inaction and her status as"Other,"she 
claims: "the only road forward for women is to claim their sovereignty" 
i 
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(p.639). But for the de Beauvoirian woman this is easier said than 
doneo Indeed, as we shall see more fully below, woman's emancipation 
constitutes a fundamental problem for de Beauvoir. Before we can 
consider de Beauvoir 7s blueprint for change, however, we must look at 
what man gains from his relationship with womar:, "the othe:r:it . 
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Chapter Eleven 
What Man Wants from Woman 
In The Second Sex it seems that de Beauvoir tries to fuse 
Hegelian and Sartrian analyses of what man seeks and what he attains 
in his relationship with woman. This fusion is largely successful 
for)although they constitute two discernible strands in de Beauvoir's 
theory) both are based on the idea that woman is the "Other." Moreover 
in her use of both these theoretical perspsctives, de Beauvoir attempts 
to show that although the relationship between the sexes is structured 
primarily according to manis desires, he can never be a satisfied man. 
Thus de Beauvoir tries to demonstrate in both H·~::gelian and Sartrian 
fashion that the seeds of frustration are contained in the relationship 
itself in as much as man never manages to attain his original goal. But 
although de Beauvoir presents an interesting and at points enlightening 
description of what man hopes to gain in his relationship with woman, 
she nevertheless fails to convince us that the inherent frustrations 
require dialectical resolution. This point is of crucial significance 
to de Beauvoir's later theory of womanYs liberation and will be of 
central concern in the following exposition. 
I 
Although de Beauvoir adopts the Hegelian notion that the subject 
can be posed only in being "opposed" by the Other, she translates this 
into Sartrian termso That is to say, she claims that it is in a relation-
ship of opposition that the subject is revealed since "the inwardness 
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of the existent is only a nothingness and because he must project himself 
onto an object in order to reach himself" (p.217). De Beauvoir, 
following Sartre, also maintains that manYs existence is contingent and 
that the nothingness at the heart of his being means he always exists 
at a distance from himself. Relying on Sartrian ontology to support 
her case, de Beauvoir also argues that it is through woman that man 
hopes to attain the impossible synthesis of for-itself-in-itself. An 
impossible synthesis which, as we have seen, for Sartre constitutes 
the goal of man's fundamental project. In other words, although de 
Beauvoir deviates from Sartre 1 s notion that man attempts to become 
God, from a knowledge of Being and Nothingness we can interpret de 
Beauvoir's comments to mean that it is through his possession of woman 
that man hopes to found his own being: 
Appearing as the Other, woman appears at the same time as 
an abundance of being in contrast to that existence the 
nothingness of which man senses in himself; the Other being 
regarded as the object in the eyes of the subject is regarded 
as en-soi, therefore as a being. In woman is incarnated in 
positive form the lack that the existent carries in his heart, 
and it is in seeking to be made whole through her that man 
hopes to attain self-realization (po173). 
De Beauvoir claims that woman is well-equipped for this task fo~ although 
a conscious existen~ she is nevertheless closely tied to animal life. 
In other words, she appears to man as the possible being through whom 
he can reconcile the two aspects of his existence - transcendence and 
facticity. 
De Beauvoir, however, points out that although man seeks self-
realization through woman, he does not actually wish to be woman. His 
search for fulfilment through her is merely due to the fact that "he 
dreams of unfolding within him all that exists" (p. 204), including 
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therefore the sex which he is not. Moreover, because de Beauvoir argues 
that the subject "succeeds in finding himself only in estrangement_!' 
(p.88) she maintains that manJin his attempt to find self-realization 
through a woman, projects on to her all that he is not so that he can 
' 
reach himself in his subsequent possession of her. However, precisely 
because woman "is everything he is not and that he longs for, his 
negation and his raison di~tre" (p.175)_, de Beauvoir maintains that manw s 
attitude to woman is fundamentally ambivalent. Paradoxically, because 
woman is to contain all that is not within him, she represents both 
what man desires and fears. Thus he is simultaneously attracted to and 
repelled by this creature whom he has set up as the Absolute Othere 
In the ensuing pages de Beauvoir seeks to show how in masculine 
mythology the Eternal Feminine assumes a number of contradictory 
guises; that man's essentially ambivalent attitude to woman means that 
she is unable to represent any "stable" concepts. Thus mythology 
portrays woman as both Good and Evil; black and white; life and death. 
She is both preying mantis and Mother Goddess; Virgin Mary and whore. 
Christianity which considers woman as flesh and temptation also considers 
her morally superior to man. In Sartrian fashion de Beau voir claims 
that although a fundamental project of man has been to appropriate woman 
as Other, it is according to the particular nature of his choice of 
being that the form of appropriation occurs. That is to say, we can 
explain an individual A11.ani s particular attraction to the many-sided 
myth only with reference to the "special idea he has of himself" (p.282) 
and to the way in which he generally asserts his freedom and transcendence. 
The ambivalence inherent in man's attitude to woman in de 
Beauvoiris theory is further increased by a number of other factors, 
the most important of which is the connection between Nature and woman. 
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De Beauvoir claims that woman's procreative functions mean that she 
is closely identified in mani s mind with Nature and thus with something 
which in itself inspires him with contradictory feelings. Thus Nature 
which not only furnishes man with his lifeJbut also deprives him of 
it; appears, no matter how much he attempts to exploit it, as an alien 
and hostile force carrying the imminence of his death. For man, then, 
woman too is seen as both a generative and destructive force: what 
he "cherishes and detests above all in woman," writes de Beauvoir, 
" - loved one and mother - is the fixed image of his animal destiny" 
for, she adds, woman represents "the life that is necessary to his 
existence but that condemns him to the finite and to death" (pp.197-8). 
According to de Beau voir, such fears of woman can be seen in 
the aura of taboos which often surround her and in the various myths 
1 
of womankind prevalent in all patriarchal societieso Woman is often 
seen as a very dangerous creature. Not only will contact with her 
menstrual blood ruin crops and man's potency but, like the Harpes and 
Sirens, she may lure man to destruction and death., In Christian 
ideology woman is the incarnation of all the temptations of the world -
flesh and devil - and in her role of witch or temptress she may use 
her evil powers to the detriment or downfall of the male community. It 
is no coincidence then, according to de Beauvoir, that it was the 
mythical first-born of the feminine species - Eve and Pandora - who 
let loose all the sufferings of humanity. 
The importance of the link between femininity and Nature to man' s 
ambivalent attitude is also to be seen in manis erotic attraction to 
the female sex. It is in embracing a young, pure woman that man feels 
he possesses all the riches of Natureo Thus, writes de Beauvoir, for 






and doe, lilies and roses, downy peach, perfumed berr.y, she is precious 
stones, nacre, agate, pearl, silk, the blue of the sky, the cool water 
of springs, air, flame, land and sea"(p.187). However, de Beauvoir 
claims that it is "re strained" Nature which man wants woman to represent, 
thus forcing her to .use artifice to disguise the inevitable deterioration 
of her flesh. And it is this which de Beau voir claims is woman' s 
"first lie, her first treason)" for life "though clothed in the most 
attractive forms, is always infested by the ferments of age and death" 
(p.192). It is for this reason that de Beauvoir maintains that man's 
erotic attraction to a woman is doomed to fail for, because he desires 
a fresh young maiden, he latterly has "to support a heavy matron or a 
desiccated hag for life" (p.,219)., 
,, 
De Beauvoir maintains that in setting woman up as the Absolute 
.. 
Other man inevitably condemns her to wear 11 a double and deceptive 
visage" (p. 229). Deprived of acting, and thus of establishing herself 
completely as an individual subject, there is a mysterious essence of 
femininity but, claims de Beauvoir, it is the mystery of nothingness 
in as much as there is precisely nothing to conceal. In one of the 
most powerful and persuasive passages in the book, de Beauvoir takes 
us through a number of different aspects of the inevitable ambivalence 
of the Eternal Feminine: 
She is all that man desires and all that he does not 
attain., She is the good mediatrix between propitious Nature 
and man; and she is the temptation of unconquered Nature, counter 
to all goodness. She incarnates all moral values, from good 
to evil, and their opposites; she is the substance of action 
and whatever is an obstacle to it, she is man's grasp on the 
world and his frustration: as such she is the source and 
origin of all man is reflection on his existence and of whatever 
expression he is able to give to it; and yet she works to divert 
him from himself, to make him sink down in silence and in death. 
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She is servant and companion, but he expects her also to be 
his audience and critic and to confirm him in his sEnse of being; 
but she opposes him with her indifference, even with her 
mockery and laughtero He projects upon her what he desires 
and what he fears, what he loves and what he hates. And if it 
is so difficult to say anything specific about her, that is 
because man seeks the whole of himself in her and because she 
is Allo She is All, that is, on the plane of the inessential; 
she is all the Other. And, as the other, she is other than 
herself, other than what is expected of her. Being all, she is 
never quite this which she should be; she is everlasting 
deception, t~e~ deception of that existence which is never 
successfully attained nor fully reconciled with the totality 
of existents (p.229). 
The frustration experienced by man in his relationship with 
woman in de Beauvoiris theory is not just confined to the ambivalence 
of the attitude which stems from her role as the Other. It is not just 
the product of his vacillation for it also results from his desire 
to possess her. De Beauvoir maintains that the mystery and danger of 
femininity, the very thing which man is attracted to, disintegrates 
with her enslavement and domestication. Thus once man has woman under 
his control "her magic is dissipated rather than transformed; reduced 
to the condition of servant, she is no longer that unconquered prey 
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incarnating all the treasures of nature" (p.219). Indeed de Beauvoir 
frequently maintains that man, by enslaving woman and confining her to 
a world of immanence, has robbed her of her original attraction as 
prey. Thus, although the thought of woman may make "man dream'j in 
reality she "represents the everyday aspect of life; she is silliness, 
prudence, shabbiness and boredom" (p.219)" 
De Beauvoir is at pains to point out that there is a great 
tension between what man desires in his relationship with woman and 
how he hopes to achieve it. Thus she claims that for man the difficulty 
is that he wants woman as both slave and enchantres~. De Beau voir 
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argues that throughout history man in his relation to woman has 
pursued that "chimera, a companion hail-slave, hail free" (p.623). 
De Beauvoir also maintains that man has sought to solve this problem 
by attempting to clothe woman, one of his possessions, in some dignity 
so that she appears to be something more than a mere thing. It is for 
this reason that she has been elevated, put on a pedestal and, we shall 
see, given the role of judge, arbiter of male actions. 
To some extent it is possible to trace in de Beauvoir's comments 
on how manis relationship with woman betrays his original desires a 
resemblance to Sartreis worko In Chapter Three, for example, we saw 
how love is doomed to failure because it is: not possible to possess 
freedom as freedom. Likewise we find in de Beauvoir's theory the 
notion that man cannot possess woman as consciousness or as mysterious 
Nature for in both instances such qualities disappear if woman is 
enslaved. Moreover, although de Beauvoir does not go into an analysis 
of sexual relationships along strict Sartrian lines, she does nevertheless 
maintain that there is an "ambiguity" in man's carnal situation. Thus 
de Beauvoir claims that what man desires in carnal union with woman 
is to possess her - to "brand" her so that she will forever be his. 
However, such dreams of possession can never be fuililled for, according 
to de Beauvoir>in "authentic possession the other is abolished as such" 
whereas in carnal possession "woman survives man's embrace and in that 
very fact she escapes him" (p.19.5). In short, there is always the 
possibility that she may be possessed by another man. Indeed de 
Beauvoir also maintains that man, instead of realising his dreams for 
possession, may in fact feel that he himself is possessed by his mistress. 







his general sexual desire on to a particular feminine boqy. Thus, far 
from feeling in total control in the sexual act, man may find himself 
ensnared by his mistress. 
Man's desires for possession of woman both carnally and in 
other ways are frustrated for another Sartrian reason: man is never 
fully able to grasp woman in her subjectivity. In Sartrian fashion 
de Beauvoir expounds the immutable subjectivity of the individual 
and maintains that woman, even at her most masochistic and enslaved, 
illustrates her subjectivity: 
Therein is (woman 1 s)original treason; the most docile, the 
most passive is still a conscious being: and sometimes the 
fact that in giving herself to him she looks at him and judges 
is enough to make him feel duped (p .626 ) • 
Thus we see that in The Second Sex de Beauvoir, although 
arguing that man wants through the possession of woman to find self-
realization, nevertheless maintains that this project is doomed to 
failure; it is not simply that his attitude to woman is too unstable 
and ambivalent and that the position of servant to which she is confined 
robs her of her original attractiveness, for there is also the fact 
that it is not possible actually to possess another. 
II 
Along with this explanation of what man hopes to attain in his 
relationship with woman de Beauvoir outlines another argument which 
can be best understood within a more Hegelian theoretical perspective. 
The major aspect of this Hegelian sVand has already been encountered 
in the summary of de Beauvoir's historical account for there we learned 
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that she argues that it is in his relationship with woman that man has 
sought to escape "the implacable dialectic of master and slave" 
(p.171 )o In other words, because de Beauvoir argues that each conscious 
being "tries to fulfil himself by reducing the other to slavery" (p.171 ), 
she maintains that man has hoped to escape this conflict in his 
relationship with the opposite sex. As we know de Beauvoir believes 
that woman is well-suited for this purpose; despite the biological 
restrictions imposed upon her - restrictions which have prevented her 
from fully asserting her subjectivity - she is nevertheless a conscious 
being. In acknowledging her own inadequacies for assertive, creative 
action,woman has thus given man recognition of his worth without being 
led to demand recognition in return. Thus de Beau voir portrays woman 
as the Other who gives man objective confirmation of his sovereignty 
but, unlike the slave, her situation has not historically raised her 
to the position where she also lays claim to her sovereignty. 
Using the Hegelian concept of recognition when discussing the 
relationship between man and woman, de Beauvoir elaborates why woman 
has been necessary to man. Thus de Beauvoir maintains that woman is 
particularly useful to man in this respect for, unlike his peers who 
are too busily engaged in projects to act as publics for one another, 
woman is always there, reaqy to recognise his successes and achievements. 
Indeed not only can woman confirm man's objective worth in the same 
way that men can do for each other but also, according to de Beauvoir, 
she can recognise some of those qualities which cannot easily be displayed 
in such an all-male forum. He can reveal to her "the special merits" 
(p.216) of his very being - his virile, seductive, tender qualities, 
for example, can only be displayed and valued with reference to her. 
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De Beauvoir also claims that as woman not only declines to 
compete with man but also accepts his values and his laws) she herself 
is able to become the symbol of man's success- simultaneously occupying 
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the role of both judge and prizeG Thus de Beauvoir claims: 
Treasure, prey, sport and danger, nurse, guide, judge, mediatrix, 
mirror, woman is the Other ••• who opposes him without denyi.ng 
him, she is the Other who lets herself be taken without ceasing 
to be the Other, and therein she is so necessary to man's 
happiness and to ·his triumph that it can be said that if she 
did not exist, men would have invented her (p.218). 
In the master-slave scenario the recognition of the Other is 
likewise so essential to the consciousness destined to be master, that 
he is prepared to die in order to achieve it. However, as we Irnow, 
this recognition) although passionately fought for by the maste; is 
ultimately rendered worthless for, far from being recognised by another 
human being,: he is· reqognised by a slave- a mere animal or thing. 
Although the master had wanted to assert himself as an autonomous being 
his position of master is dependent on the slave's recognition. In 
The Second Sex de Beauvoir, it seems, also tries to portray the male 
female relationship as undergoing these kinds of changes but, as we 
shall see, de Beauvoir is not as convincing as Hegel. 
In de Beauvoir's theory there is certainly the notion that 
enslavement contradicts the original reason to enslave. However, this 
notion refers more to the concept of possession and does not actually 
affect the recognition which man attains in his relationship with woman. 
In other words, de Beauvoir never explicitly shows that the recognition 
which woman gives man is worthless. To some extent this is in harmony 
with de Beauvoir's reiterated insistence that despite the fact that 
woman is confined to immanence, she is nevertheless a human being. And 
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as sue~ a being whose recognition is important. However, even if de 
Beauvoir had maintained that woman's recognition is worthless to man, 
this would not have led to the drama of the Hegelian scenario. Hegel1 s 
master attains objective confirmation of his worth only through the 
slave's recognition but de Beauvoir's man does not acquire recognition 
of his sovereignty only in his relationship with woman for, like the 
slave, he also attains it independently through his labour. 
This notion of independence leads us to question what de Beauvoir 
does, in fact, make of the idea that the master comes to be dependent 
on the slave. HGre we find that despite de Beauvoiris continued attempt 
to show that unlike the dependent condition of femininity, man is an 
independent being, she does try to make some parallels between man and 
master. Thus she claims that "the dialectic ofmaster and slave here 
finds its most concrete application: in oppressing, one becomes 
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oppr~ssed. Men are enchained by reason of their very sovereignty" (po499). 
However, in claiming this de Beauvoir cannot actually find parallels 
in Hegel~s master-slave. In Hegel~s theory the disadvantaged position 
of the master comes from the fact that the recognition which sustains 
him as master is obtained from a mere thing, and that because his needs 
are catered for by the slave he does not take part in creative labour. 
Thus the master is arrested at a primitive level of development and is 
unable to become a full human being. The oppression of man to which de 
Beauvoir refers is linked to neither of these things. It refers simply 
to the idea that as woman is morally and financially dependent on man, 
he may be required to act in accordance with her needs and demands. In 
other words, in enslaving woman he has lain the foundations of his 
own responsibility for her. Moreover, what de Beauvoir calls oppression 
in this context, is little more than what she elsewhere refers to as 
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"irritation" (p. 500 ) o Unlike the master, man1 s position in de Beauvoir' s 
theor,y does not retard his human development or keep him at the level 
of the "inessential means" (p. 635). It is merely a position of responsibility; 
responsibility which, in the light of de Beauvoiris own ontology and 
ethics, he is ultimately free to reject. 
Thus we can say that although de Beauvoir tries to show how the 
relationship between man and woman is dialectically transformed so that 
it betrays his desires, the weight of her general argument is not 
convincing. As de Be~ruvoir claims that man is able to confirm his 
sovereignty in his labour, and as for Hegel this constitutes a higher 
stage of confirmation, de Beauvoir 1 s man has avoided the impasse of the 
master and escaped the problems of dependency engendered by recognition 
gained only from a slaveo Moreover, as de Beauvoir has not introduced 
us to the idea that man is prevented from fully affirming his humanity> 
she is unable to convince us that manis oppression of woman constitutes 
his own oppressiono 
According to de Beauvoir's peTspective, then, man may feel 
frustrated, cheated, irritated and bored in his relationship with woman 
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but never actually oppressed. Indeed it is important to remember that 
despite some of its negative, frustrating feature~de Beauvoir maintains 
that man benefits ontologically from his relationship with the opposite 
sex. In other words, in recognising him, in incarnating Nature and the 
Other, woman? s subordinate status suits man? s "ontological pretensions.". 
In fact de Beauvoir actually argues that woman's role is so important 
to "man's happiness and his triumph" (p.218) that he created her 
specially to fulfil his needs. 
Leaving aside the ontological aspects of the relationship there 
are other reasons why man benefits from his oppression of womano For 
example, de Beauvoir claims that whereas human existence always contains 
immanent and transcendent qualities, man has appropriated the latter 
and confined women to the world of the "given." Thus he has managed 
to escape completely the negative, animal aspects of life~ Moreover, 
in confining woman to such a world he assures himself of a haven to 
which he can e se ape: 
When he comes home in the evening, he is once more at anchor 
on the earth; through his wife the continuity of his days is 
assured; whatever may be the hazards he confronts in the outer 
world, she guarantees the recurrence of meals, of sleep; she 
restores whatever has been destroyed or worn out by activity, 
preparing food for the tired worker, caring for him when he 
is sick, mending, washingo And into this conjugal universe 
205 
that she sets up and keeps going, she brings the whole of the 
vast world: she lights fires, puts flowers about the house, 
domesticates the emanations of the sun, water, and earth (p.209). 
Despite the fact that de Beauvoir never manages to portray man 
as oppressed in his relationship with woman and indeed claims that he 
benefits great~ from it, she nevertheless maintains that man would 
profit from woman's emancipation. 11He would be liberated in her liberation" 
(p.729), writes de Beauvoiro This argument is based on the notion that 
man would find his relationship with woman enriched if she were an 
equal; that womanVs liberation would, in fact, lead to more dramatic 
relations between the sexes as each would then be seen as Othero However, 
of much more significance than this is de Beauvoir' s idea that reciprocal 
relations between individuals and groups are imperative for ethical 
reasonso But in order to understand how likely man is to accept or 
desire woman's emancipation, it is necessar.y to examine in some depth 
de Beauvoir's view of reciprocal relations and, within the terms of her 














In previous chapters it has be en shown that throughout The 
Second Sex de Beauvoir uses Hegelian and Sartrian concepts to analyse 
the male· .. female relationship. At times the use of these two theoretical 
perspectives is quite compatible. But there are occasions when there 
is a tension, if not a basic incompatibility, in such a use of 
Sartrian and Hegelian ideas. And, as we shall see, this is most acutely 
demonstrated in de Beauvoir 1 s theory of conflict and its resolution. 
In The Second Sex de Beauvoir follows Hegel and maintains that 
at a certain stage of development, man senses himself to be a subject; 
but that he is driven to have this confirmed by a consciousness which 
is separate from yet identical with his own: "Each conscious being 
aspires to set himself up alone as sovereign subject. Each tries to 
fulfil himself by reducing the Other to slaveryn (p .1 72). According 
to de Beauvoir, however, this desire although necessary to human develop-
ment underlies rrthe tragedyrr of the human situation. 
De Beauvoir not only shares with Hegel this belief in a fundamental 
hostility betwe8n Self and Other but also like him maintains that such 
conflict may be r·3solved. In Hegel this reconciliation is ultimately 
effected by the obliteration of objectivity and the synthesis of both 
moments of the dialectic in the form of the Absolute. And it is this 
which, as we have seen, in our inspection of some of Sartre's ideas 
leadshim to accuse Hegel of "ontological optimism." Thus Sartre, while 
accepting the notion of an original struggle between consciousnesses, 
nevertheless opposes Hegel on the grounds that the conflict and separation 
of consciousnesses is a permanent feature of human existencee In short 
Sartre rejects Hegel 7s optimism in favour of a theory in which conflict 
is cyclical and the essence of the relationships to which we are all 
doomed. 
De Beauvoir, however, writing The Second Sex after the publication 
date of Being and Nothingness
1
amends this aspect of Sartrian existential-
ism and yet retains the notion of a fundamental conflict between 
individuals intact. In other words, in the aftermath of war and in the 
wake of the development of a socially committed philosophy, de Beauvoir 
claims an elimination of conflict is possible. Thus in The Second Sex 
we find an ontology which posits an "a priori" struggle of consciousnesses 
hand in hand with a concept of obtainable reciprocityo However, such a 
synthesis is not justified, or even discussed, in theoretical terms 
and de Beau voir simply uses both arguments in the course of her study. 
As we have already seen in previous chapters, de Beauvoir believes 
that the desire to enslave the Other - "the imperialism of the human 
consciousness" - is a fundamental aspect of human existenceo So 
fundamental in fact that de Beauvoir never feels it necessar,r to justify 
her notion that man would have wanted to dominate woman. This does not 
mean, however, that in de Beauvoir's theor,y relations between~ are 
always ones of oppressor and oppressed,for it would appear that.if a , 
certain equality between individuals or groups already exists then a 
/ 
reciprocal relationship between them may develop: 
••• when two human categories are together, each aspires to 
impose its sovereignty upon the other. If both are able to 
resist this imposition, there is created between them a 
reciprocal relation, sometimes in enmity, sometimes in amity.· 
always in a state of tension. If one of the two is in some 
ways privileged, has some advantage, this one prevails over 
the other and undertakes to keep it in subjection (p.93)o 
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In other words, de Beauvoir claims that although the desire to-dominate 
the Other is fundamental and irresistibl~it may be kept in check if 
a certain equality between the protagonists already exists. Thus for 
example where there is no obvious difference in strength between opposing 
force~ recognition may seem preferable to those concerned to total and 
unceasing conflict. However de BeauvoirYs notion of the possibility of 
reciprocity and her hope for harmonious relations between individuals 
in the future is not based on the idea that man's desire for domination 
is tempered by reason or pragmatism. On the contr~ de Beauvoir's 
belief in the possibility and importance of reciprocity is firmly rooted 
in her notion that reciprocal relationships place humanity on a higher 
existential plane: 
It is possible to rise above this (fundamental) conflict if 
each individual freely recognises the other, each regarding 
himself and the other simultaneously as object and subject in 
a reciprocal manner. But friendship and generosity, which 
alone permit in actuality this recognition of free beings, 
are not facile virtues; they are assuredly man's highest 
achievement, and through that achievement he is to be found 
in his true nature. But this true nature is that of a struggle 
unceasingly begun, unceasingly abolished; it requires man to 
outdo himself at every moment (p.172). 
However, although from this passage we learn quite clearly the 
status and definition of a reciprocal relationship in de Beauvoir's 
theory, we do not learn the conditions under which such "friendship Yt 
and I? generosi tyit flourish. We do not, for example, Imow how men either 
en mas se or as individuals manage to temper their fundamental desire 
for domination and reach this higher state. However, even if de Beauvoir 
had discussed these points it does not seem possible that she would 
have been able to reconcile the ontology on which her analysis is 
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based with the essentially ethical notion that the resolution of 
conflict is both desirable and possible. 
De BeauvoirWs notions of conflict and reciprocity become 
more complicated, when we examine them within the context of the 
relationship between man and womann Thus, for example, although de 
Beauvoir maintains that it is an ontological rifactvr that each individual 
tries to assert his sovereignty through enslaving the Other, this is 
not applicable to the female sexo In other words, de Beauvoiris 
ontological n facts'' have relevance only to half the human race 1 Thus 
in claiming that women, both historically and contemporarily> have not 
stood up ''before" the world and felt ''unique and sovereign?~ - that they 
have abdicated in favour of men - de Beauvoir contradicts her earlier 
claim that individuals always try to fulfil themselves by "reducing 
the Other to slavery. ti Of more importance, however, than the fact that 
woman is behaviour contradicts de Beau voir's n ontologyiJ is the way in 
which she conceptualises the relations between the sexes. 
Although de Beauvoir is not always consistent on the question 
of whether or not reciprocity between the sexes has ever existed, a 
dominant theme of The Second Sex is that women have always been 
subordinate to men - that the relationship between the sexes has not 
been reciprocal - and that it has been structured according to man's 
desires. However de Beauvoir is inherently ambivalent about the 
r~levance of "the imperialism of the human consciousness" to mants 
relationship with woman. Thus de Beauvoir simultaneously maintains 
that man would inevitably want to dominate woman, and that "the couple 
is an original Mitsein" (p.67 ) • In other words, although de Beauvoir 
takes it as axiomatic that man would want to dominate woman, elsewhere 
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she maintains that despite the fact that human relations are not based 
on "Mi tsein}n the couple relationship is one based primordially on 
co-operation and harmony. Thus it appears that in this instance the 
relationship between man and woman and man and his fellows is one of 
inversiono That is to say, the conflict between men is ontological but, 
according to de Beauvoir, may be replaced by reciprocity if man can 
manage to raise himself and assume this authentically human attitude. 
The raw, unmediated relationship between the sexes, on the other hand, 
is apparently one of "unity" and it is historical progress) and to a les-
ser extent ontolo~which have determined manis desires to oppress. 
In other words, historical progress has meant the oppression of woman 
but allowed the possibility of reciprocity between men. As de Beauvoir 
argues that womanis status as"Other"is not compatible with truly 
reciprocal relations -with the existence defined by her as "man'ls 
true nature" - she believes it now constitutes a barrier to real human 
progress. 
Part V 




According to Simone de Beauvoir womanis full emancipation 
depends on women acting en masse to assert themselves and thus to 
redefine the concept of "femininity'~'·' This is not to deny that 
individual women may, from time to time, assert her humanity but in 
our patriarchal society this assertion can only be purchased at the 
cost of this woman Y s femininity. Neither is this to deny that de 
Beauvoir occasionally lapses into speaking of some women who "have never 
had to sense in (their) femininity an inconvenience or an obstacle" 
(p.27). Still less is it to imply that de Beauvoir thinks emancipation 
will come easily. The general run of de Beauvoir's argument is clear: 
woman's emancipation nru.st be "collective" (p.639). 
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The snares which await any attempt at emancipating woman are 
considerable. There is, first of all, the lack of any common work or 
interest which might bring women (as it has in the case of the proletariat 
or oppressed ethnic groups) together. The success of each woman depends 
on her getting and keeping a single male. Thus women are forced to 
compete for the favours of men. At the same time women "live dispersed 
among the males, attached through residence, housework, economic 
condition and social standing to certain men- fathers or husbands -
more firmly than they are to other women" (p .19). Thus dispersed women 
have little chance of developing a "we" feeling. Moreover de Beau voir 
believes that the sexes are naturally interdependent so that women can 
hardly dream of "exterminating males" (p.19) and this restriction makes 
it difficult for women to think of men as "the Othe:4" But woman's 
"pas si vi tyn is the biggest bar to her liberation in de Beauvoir 2 s 
theory. To explicate the passive nature of woman's consciousness we 
need to see how the foundation,having been laid in girlhood~is reinforced 
in womanis domestic labour. 
I 
In the historical sections of The Second Sex de Beauvoir defines 
the superior nature of manis labour in terms of its creativity. Thus 
it is with reference to the Hegelian master-slave dialectic that we 
understand why man was able to assert his sovereignty through the use 
of the bronze tool. In the contemporary sections of the book de Beauvoir 
still expresses the superiority of men with reference to the creativity 
of their labour. But de Beauvoir begins to combine a Hegelian emphasis 
on labour with one which has Sartrian roots. Thus in some instances in 
The Second Sex it is productive labour which is of special significance 
to man, not simply because it affords him recognition of his human 
consciousness but because it gives him that materialist conception 
which for Sartre is necessary for an authentic perspective on the world 
and one~s place in it. Bearing in mind these two views of the potential 
significance of labo~ let us look at the way in which de Beauvoir 
describes womanVs domestic work and the consciousness which results. 
Using the essentially Hegelian idea that creative labour is 
significant to the labourer if it externalises his consciousness, de 
Beauvoir argues that woman's household tasks have little human value 
since they rarely produce anything durable and bring no lasting satis-
faction to the creator. Thus even though cooking can be creative and 
requires certain skills, it does not produce objects of permanence and 
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so woman derives little benefit from it. But it is particularly housework, 
likened at one point to "the torture of Sisyphus" (p.470) which de 




sense of her human status nor allows her to know the pride 
De Beauvoiris objection to household chores is not confined to 
the fact that such tasks are unsatisfying and of little benefit to the 
labourer. More importantly she maintains that such activities are 
technically rudimentary o Even though some technique may be involved 
in such operations, de Beauvoir claims that they are subject to their 
own laws: "One must obey the fire, the water, wait for the sugar to 
melt, for the dough to rise, and also for the wash to dry, for the 
fruits to ripen on the shelf" (p.609). De Beauvoir argues, therefore, 
that woman 9s tasks are "too monotonous" to teach her "the laws of 
mechanical causation" (po61 0). De Beauvoir also claims the converse; 
namely that as woman's activities are not based on technique, they 
appear to involve "magic" or "sorcery" (p .4 72ff) • Moreover, according 
to de Beauvoir, woman further experiences this lack of technique in 
her reproductive role; for the reproductive process cannot be expressed 
in a "mathematical equation" and, obeying its own laws, it is a process 
which "no machine can hasten or delay" (p.609). 
The importance of de Beauvoiris conception of the labour 
activities of women is to be seen in the profound consequences which 
she believes such labour has on the nature of feminine consciousness. 
This is expressed most succinctly by de Beauvoiris claim that because 
woman does not do technical work her "mentality perpetuates that of 
agricultural civilisations which worshipped the magic powers of the 
land" (p .61 0). It is this lack of technical Imowledge and experience 
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which means in de Beauvoir' s theory that woman is unable to think of 
herself as a creator or to appreciate the trmasculine logicn (p .61 0) with 
which man has learned to conquer and create his physical environment. 
Thus de Beauvoir argues that woman is unable to understand the nature 
of action necessary to change the world and feels lost in Nature -
nat the heart of an immense, vague nebula" (p.61 0). Furthermore 
unlike man, who de Beau voir portrays as for ever sharpening his analytical 
tools, woman is "content ••• with extremely vague conceptions, confusing 
parties, opinions, places, people, events." In short, nher head is 
filled with a strange jumble" (p .611) o 2 
WomanVs lack of technical training means that she feels powerless 
and, like Sartre's anti-Semite (who is also defined as a non-productive 
worker), tends to see the world as something "fixed!' 
3 
In fact de 
Beauvoir argues that one of the distinguishing features of the sexes 
is that whereas woman feels "powerless against things: volcanoes, police, 
patrons, men" (p.613), man takes responsibility for the world he lives 
in. In contrast with man "who knows that he can develop different 
institutions, another ethic, a new legal code" (p.612), woman's feelings 
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of powerlessness give rise to feelings of resignation. Indeed de Beauvoir 
claims that while such resignation may inspire patience and tenacity, 
it also "engenders a sterile prudence" (p.613) - a frame of mind which 
means that she is "always trying to conserve, to adapt, to arrange 
rather than build anew" (p.614). Ultimately de Beauvoir even concludes 
that the consciousness of women is such that they "prefer compromise 
and adjustment to revolution" (p.614)o 
Thus irrespective of whether de Beauvoir emphasises the importance 
of work for essentially Hegelian or Sartrian reasons, she portrays 
the consciousness which woman attains in her domestic work as passive. 
In short, for de Beauvoirian woman "everything influences her to let 
herself be hemmed in, dominated by existences foreign to her own" 
(p.721 )o As such, womanYs consciousness is not that requisite for a 
struggle for liberationo The significance of this, however, can be 
best understood in the light of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic. 
II 
As we have seen, de Beauvoir envisages manis historic and 
contemporar.y role as allowing him to assert his humanity by means of 
mastery and slavery. De Beauvoirian woman, however, is similar only 
to the negative features of the Hegelian master and slave. Thus, 
although there are parallels between woman and some aspects of siavery 
and between woman and master; no analogy can be made between woman and 
creative slave. It is particularly this fact which does not bode well 
for woman's emancipation. 
If we bear in mind·the historical and contemporary role which 
de Beauvoir ascribes to woman, it appears that woman's consciousness 
is similar to that_of HegelYs slave in the immediate aftermath of the 
Fight; that is before labour has transformed his consciousness. Indeed 
woman's consciousness, as described by de Beauvoir, is similar to the 
slave's at this stage in his development and yet more backward than it. 
This backwardness results from de Beauvoir's claim that as woman has 
never been engaged in battle - never learned "the lessons of violence" 
- she has not had the opportunity to contemplate her own death, to 
confront the contingency of human existence. We do not have to accept 
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de Beauvoir 1 s idea that master and slave share the same risk, to see that 
in her theory, woman, even more than the slave, represents the dependent 
consciousness of given being who has never demonstrated an ability 
to overcome an animal attachment to life. 
The notion that because woman has never been engaged in battle, 
her consciousness is more slavish than the slave7s,is further borne out 
when we take into consideration her lack of fear. The fear experienced 
by the slave in the Hegelian scenario is crucial to his future development; 
the fear which the slave first experienced in his combat with the 
master continues as part of his servitude and forces him to grasp the 
meaning of existence. Indeed Hegel maintains that if consciousness 
"has not endured absolute fear, but merely some slight anxiety" - if 
"its natural consciousness has not tottered and shaken" - then it cannot 
get "beyond the attitude of bondage." 4 Thus, as de Beau voir claims 
that the continuation of womanis oppression is based on the economic 
and ontological enticements to complicity and that woman accepts man 1 s 
values, woman cannot be seen as having been "shaken" to the core of 
her being. 
The fact that de Beauvoir's woman has never been prepared to 
fight, nor has experienced the contingency of human existenc~ keeps 
woman largely at the animal, bestial level of early slaveryo But 
following on from Hegel, we may be tempted to assume that although man, 
like the master, has laid the foundations for mankind 1 s progress, it 
is ultimately the oppressed woman who, by asserting her autonomy and 
demanding recognition, will create a truly human society based on 
reciprocity. However de Beauvoir's theory prevents her from invoking 
the dialectics of the original Hegelian scenarioo 
An intriguing feature of de Beauvoir's theory is that her 
woman is also comparable to Hegel's master in that her exclusion from 
creative labour means that like him she is steeped in Universality, 
realising none of her individuality and representing only certain 
biological roles -mother, daughter, sister -within the family. Woman's 
and master 7s exclusion from creative labour not only precludes them 
means 
from becoming proper individuals but also/that if the principles of 
) 
mastery or femininity were to reign supreme) nothing would change. The 
first fight would merely be replicated indefinitely in wars of prestige 
and woman's maintaining role would result in the mere repetition of 
the same life in more individuals. Indeed it is because de Beauvoir 
equates the principle of femininity with stagnatio~ that she argues 
that woman's devaluation was a necessary stage in human progress. 
Thus the de Beauvoirian woman, like the Hegelian master, is in 
an impasse. In the Hegelian scenario, oppression is dialectically 
overcome by the slave but the situation of de Beauvoir 9s woman does not 
contain the germ of her liberation. Having been excluded from the type 
of meaningful or dangerous activity which could furnish her with the 
objective conditions necessary for her to claim her sovereigntY; she 
is unable to fight for her liberation. It seems that having accepted 
the status of'•other, •• in a moment of historical exigency, without being 
beaten in combat, de Beauvoir 1 s woman is unable to reject it once the 
situation no longer merits such a sacrifice. In other words, the 
maintaining, untranscendent role to which she is confined insulates 
her consciousness so that she is unable to escape. Master and woman, 
then, in comparison to slave and man, represent the static aspect of 
the dichotomy- an aspect, which in woman's case, theoretically belies 
the oppressed's liberating role. 
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One may be tempted to assume that the stagnation in the male 
female relationship could be overcome by man for, after all, in de 
Beauvoirian theory he not only inculcates some aspects of the principles 
of mastery and slaverY) but he would also be realising his "true nature" 
if he initiated a reciprocal relationship with woman. Furthermore, 
as we learned in Chapter Eleven, de Beauvoiris theory leads us to the 
conclusion that although man, like the master, is in a situation he 
desired, he can never attain satisfaction. In enslaving woman he has 
robbed her of her original attractiveness; she has been confined to a 
world of immanence where her previous magic and mystery have been 
replaced by mediocrity. Leaving aside for the moment whether in 
de Beau voir's theory man would want to liberate woman, would this in 
fact be a plausible scenario for emancipation? 
III 
Central to most theories of liberation is the idea that the 
oppressed cannot be liberated; that they must be the s~bjec~not the 
object of the verb. 5 Thus the struggle for liberation is frequently 
portrayed as possessing cathartic qualities in as much as it is in this 
revolutionary activity that the oppressed fully cast off the mentality 
of subordinatione If the oppressed neither struggle nor rebel - if 
liberation is not the result of their own activities - then the 
mentality of subordination will remain. The necessi~ for the oppressed 
to be at the heart of the liberating action is illustrated by the master-
slave dialectic. If the master, for whatever reason, decided to give 
the slave his freedom, the slave would remain an animal or thing for 
he has not asserted his humanity over his animal-like fear of death. 
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Moreover, a slave freed voluntarily by his master would be so feeble 
that he could easily be enslaved by another master. In 
other words, the structure of the oppressive relationship might be 
altered from above yet the consciousness of dominance and subservience 
remain the same. 
Frantz Fanon also illustrates this point with reference to blacks. 
In Black Skin, White Masks he writes: "Historically, the Negro steeped 
in the inessentiality of servitude was set free by his master. He did 
not fight for his freedom." And so, adds Fanon: "The Negro is a slave 
who has been allowed to assume the attitude of a master. The white man 
6 
is a master who has allowed his slaves to eat at his table." Paulo 
Freire in The Pedagogy of the Oppressed likewise argues that the 
oppressed must be the actors in the struggle for liberation in as much 
as "the liberation of the oppressed is the liberation of men, not 
7 
things." Accordingly Freire argues: "Freedom is acquired by conquest, 
8 
not by gift • n 
Such views assert the necessity for human action and the 
immutable subjectivity of the individual and so they are in harmony with 
existentialist ontology. Indeed the emphasis on the oppressed's role 
accords with statements in The Second Sex. It is the notion that 
emancipation is dependent on a change in consciousness and not simply 
on the outward trappings of freedom which underlies de Beauvoiris 
comments on the emptiness of abstract rights for women and her statement 
that in our society the nature of woman's consciousness is such that 
"she is a slave even when she behaves with apparent freedom" (p.500). 
However, despite this underlying notion de Beauvoir insinuates 
at points that woman~ be liberated by the activities of others. Thus 
not only does she write about society "restoring" (p. 740) womani s 
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quoting Rimbaud, 
sovereignty but also,~of man "letting" woman "go free" (p. 292). Consider 
her most important statement on this question: 
Oppressors cannot be expected to make a move of gratuitous 
generosity; but at one time the revolt of the oppressed, at 
another time the very evolution of the privileged caste itself, 
creates new situations; thus men have been led, in their own 
interest to give partial emancipation to women: it remains 
only for women to continue their ascent, and the successes 
they are obtaining are an encouragement to do so o It seems 
almost certain that sooner or later they will arrive at 
complete economic and social equality which will bring about 
an inner metamorphosis (p.738 , emphasis added). 9 
Even here de Beauvoir mentions the activity of the oppressors as having 
significance for liberation. However, although de Beauvoir portrays 
man's activity as the catalyst of the process leading to woman's 
emancipation, it is not simply a question of man giving woman her 
emancipation. Let us examine in depth the various factors involved. 
In Chapter Eleven we learned that de Beauvoir maintains that 
man derives many benefits from his relationship with woman,"the Other." 
Moreover despite de Beauvoir 1 s ethics and notion that man would morally 
benefit from womanvs emancipation) the logic of her theor,y is that man 
gains from his oppression of woman and is unlikely to relinquish this 
position of dominanceo De Beauvoir even states this in the conclusion 
when she maintains that man "is very well pleased to remain the 
sovereign subject, the absolute superior, the essential being; he 
refuses to accept his companion as an equal in any concrete wayrr (p. 726) • 
In short, de Beauvoir cannot paint a convincing picture of man actually 
renouncing his positiono 
However, if we look again at de Beauvoir~s programme for woman's 
emancipation we see that man is to become catalyst of the process 
because it is in his interests to change woman's situation and not 
because he would be acting in accordance with his "true" nature. In 
other words, man's economic interests lead him to desire woman's 
productive labour and he unintentionally activates the process which 
de Beauvoir at one point believes will lead to sexual equality. In 
her terms, woman's emancipation is linked to the "economic evolution 
of the masculine world," .. and so the change in the economic order 
will awaken a new consciousness in women. But is de Beauvoir being 
consistent with her own theory here, and is she being realistic? 
IV 
Throughout The Second Sex de Beauvoir continually emphasises 
that through his labour an individual can establish his sovereignty. 
So it is not surprising that her conclusion on the future of woman's 
liberation should portray work as vital to this process. De Beauvoir 
simultaneously maintains that woman's lack of meaningful employment 
is intrinsic to her oppression and that this must be changed if she 
is to cast off her role as Other. "The curse that is upon woman as 
vassal," writes de Beau voir," (is) the fact that she is not permitted 
to do anything. n However, she adds optimistically that when woman 
"is productive, active, she regains her transcendence" (p.638). A good 
part of the optimism of de Beauvoiris conclusion is dependent on this 
notion of the importance of work to woman's liberatio~for she maintains 
that technology now guarantees women entry into productive work. De 
Beauvoir even claims that in the age of the machine and with woman 
"now protected from the slavery of reproduction", woman is in a position 
to assume the economic role "which is offered her and which will assure 
10 
her of complete independence" (p.1.52, emphasi.s added). 
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In de Beauvoiris theory the liberating nature of work for 
women appears to be based on two things: her material and psychological 
independence of men. In short, work would eliminate the parasitical 
nature of feminine existence: 
It is through gainful employment that woman has traversed 
most of the distance that separated her from the male; and 
nothing else can guarantee her liberty in practice. Once 
she ceases to be a parasite, the system based on her dependence 
crumbles; between her and the universe there is no longer any 
need for a masculine mediator (p.689,emphasis added). 
Elsewhere, however, she notes that a job often does not allow her to 
become independent of men. ·As de Beauvoir points out, women are 
often forced into low-paid work and even where they do the same job 
as men1 they often do not receive equal pay. Thus she claims: "The 
majority of women do not escape from the traditional fe~nine world; 
they get neither from society nor from their husbands the assistance 
they would need to become in concrete fact the equals of mantt (po690). 
Indeed de Beauvoir argues that although some women benefit from the 
feeling of self-sufficiency which working may give them, for many women 
it is simply a "double servitude" (p.690) for, not finding in their 
work the means to become economically independent of men, m~ women 
become servants both to their job and their "protector.n In other 
words, de Beauvoir argues that women are exploited as a pool of cheap, 
unorganised labour and that their unrecognised status in the job 
market leads them to see their jobs and their economic position as 
unimportant. Therefore, de Beauvoir cannot, and for the most part 
does not, claim that for the vast majority of working women, a job 
automatically ends their dependent and.pa.rasitical existence. Their 





job as unimportant - as something to fill in the period before marriage 
or as a way to earn "pin moneYj" So even these working women retain 
a psychological dependence on men. 
The material dependence on men which is retained by the majority 
of women by virtue of their low paid work disappears for women who 
enter the professions or the arts. But, according to de Beauvoir in 
her chapter entitled "The Independent Woman/' for these women too the 
psychological dependency remains. For despite the fact that de Beauvoir 
pins her hopes for liberation on women entering productive work, she 
herself remains sceptical of the relevance of employment to woman's 
emancipation. 
To some extent, such scepticism emanates from the notion tha£ 
women can find no individual salvation and that genuine emancipation 
depends not simply on getting a good job, but on working within a world 
in which changes have been made to woman's total situation. For example, 
although the woman who works may "refuse to confine herself to her 
role as female, because she will not accept mutilation" de Beauvoir adds 
that "it would also be mutilation to repudiate her sex" (p.691). 
De Beauvoir subsequently advises the "woman who has no wish to shock 
or devaluate herseLf socially" to live out her "feminine situation in 
a feminine manner" (p o692). In effect, then, de Beau voir is saying 
that repudiating one 'l s sex absorbs time and energy) and only succeeds 
in making one a freak, and so it is actually preferable to attempt to 
harmoni;:;e femininity with more human pursuits. But as this will always 
dilute womanis commitment to her job, since she will have to find 
time to maintain her feminine appeal, de Beauvoir argues that as long 
as femininity is not redefined even women who work will find it very 


















It appears that while an individual woman in de Beau voir's 
theory cannot find emancipation in her work, nevertheless it is only 
when women begin to work that they will lay the foundations for 
collective action; that work is a prerequisite for the redefinition of 
femininity which, in the final analysis, will constitute womanis 
emancipation. For this reason, the influx of women into productive 
labour is seen by de Beauvoir as a period of ·transition (po292). 
However, de Beauvoir does not convince us that even women who work in 
jobs which ~allow them to become creative and transcendent) can 
cast off their psychological dependency. Speaking specifically of 
women in the professions and the art~ de Beau voir maintains: " ••• the 
independence she has won through work is not enough to abolish her 
desire for a glorious abdication" (p. 704) o Indeed de Beauvoir argues 
quite clearly that access to transcendent pursuits is not enough to 
eliminate"the myth of the liberating saviour-hero": 
She would have had·to be brought up exactly like a boy to 
be able easily to overcome her adolescent narcissism; but 
as it is, she continues into adult life this cult of the ego 
towards which her whole youth has tended. She uses her 
professional successes as merits for the enrichment of her 
image; she feels the need for a witness from on high to reveal 
and consecrate her worth. Even if she is a severe judge of 
the men she evaluates in daily life, she none the less 
reveres Man, and if she encounters him, she is ready to fall 
on her knees (po704). 
In short, through employment woman may gain the opportunity to be 
transcenden~ but she still dreams of completely foregoing such 
transcendence and becoming subservient to man. 
The orientation to passivity engendered in girlhood is so strong 
that even the adult woman finds it difficult to shake off; she is not 
able to adopt a masculine attitude to work and creation. De Beauvoir 
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suggests that woman is too busy in search of herself and, in her attempt 
to become a fascinating object, too prone to narcissism to obtain the 
forgetfulness of self which is a prerequisite for artistic activity and 
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general success. Indeed de Beauvoir claims that Rosa Luxenbourg's 
achievement, for example, was partly due to the fact that she was "ugly" -
not tempted to "wallow in the cult of her own image, to make herself 
object, prey, trap" (p. 721). Moreover, echoing Sartre in Anti-Semite 
and Jew, de Beauvoir maintains that because woman1s place in the human 
world is not assured, she is not able to raise general questions ab_out 
the contingency of existence. In other words, like Jews and other 
oppressed groups, women are so preoccupied with the attempt to establish 
themselves as human beings that they are not able to contemplate 
generally the meaning of life - to experience "anguish.11 Although 
woman may experience uneasiness she is not, as Sartre would say, in a 
position "to raise questions about the place of man in the world and 
11 
his ultimate destiny." And it is the asking of such questions which, 
according to de Beauvoir, tends to underlie works of lasting importance. 
For a variety of reasons, then, ranging from feeling insecure 
about being in a world to which she has so recently been admitted, to 
being obsessed by herself and her own image, woman is unlikely to become 
fully absorbed and creative in her work. Thus de Beauvoir, talking 
even of women who are involved in the expressive arts, writes: '~oman 
is ready enough to ~ at working but she does not work" (p. 714). 
Thus the line of argument, which underlies most of de Beauvoir 1 s comments 
on woman's failure to become absorbed in her work and place a value on 
it, is the notion that as long as she has 11 to struggle to become a 
human being, she cannot become a creator" (p. 723). This argument conflicts 
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with the Hegelian aspects of her theory. It contradicts the notion in 
Hegelian philosophy, which at other points de Beauvoir seems to accept, 
that it is in his labour that the slav~ simultaneously becomes a human 
being and a creator - that the act of creation constitutes his humanisation 
and prompts him to fight for recognition. 
However, in some respects de Beauvoir is on strong ground when 
she makes a distinction between woman and the slave; for whereas the 
latter's labour is forced, "paradises of idleness and delight" (p .169) 
are flashed before woman's eyes. That is to say, although woman may, 
for whatever reason, feel compelled to work, this society continually 
urges her to see her success in other terms; it constantly invites her 
not to take work seriously and to seek recognition of her worth through 
marriage to a successful man. Thus de Beauvoir claims that woman will 
continually be demoralised and undermined if she can gain recognition 
and support through becoming a parasite. It is for this reason that 
de Beauvoir maintains: 
As long as the temptation to convenience exists - in the 
economic inequality that favours certain individuals and the 
recognised rights of woman to sell herself to one of these 
privileged men - she will need to make a greater moral effort 
than man in choosing the road of independence (pp.168-9). 
De Beauvoir subsequently concludes that marriage must be 
"prohibited as a icareer' for women" (p.,500). In other words, woman 
must be forced to labour. But even if woman was forced to take work 
seriously - to treat it as the main aspect of her life - would it 
create the circumstances in which she would become equal to man? 
V 
The problem for de Beauvoir here is the extent to which women, 
having been socialised in patriarchal society, are able to become 
emancipated through productive work. Is this simple transformation in 
woman Vs life enough to bring about an "inner metamorphosis"? At 
times de Beauvoir indicates that woman's entry into productive labour 
is almost in itself enough to emancipate women. Thus as women are more 
and more becoming gainfully employed, sexual equality is coming rapidly 
into viewo Elsewhere, however, even when discussing women who work in 
jobs which are well-paid and stimulating, de Beauvoir maintains that 
the weight of woman's past experience~and the ever-present temptations 
to abdication, prevent work from making woman man. De Beauvoir sees 
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that a pre-requisite of woman's emancipation- a change in consciousness -
is not likely to emanate from a haphazard development of productive 
forces but from a much more systematic attempt to obliterate the pressures 
on woman to abdicate in favour of man. Nothing short of revolution 
will do. Thus manis role as catalyst seems limited. De Beauvoir is 
unable to demonstrate that the other changes required for woman's 
emancipation - the completely equal treatment of children throughout 
childhood and the prohibitions of marriage and motherhood as a career 
for women, for example- are also likely to be features of man's 
evolution within the existing socio-economic order. In the conclusion 
de Beauvoir apparently attempts to get round this problem by linking 
the emancipation of woman to the establishment of a different kind of 
economic system and concomitantly a different moral and social order: 
We must not believe ••• that a change in woman's economic 
condition alone is enough to transform her ••• but until it 
has brought about the moral, social, cultural and other 
consequences that it promises and requires, the new woman 
cannot appear (p.734). 
In short, in The Second Sex woman's emancipation is ultimately posed 
as the result of a socialist revolution - a revolution which, given 
the current passivity of women, will be made by men. 
Recently de Beauvoir stated that in The Second Sex she "stopped 
at the point of affirming a v1re confidence in the future, in the 
revolution and in socialismo" This vague confidence allowed her to 
skip over all the more difficult problems of strategy and tactics for 
woman's emancipation.
13
But in so doing she falls into the same trap 
she had herself pointed to for the artistic or professional woman: she 
is rescued from her difficulties by a "liberating saviour-hero" - the 
male revolutionary who, in overthrowing capitalism, also (conveniently) 
overthrows sexism. Moreover de Beau voir w s optimism is buoyed by an 
almost Whigg belief in inevitable human progress o She repeatedly 
asserts that man "will" be led to recognise woman as a fellow human 
being: 
He loves her to the extent that she is his, he fears her in 
so far as she remains tbe other, but it is as this 
fearsome other that he seeks to make her more profoundly his -
and this is what will bring him to elevate her to the dignity 
of being a person and lead him to recognise in her a fellow 
creature (p.201, emphases added)o14 
In short, recognition will come inevitably. Into this uplifting history 
de Beauvoir smuggles a hint of struggle, for she says that "the existent 
(in this case woman) who is regarded as inessential cannot fail to demand 
the re-establishment of her sovereignty" (p.726, emphasis added). 
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Similarly she maintains that "there is .!!Q other way out for woman than 
15 
to work for her liberation" (p .639, emphasis added). But these small 
protestations do not surmount the main difficulty: de Beauvoirian 
woman would be given her freedom and against this gift we can but 
recall Freire~s notion that freedom must be fought for to be real. 
In the introduction to The Second Sex de Beauvoir asks: "How 
16 
can independence be recovered in a state of dependency?" (p. 29) • This 
is the central political question of her work and yet she can find no 
satisfactory answer to it. Her woman is passive and hence awaits the 
socialist prince charming, the revolutionary hero, to release her 
from her slumber. Productive labour looked like providing a way out, 
but even on her own account this just leads to "double servitude": 
in capitalist society it merely serves to reinforce woman's oppression, 
for the truly creative and productive work is kept for men,and women 
get the repetitive jobs which fetch low pay. Her final resort to a 





The Socialism of "The Second Sex" 
Recently de Beauvoir has claimed that she was a socialist 
when she wrote The Second Sex. There is no question that the conclusion 
has a socialist element. But we may doubt that this element arises 
from the argument which precedes it. We have previously seen that The 
Second Sex makes bows in the direction of historical materialism 
without taking that philosophy seriously. We must now consider whether 
the socialism of the book is any more profound than its historical 
1 
materialism. 
There are notoriously many definitions of socialism, but we 
are fortunate in this instance as we have a definition, acceptable to 
de Beauvoir herself, of a socialist theory of woman's oppression. In 
All Said and Done, the most recent volume of her autobiography, de Beauvoir 
not only claims that Juliet Mitchell in Womani s Estate "gives a very 
good description of the divergence between radical feminism and abstract 
socialism" but also that nsome years ago I would have upheld precisely 
these abstract socialist positions!' 
2 
Although it is not explicitly 
spelled out in this statement, from other sources it is apparent that 
the "some years ago" refers to the position adopted by de Beauvoir when 
she wrote The Second Sex'! In order to examine whether de Beau voir under-
takes a socialist analysis, or indeed could be broadly defined as a 




Men are the oppressors. 
All societies have been male 
supremacist. 
It starts with a psychological 
power struggle - which men win. 
Socialism has nothing to offer 
us. 
Socialist countries oppress 
women. 
What we want, is all women to 
unite against men and male-
dominated society. 
We want to liberate women 
from male oppression 
Abstract Socialists 
Men are not the oppressors: it's 
the system. 
Capitalism oppresses women. 
It starts with private property. 
We've got to discover 'our 
relationshipi to socialism. 
The scene isn't t.oo good in socialist 
countries for women -but that's 
because womenis liberation wasn't 
part of the revolutionary struggle. 
It's most necessary to convince men 
of the importance of our struggle. 
They are oppressed by their roles too. 
All people are alienated under 
capitalism, we want to liberate 
everybody to become 'whole people'. 
The basic issue at stake in each of these seven points is how one 
conceptualises the relationship of woman's oppression to the economic 
system. As many of the points overlap, we shall not systematically 
take each point in turn but merely use the classif~cator,y scheme as 
a guide to the kind of questions we should ask and to the way in which 
we should classify the replies. Whether de Beauvoir 1 s theory can be 
described as "abstract socialist" depends on what kinds of answers are 
given in The Second Sex to the following sets of questions: 
1. Is woman's oppression merely an aspect of capitalist society, its 
origins to be found in the development of private property, or is 
it rooted in other factors, such as biology, which make it a more 
universal feature of human societies? 
2. If it is the economic system (rather than man) who is the enemy, 
to what extent are men also oppressed under capitalism and how 
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likely is it that they will overthrow the system in which woman's 
oppression has its roots? 
3. If it is agreed that men are economically exploited and so 
potential revolutionaries, is it, nevertheless, true that they 
may want to perpetuate sexism because it is beneficial to them, or 
are they also oppressed by their sex roles and therefore will gain 
from woman's liberation? 
I 
In The Second Sex de Beauvoir does not portray the oppression 
of woman as stemming from the particular nature of capitalist society. 
She not only rules out the possibility that woman has ever been equal 
to or superior to man but, in line with her evolutionary approach, also 
maintains that such oppression was a necessary stage in humanity's 
rise above the given life of the in-itself. Moreover, it could be 
maintained that in de Beauvoir's theory, capitalism has some advantages 
for women; the technological advances wrought by this economic system, 
by eradicating certain features of woman's reproductive role, can provide 
the basis for the future liberation of women. 
If we broaden our question and ask if in de Beauvoir's theory 
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it is private property, and not necessarily capitalism, which introduced 
the oppression of wom~we are forced yet again to return to de Beauvoiris 
notion of the inevitability of woman's oppression. Such inevitability 
is based on both biological and ontological factors. Thus, as we have 
seen, although the creation of private property is something of a 
watershed in de Beauvoir's theory of the origins of woman's subjugation, 
p 
it cannot be treated as the actual starting point of such oppression. 
All that can be argued is that private property is important in de 
Beauvoir's theory because it is the first material manifestation of 
man's domination of woman. If we take into consideration both the 
physiological and ontological advantages attributed to males in de 
Beauvoir's theory and translate this into what Mitchell calls a 
"psychological power struggle" won by man, we find that in Mitchell's 
classification scheme, on all the points relating to the origins of 
woman's oppressio~ it is radical feminism and not abstract socialism 
which approximates to the theoretical position of The Second Sex. 
As de Beauvoir's theory rules out the possibility that capitalism, 
or private property, is the cause of woman's oppression, we may be led 
to assume that there is no need for us to continue our inquiry; that 
the other questions need not be asked unless de Beauvoir sees woman's 
oppression within the context of the economic system. But, as we have 
seen, although de Beauvoir's analysis of the origins of woman's. 
oppression is more radical feminist than socialist in orientation, as 
her historical account progresse~ de Beauvoir does link the oppression 
of woman to the economic system. Ultimately she even states that a 
socialist revolution is necessary to liberate woman. 
II 
In Mitchell's classificatory scheme, sexism can be seen either 
as the principal cleavage in society or viewed as part of a generalised 
system of oppression. A basic difference between these two analyses of 




that the male-female opposition is the most important social division 
and, where they do recognise the existence of other types of domination, 
may also maintain that it is the prototype of all other forms of 
oppression. On the other hand, socialists tend to argue that it 
either "coincided" with or developed from the emergence of class society. 
In order for us to decide which of the two positions of the classification 
scheme is nearest to The Second Septwe must know if de Beauvoir portrays 
woman' s subordination as unique and primary or as part of a generalised 
system of oppression. Then we shall be in a position to know whether 
de Beauvoir' s analysis leads to the conclusion that both men and women 
have an incentive to revolutionise the socio-economic order; to replace 
capitalism with an egalitarian and inoppressive economic system. 
Throughout The Second Sex de Beauvoir gives very little indication 
that she is aware of the existence of social class. This point is neatly 
epitomised by the fact that in the twenty page index to the book there 
are fe~ than five references to social class, most of which refer to 
not 
incidental comments made by de Beauvoir and/to points structurally 
integrated with her argument. This almost complete failure to acknowledge 
the existence of social and economic inequality is the outcome of a 
6 
fundamental aspect of de Beauvoir's theor,r. 
De Beauvoir's theory- in her own words- is "Manichean"; it 
portr~s the world as polarised into two groups - male and female - where 
masculine represents "the good" and feminine "the bad." In The Second 
Sex the dichotomy which de Beauvoir most commonly uses to convey her 
Manicheaism is maintaining-creating. As de Beauvoir concentrates in 
this dichotomy on the nature of the tasks allotted to each sex, the most 
significant factor she uses to differentiate men from women is a sexual 
7 
division of labour. Since de Beauvoir uses work to differentiate "man" 
... 
from "woman", and since de Beauvoirian man has appropriated the positive 
aspects of existence, for her notion of sexual bifurcation to be 
meaningful she must assume that all men by virtue of their sex are 
creative and transcendent and that for women the converse must be true. 
Normal~ this perspective leads de Beauvoir to ignore hierarchies or 
inequalities which are not linked to sex but which are nevertheless 
rooted in labour. Thus, as we shall see below, de Beauvoir cannot 
develop a class analysis. Even when other hierarchies are acknowledged, 
as in the master-slave dialectic, they are not integrated into the 
structure of her argument. Moreover, de Beauvoir identifies "man" 
with the superior male in the hierarchy and analyses the impact that 
this had on the male-female relationship from his perspective. Thus 
it is the fact that the master gained recognition which de Beauvoir 
considers important in archetypal man's relationship with woman, and 
not that recognition was given by man, the slave. 
De Beauvoir's tendency to equate man's existence with the 
existence of the dominant group of males and to see work and related 
activities as things which distinguish men from wome~ but not men from 
one another, is carried over into her analysis of the present. Thus 
de Beauvoir maintains that a basic inequality between the sexes still 
lies in the fact that unlike woman, man finds "concrete realisation 
in work and action" (p .498 )) and that even today "the male is called upon 
for action, his vocation is to produce, ·fight, create, to transcend 
himself towards the totality of the universe and the infinity of the 
future" (p -466). This is so strange a view of the nature of work in 
the present highly industrialised and automated epoch that de Beauvoiris 
continuing use of work as the source of male superiority over women 
becomes increasingly questionable. She ignores or at least seriously 
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underestimates the extent to which men are unequal in their access 
to creative and transcendent pursuits. Reviewing The Second Sex on 
publication in America, C. Wright Mills took issue with de Beauvoir on 
this point. He claims: 
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She tends to impute to all men what is in fact true only of 
very few of them: a transcendent flight, a life of accomplishment. 
It is true that she at times recognises that this is not so 
but she does not take it into systematic account as s~e compares 
"the" situation of men with "the" situation of women. 
Since de Beauvoir defines masculinity in terms of positive human 
activit; she hardly questions the economic role played by men in 
contemporar,y society. It is man as scientist, engineer, explorer, writer 
who see~to serve as a model for de Beauvoirian man and not the majority 
of men who, in a subsidiary and uncreati ve role, do little more than 
execute the plans for this privileged, educated elite. For de Beauvoir, 
then, work is a source of transcendence and fulfilment for man and as 
such it is not portrayed as something which gives rise to alienation. 
Not only does de Beauvoir fail to argue that work is the source 
of alienation for most me~ but she also does not convey its role in 
class divisions. As labour is used as a crucial factor in expressing 
an individual's place in the sexual hierarchy, and as this is the only 
hierarchy systematically recognised by de Beauvoir, it cannot be used 
to locate an individual's place in the labour process or to assign him 
to a social class. The existence of classes may on occasion be referred 
to by de Beauvoi7 but their delineation cannot be undertaken within 
the context of her existentialist theory. Even where she. subscribes 
to socialism there is an immense gap between her position and their's, 
for the rock of socialist theory is the notion that labour is the 













De Beauvoir's lack of a class analysis is much more apparent in her 
portrayal of man's existence than of woman's. As we have seen there 
is often a startling contrast between de Beauvoir's ideas of man and 
the condition of the vast majority of men. With woman, on the other 
hand, there is less potential for a dramatic contrast between archetype 
and the condition of most women. This arises from the fact that de 
Beauvoir maintains that woman's existence had intrinsically negative 
features. Thus the difference between de Beauvoir's model of womanhood 
and the actual conditions to which women are confined is narrower than 
for man. Moreover, because de Beauvoir sees woman's situation as one 
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of oppressio~she can more easily admit the existence of social and 
economic inequality within the feminine condition. Thus the only section 
of the book which contains any significant class analysis is that dealing 
with the condition of women from the institution of patriarchy proper 
up until the present day. De Beauvoir is able, for example, to discuss 
the exploitation of woman's labour in the early period of industrialisation 
and contrast this with the different forms of oppression within other 
social classes. This does not amount to an integration of class into 
de Beauvoir's general theory, simply that here she is more aware, or 
at least more reaqy to admit, the existence of class differences between 
women. 
De Beauvoir is sometimes prepared to describe how woman's 
oppression varied between social classes but her general analysis 
exhibits a middle-class bias. Thus, unless de Beauvoir tells us that 
she is discussing women who work in factories or who lives in conditions 
of poverty (by no means frequent references~ her archetypal woman is 
recognisably a member of the French bourgeoisie. For example, when 
p 
de Beauvoir writes of "woman's" social life she claims that this is 
marked by such matters as her "relations with dressmaker and milline)"· 
(p.550) and that in conventional terms her success is dependent on her 
organisation of parties and receptions at which "the table is laden 
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with fine food and precious wines" (p.553). The affluence of de Beauvoir' s 
woman is continually apparent. Thus de Beau voir talks about "the 
gleam of diamonds in her necklace" (p.544) and frequently describes 
her physical environment as one in which she 11 surrounds herself" with 
isilk,vv velvets,11 porcelain,11pearls J 'brocades," bouquets•... (p. 544ff). 
The middle-class nature of the world in which de Beauvoirian woman is 
ensconsed seems reinforced, if not derived from, the fact that, when 
substantiating her arguments, de Beauvoir has a tendency to use 
material and quotations from bourgeois novelists such as Flaubert, 
Baudelaire and Eliot. This does not mean that de Beauvoir embraces 
9 
the life-style of the bourgeoisie, on the contrary she despises it. 
It means that like most of us de Beauvoir has a tendency to generalise 
from the conditions she knows best - in this case, the existential 
conditions of French bourgeois women. 
De Beauvoiris credentials as a socialist are thus doubly in 
doubt. She writes from the perspective of the French bourgeoisie -
not the proletariat - and she paints such an attractive portrait of the 
role of men in capitalist society that the reader is left wondering 
why they should ever want to make a socialist revolution. Her 11man11 is 
left with no reason to want to end the oppression of woman from which 
he benefits so overwhelmingly. 
pzz 
III 
We must also question whether the socialist revolution she 
urges will liberate women. Even if we accept that the present form 
of society is oppressive to men and that the proletariat will overthrow 
it, how likely is it in de Beauvoir's theory that such revolutionaries 
will desire to break down the rigid sexual differentiation in which 
woman's oppression has its roots? 
Mi tchell' s classificat·ory scheme indicates that within radical 
feminism is the notion that man is the enemy; that it is he who has 
established the present relationship between the sexes and who benefits 
directly from it. Woman's liberation thus depends on overthrowing male 
domination a As this is contrary to man's interests, it must be undertaken 
in battle with him; as the enemy, man must be either eliminated or 
subdued in this struggle for liberation. Abstract socialists, on the 
other hand, see the capitalist system as oppressive; it is the system, 
not man, which is woman's enemy. Man may be nominally dominant within 
the sexual relationship but, it is claimed, both sexes are oppressed. 
According to abstract socialists, sexism, in the rigid assignment of 
secondary sexual characteristics such as aggression and passivity, 
artificially restrictsan individual's potential for free expression 
and development. One aim of women's liberation is to break down these 
barriers; by ridding society of oppressive, stereotype sex roles to 
allow both sexes the opportunity to become nwhole" people. Implicit 
here is the notion that human characteristics are split at present 
between the two sexes and that the future liberated human being will 
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be able to express her/himself in both male and female ways. Humanisation 
.. 
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means the individual being able to combine in his/her personality and 
behaviour the positive characteristics currently associated with both 
masculinity and femininity. In short, abstract socialists maintain 
that it is also in men's interests to end rigid sexual stratification. 
De Beauvoiris theory does not correspond to a socialist analysis, 
as defined by Mi tch ellJ since de Beauvoir does not maintain that men 
are not "whole" people. However, in as much as de Beauvoir claims that 
the continued oppression of woman prevents man from becoming a completely 
authentic and moral individual, she maintains that he would benefit 
from woman's liberation. In so arguing de Beau voir is also in opposition 
to radical feminism,~in that she maintains that it is possible to enlist 
men's support for woman's liberation. Thus, de Beauvoir' s argument 
that men would gain morally from woman's liberation corresponds more 
to the liberal or utopian socialist traditions than to the kind of 
Marxist, materialist analysis contained in Mitchell's classificatory 
scheme. De Beauvoir's theory echoes John Stuart Mill's The Subjection 
of Women as it reaches the notion that men and women would benefit 
10 
from a sexual revolution via an abstract ethical route. Once again 
therefore, we return to the idea that for de Beauvoir> the liberation 
of woman, even assuming a mutual interest of the sexes, has little 
relevance to the need for revolutionary socio-economic change. 
There is a further reason why we should question the idea 
that 
in de Beauvoir's theoryjthe male revolutionary would become woman's 
liberator. In Chapter Eight it was demonstrated that in de Beauvoir's 
theory the roots of woman's oppression are.to be found in ontological 
factors; that is, those factors which lead to the confirmation of 




only within this context that economic factors become important. 
Private property, for example, in de Beauvoir's theory is significant 
as we have seen, because it is a vehicle for man's ontological 
pretensions. In the later sections of The Second Sex, however, 
de Beauvoir claims: "The evolution of woman's condition is to be 
explained by the concurrent action of these two factors: sharing in 
productive labour and being freed from the slavery to reproduction" 
(p.152). Here we see de Beauvoir maintaining that the most significant 
factors involved in woman's oppression and, therefore, in her emancipation, 
are materialist factors. However, in so saying she glosses over the 
fact that a change in the economic system will not eliminate the 
desires which she claims originally prompted man to dominate woman. 
Indeed Mitchell, who classifies de Beauvoir's theory in The Second Sex 
as 11 abstract socialist", indicates this problem when she writes -
But interestingly socialism emerges as a curiously contingent 
solution at the end of the work, in a muffled epilogue ••• 
It is not easy to see why socialism should modify the basic 
"ontological" desire for a thing like freedom which de Beauvoir 
sees as the motor behind the fixation with inheritance and 
the propf~ty system or the enslavement of women which derived 
from it. 
As Mitchell sees, de Beauvoir poses socialism as the solution to 
something which she did not originally define as the nub of the problem. 
Indeed it is interesting to note that Mitchell reaches this conclusion 
even though she gives a much more materialist interpretation of de 
Beauvoir's account of the origins of woman's oppression. 
In Force of Circumstance de Beauvoir acknowledges indirect~ 
the incompatibility of the ontology in The Second Sex with the adoption 
of a conventional materialist/ socialist approach. Thus writing of how 
.. 
she currently sees this wor~de Beauvoir states that nowadays: 
I should take a more materialist position ••• in the first 
volume. I should base the notion of woman as other and the 
Manichean argument it entails is not an idealistic and a priori 
struggle of consciousnesses, but on the facts of supply and 
demand. • • • This would not necessitate1 ~y changes in the subsequent development of my argument. 
De Beauvoir acknowledges that the ontology of this work would have to 
be changed to bring it into harmony with a properly materialist 
perspective. In saying this, however, de Beau voir underplays :the 
extent to which such a change would profoundly modify her argument. 
After all, "the idealistic and a priori struggle of consciousnesses" 
is no small factor in The Second Sex as it underlies much of her 
theory. Moreover, it is by no means clear that de Beauvoir could 
convincingly make the connection between the essentially philosophical 
notion of woman as Absolute Other and "the facts of supply and demand. n 13 
Of much more significance, however, to our present investigation is 
the extent to which de Beauvoir's entire theory is compatible with an 
orthodox socialist approach. Removing the notion of "a priori" conflict 
may help her her~ but there are other aspects of her philosophy which 
do not seem to combine well with such a political perspective. 
It is the compatibility of existentialism and socialism which 
is in question. Such a question is not new. Indeed there have been 
various attempts to show how existentialism is more in harmony with 
the values of a capitalist society than with those usually inherent 
in socialist thought. Herbert Marcuse, writes of Sartre' s early work: 
" ••• behind the nihilistic language of Existentialism lurks the 
ideology of free competition, free initiative and equal opportunity 
Everybody is master of his own destiny." 










anti-socialist values have been attributed to de Beauvoir's life 
and work. In a review of one of de Beauvoir's volumes of autobiography 
/ 
Rene Girard remarks: 
This is an excellent definition of that modern spirit 
competitive and puritanical which erects philosophical systems 
as well as industrial empires. However much we admire this 
valorious feat, we must not exaggerate the scope of the 
revolution. 15 
Indeed Girard subsequently maintains that what de Beauvoir desires is 
to turn everything ninto a competitive examination ••• and everybody 
16 
try to run away with first prize. n 
In Chapter Three we saw that Sartre's early socialism was little 
more than an abstract commitment to the idea of revolution and was 
17 
not an outcome of his theory. LiketrJise in de Beauvoir' s work, the 
socialist conclusion is tacked on. Not only does the way in which she 
conceptualises the male-female dichotomy inhibit the development of a 
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class analysis and the use of such notions as alienation and exploitation, 
but also the values embodied in her philosophy are individualistic and 
at odds with collectivist socialism. Thus she is ultimately unable to 
convince us either that people would or could work together for socialism 
or that this would be desirable. Indeed de Beauvoir at her most 
optimistic is only able to suggest that harmonious relations with the 
Other are possible if individally we keep our desire for domination 
in check and treat each other as equals. The rrrevolutionrr is thus 
essentially one which must be waged individually in the existent's 
consciousness. To this extent, woman's emancipation seems to have more 
to do with existentialist ethics than socialism. As such we are led 
to conclude that a more logical outcome of de Beauvoir's theory of 
woman's liberation is the idea, ascribed to radical feminism in 
2Lh 
Mitchell's scheme, that "socialism has nothing to offer us." 
' 
When de Beauvoir wrote Force of Circumstance in 1963 she claimed 
that now she would undertake a more materialist analysis of woman's 
oppression, but that she was pleased that in The Second Sex she had 
"avoided falling into the trap of 'feminism'·" She maintained that 
she had never believed woman's emancipation could be achieved "independently 
of a revolution in production." 18 Indeed since it is the socialist 
revolution which is of primary importance, she never thought that this 
book would, or should, make women want to struggle for independence. 
Nevertheless, de Beauvoir did hope that it would make wamen more 
conscious of their oppression. 
More than ten years later, in 1972, de Beauvoir's position on 
this matter had completely changed. It is precisely this non-feminist 
aspect of The Second Sex which she now repudiates. One published 
interview with de Beauvoir appeared under the heading: "Today I've 
changed, I've really become a feminist.n19 Currently de Beauvoir argues 
that whereas The Second Sex is a socialist book, now she is a conventional 
feminist. In other words, nowadays she believes in the necessity for 
an independent struggle of women and does not think that a socialist 
revolution - a change in production - enough to liberate womeno It 
seems that de Beauvoir partly arrived at this latest position because 
of the oppressed condition of women in "socialist" societies. In this 
interview she claimed: 
Marx' s dream of a socialism which would change man has not 
been realised anywhere. They have changed the relations in 
production; but we realise more and more that changing the 
relations of production is not enough to effect a ·real 
change in society, to change mankind. And as a result, in 
spite of the different economic system the traditional roles 
of men and women would remain the same.20 
Moreover in All Said and Done de Beauvoir also claims that when she 
wrote The Second Sex she believed "the class-war should take precedence 
over the struggle between the sexes" and that currently she now thinks 
they should be carried out together - that relations between the sexes 
is as "primary" as the economic relations in society and should not be 
21 
seen as a secondary issue. This does not mean that de Beauvoir 
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believes the overthrow of capitalism irrelevant to woman's emancipation, 
simply that it is not sufficient. 
But would changing the conclusion of The Second Sex so that an 
independent struggle of women is seen as vital to woman's liberation 
be enough to make this a "feminist" work? 
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Chapter Fourteen 
The Feminism of "The Second Sex" 
The Second Sex has been hailed as nthe Bible of feminismn 
but its author claims that it is a non-feminist work. The reasons for 
de Beauvoir 1 s assertion have alreaqy been covered - at this time de 
Beauvoir did not believe that women's autonomous, albeit collective, 
activity is necessar,r to ensure their emancipation. She argued that 
the elimination of woman t s subordination would be an inevitable by-product 
of the creation of a socialist society. De Beauvoir is certainly 
right to ·maintain that this theoretical perspective makes The Second Sex 
different from what is nowadays considered a "feminist" theor,r. 
However, there is another major aspect of de Beauvoir's theory in 
The Second Sex which distinguishes it from modern feminism- the nature 
of de BeauvoirYs vision of woman's emancipation. 
I 
In Mi tchell' s classificat ory scheme we saw that it is difficult 
to make generalisations about "feminist theory," as such a generic 
term covers divergent views. Nevertheless, there is one major 
factor which distinguishes contemporary feminism from the feminism of 
the suffragette movement -woman's emancipation is no longer seen as 
imitating man. Writers such as Mary Wollstonecraft and John Stuart 
Mill and the ideologues of the suffrage movement wanted to claim 
1 
women's rights in a man's world; this is the aim of a minority in the 
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current women's liberation movement. Groups like the National Organisation 
of Women in the United States under the leadership of Betty Friedan, 
may gain the support of feminists in their attempt to extend women's 
equality with me~ but nevertheless a major thrust of feminist ideology 
2 
is an attack on the masculine world. Germaine Greer in her book 
The Female Eunuch (1970) succinctly expresses such a view when she writes: 
"If women understand for emancipation the adoption of the masculine 
role then we are lost indeed. n3 Using one of de Beauvoirrs concepts, 
we could say that the difference between modern feminism and its 
predecessor is that the former no longer operates within a "masculine 
perspective a" 
Fundamental to most feminist theories, then, is a rejection 
of masculinity; to be male is not to be identified with hurnani ty. Hand 
in hand with such a devaluation, but not always complete repudiation, 
of masculinity is an upgrading of feminine characteristics. For 
different reasons such upgrading of feminini~ emanates from both the 
"abstract socialist" and "radical feminist" strands of feminist theory. 
In the former the elevation of femininity does not necessari~ mean 
that femininity per se is extolled: women live in a mutilated condition, 
but a condition which gives rise to positive ways of behaving. Thus, 
such feminists claim that although women are oppressed - confined 
artificially to a domestic world - in fulfilling their feminine role, 
certain modes of behaviour such as being caring, gentle, open, and 
unselfish are cultivated and valued. Therefore, women 2 s liberation 
should not be seen in terms of imitating men. Although critical of 
the independent and aggressive aspects of masculinity, such feminists 
believe both sexes have positive features; that we should encourage 
everyone to express themselves in "masculine" and "feminine" ways. 
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The radical feminist strand of feminist thought, however, is 
more critical of masculinity and accordingly tends to elevate femininity. 
In its extreme forms it begins from the notion that woman is essentially 
different from man and better than him. Valerie Solanis, for example, 
in her S.CoUoM. (Society for Cutting Up Men) Manifesto (1967) refers 
4 
to man as a "walking abortion" and Elizabeth Gould Davis in The First 
Sex (1975) argues that man is a "genetic ITDJ.tation." 
5 
It is these 
ideas which underlie feminist separatism and even prompt some feminists 
to see boys as "contaminated" by masculinity and therefore to be avoided. 
There is, then, in this theory an underlying notion that biological 
femininity is something to be revered. In view of the dubious 
essentialism involved in such a theory, and the unnecessary rejection 
of anything trmale, n such ideas are rightly not something which de 
Beauvoir would accept. However, as we shall see, a weakness of de 
Beauvoir vs own theory is that she differs also from the "socialist" 
strand of feminism in as much as she generally idolises man and sees 
woman's liberation in terms of her assumption of masculine characteristics. 
This perspective is not incidental to de Beauvoir's theory but, as 
will become clear, is rooted in some of the major assumptions on which 
it is based. 
II 
It has already been asserted that de Beauvoir's theory is, in 
her own terms, ''Manichean. n Margaret Wal ters in her essay entitled 
"The Rights and Wrongs of Women" aptly describes such Manicheaism when • 
she writes: 
(de Beauvoir's) ••• cool, unhesitating authoritative 
prose sets up a whole ser.ies of absolutely rigid oppositions -
masculine vs feminine, culture vs nature, human vs animal, 
production vs reproduction, activity Gs passivity. The first 
term is always good, the second bad. 
But Walters fails to point out that masculinity and femininity represent 
all the oppositions which she outlines. It is the male in de Beauvoiris 
theory who represents culture, humanity, production and activity; and 
the female who incarnates the opposite of such termso Thus in such a 
scheme man represents all that is "good" and woman all that is "bad." 
It is de Beauvoiris theoretical perspective which leads her to 
convey the world in this way: because she sees the process of human 
development involving individualisation and transcendence of biology, 
woman's reproductive role means that her existence has inherently 
negative features. Woman is therefore associated with such aspects of 
life as magic/superstition/immanence/stagnation. Conversely, de Beauvoir 
portrays man as a noble creature. He is posed as a powerful, trans-
cendent force - risking his life to affirm his sovere.ignty or attaining 
his ideals and through his projects creating a human world of techniques 
and valueso It is he who has brought human society to its elevated 
heights - it is he who, in de Beauvoir 2 s theory, has been responsible 
for all acts of creation: thus art, philosophy, literature, science, 
medicine, have been exclusively his achievements. 
For de Beauvoir man's values are equivalent to human values. 
This leads her to assert that historically woman was prepared to 
recognise man and that, although she may sometimes want to negate the 
masculine world, she still does not aim to elevate the feminine domaino 
In The Second Sex de Beauvoir thus rejects the idea that there has ever 
been properly "feminine11 values but she has articulated this idea more 
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clearly in recent years. It seems that de Beauvoir has clarified her 
position on this matter since the question of the positive attributes 
of femininity is an issue in the feminist movement. In order to 
understand better de Beauvoir's position in The Second Sex her recent 
arguments will be outlined. 
In 1 972, in an interview with Alice Schwartzer, de Beau voir 
claimed that whereas "Rimbaud imagined that liberated women would bring 
something entirely different into the world, n she does not believe this 
would be the case. To substantiate her position de Beauvoir maintained: 
" ••• culture, civilisation and universal values were all made by men 
7 
since it was they who represented universality." In other words, in 
a society in which the sexes were equal, women would not dispute mani s 
values, perspectives or tools but would adopt them as their own. 
However, de Beauvoir added that things created by men may be 
contaminated by masculinity but she did not make clear what such taint 
involveso What is clear, however, is that over the past few years de 
Beauvoir has continually maintained that to believe womanYs emancipation 
will bring "new values" is to postulate a feminine nature or essence 
and thus to believe in something which she has always sought to 
repudiate. 
Specifically de Beauvoir has taken issue with the brand of 
feminism which emphasises the positive nature of woman's reproductive 
role. Thus in one interview she claimed that while it is better for 
women to be no longer ashamed of their bodies "one must not make too 
8 
much of ito" Indeed de Beauvoir argued that if too much is made of 
the feminine boqy it may lead to the idea that the female boqy gives 
a "fresh vision of the world," and so to "descend to the level of the 
250 
irrational, the mystical and the cosmic." In this interview de Beauvoir 
also claimed: "A woman has no special value, a priori, because she is 
a woman." To believe this is the case, she added, "would be the most 
9 
retrograde biologism totally contrary to everything I believe in." 
However, while de Beauvoir clearly rejects such "biologismy to all 
intents and purposes her previous theory in The Second Sex is similaro 
Thus although de Beauvoir does not have a rigid notion of a masculine 
or feminine "essence" - some immutable Eternal Feminine for example -
she nevertheless describes both man's and woman's experience of their 
boqy in sexuality and in reproduction as giving rise to a certain 
perspective on the world. De Beauvoirian man feels himself to be 
transcendent, independent, and sovereign in the fulfilment of his 
biological masculinity while woman is dependent and feels "hemmed in." 
De Beauvoir actually explains woman's belief in magic partially in 
terms of her sexual experience. De Beauvoir states: 
Her passive eroticism makes desire seem to her not will and 
aggression but an attraction akin to what that which causes 
the devining rod to dip; the mere presence of her flesh swells 
and erects the male's sex; why should not hidden water make 
the hazel rod quiver? (p.619). 
In short, de Beauvoir believes that woman's boqy gives rise to a certain 
consciousness. As this consciousness woman acquires is more backward 
than man's, in de Beauvoir' s theory manY s body is such that he is a 
specially privileged being; he is the ontologically advantaged sex. 
Thus the feminist notion that woman has a "special value" is not so 
much at odds with de Beauvoir's theory in The Second Sex because it is 
opposite to what she argues, but because it emanates from assumptions 
contrary to her own. 
p 
Although de Beauvoir argues that the emancipated woman will 
not introduce "new values" into the world, she believes that her 
emancipation will ~ffect a change in human relationships. She accepts 
the strand of feminist thought which elevates femininity because there 
are certain positive characteristics which emanate from woman's 
situation. She now maintains that certain feminine qualities should 
be communicated to man. Emancipation, she thus claims must combine 
1 
10 
"the best of man and the best of woman." However, this notion is 
most undeveloped in The Second Sex. Only on a couple of occasions does 
de Beauvoir maintain that woman's position gives her admirable character-
istics. For example, at one point de Beauvoir writes that girls have 
more "psychological insight than boys" (p .383). At another juncture 
she claims that woman lives her life in a more "genuine" fashion because 
man "hesitates to see himself fully as flesh" (p.423). However, when 
de Beauvoir claims of women: "It is precisely because they are oppressed 
that the best of them avoid the defects that disfigure their oppressors" 
(p.270), she is out of harmony with the general tenor of her argument. 
Indeed it is only if "the best of them" refers to very few womenJ that 
this fits in with the predominant notion in de Beauvoiri s theory that 
woman's situation deprives her of manifesting "the loftiest human 
attitudes" (p.63.5). 
On the publication of The Second Sex Albert Camus complained 
that de Beauvoir had made the French male look "ridiculous," but in 
reality de Beauvoir denigrates and ridicules women more than meno 
Individually de Beauvoir may criticise men for their attitudes or 
behaviour but as a sex males are portrayed in a flattering light. Although 
11 
de Beauvoir is critical of the petit bourgeois male - ensnared in 
the spirit of seriousness - it is particularly the women of this class 
who are attacked for, de Beauvoir tells us: "Their vain arrogance, 
their radical incapability, their obstinate ignorance, make them the 
most stupid non-entities ever produced by the human species" (po638). 
The general picture to emerge of the sexes in de Beauvoiris work is 
man, noble and human, wanting to elevate woman to dizzy mystical heights, 
and woman representing the base, mundane aspects of life. To the extent 
that de Beau voir claims: woman is n silliness, prudence, shabbiness 
and boredom" (p.219), she echoes Tolstoy; for he said: "Regard feminine 
society as an inevitable evil of social life, in so far as you can, 
12 
avoid it." 
In Force of Circumstance de Beauvoir writes that although she 
was often accused of being anti-men in The Second Sex'subtler readers ., 
concluded that I was a misogynist and that, while pretending to take 
up the cudgels for women, I was damning them." Although de Beauvoiri s 
use of the word "subtle" suggests that this is a slightly more accurate 
assessment of her position, she maintains that this is "untrue. n She 
argues that while she did not unconditionally praise women and indeed 
"atomized all those defects engendered by their condition," she also 
13 
showed "their good qualities and their merits." However, while 
de Beauvoir does this only on the rarest occasions, it is nevertheless 
true that for the most part she shows how woman Vs cowardly and 
inauthentic existence results from her situation. Thus at one point in 
The Second Sex she maintains: "It is not mysterious essence that compels 
men and women to act in good or in bad faith, it is their situation 
that inclines them more or less towards the search for truth" (p.27). 
Thus it is woman is situation which must be changed before she can 




De Beauvoir's view of the negative features of feminine biology 
combined with her notion that the characteristics of femininity engendered 
by her situation are on the whole inferior to man's lead, as C. Wright 
Mills argues, to the solution of the man-woman problem for de Beauvoir 
being: "the elimination of woman as we Imow her." 14 This is succinctly 
expressed by de Beauvoir in her conclusion for, instead of arguing that 
the sexes should be brought up the same, she states: 11 ... the little girl 
••• must be brought up the same as her brothers" (p.73.5, emphasis 
added). A further example, of such male bias is contained in de 
Beau voir's statement about the trbattle of the sexe~" for she maintains 
that such a battle will continue as long as each protagonist fails to 
recognise each other as equal; that is, 11 as long," she adds, "as 
femininity is perpetuated as such" (p.728). Moreover, given this 
perspective, it seems no accident or simple misuse of terminology that 
the c0ncluding sentence of The Second Sex urges men and women to affirm 
15 
"their brotherhood" (p.741, emphasis added). 
In arguing that woman's emancipation involves her becoming 
like man, de Beauvoir not only breaks with most feminist theor'Yj but 
also with some of the classic literature on oppression and liberation. 
In most theories of this kind there is the notion that the oppressors, 
in treating others as things, are retarded or "dehumanised" by their 
role. In Hegelian philosophy there is the notion that the characteristics 
of human consciousness are split between master and slave. Thus it is 
in breaking down this division - the creative slave risking his life 
and acquiring aspects of his master's consciousness - that the fully 
human being will emerge. In The Pedagogy of the Oppressed Paulo Freire 
also writes: "Dehumanization, which marks not only those whose humanity 
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has been stolen, but also (though in a different way) those who have 
16 
stolen it, is a distortion of the vocation of becoming more fully human." 
As de Beauvoir sees womanYs emancipation in terms of her 
becoming man, there is a parallel to be drawn· between de Beauvoir's 
attitude and that of oppressed groups; for, again as Paulo Freire points 
out, frequently the oppressed go through a stage in which liberation -
17 
"being a man," or a "human being" - means becoming like the oppressor. 
De BeauvoirYs theory, then, simply leads to the idea that the 
emancipated woman is man modified in some unimportant and unspecified 
way by the possession of a different boqy. From The Second Sex it 
appears that· de Beauvoiris new woman will, like her male counterpart, 
undergo "a real apprenticeship in violence" and extend her grasp on 
the world by asserting herself in creative and transcendent acts. In 
order to make sure that women do assert themselves and are not tempted 
to "abdicate," marriage will be "prohibi tedtr as a career for women and 
childcare will be a communal responsibility. 
Once assertive and sovereign woman will be able to choose her 
ow.n destiny. This in itself will create the circumstances in which 
18 
"the relation of the two sexes is ••• a relation of struggle" (p.223). 
In such an atmosphere, de Beauvoir claims, the sexual relationship 
will not lose its spice but will in fact become more dramatic and 
exciting. In short, when each sex genuinely sees the other, as 
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"the Other," then ecstasy and passion will flourish. 
The notion of struggle is not simply the logic of de Beauvoir's 
theory of sexual relations but also applies to all domains of human 
existence. "The world is not a harmony" de Beauvoir writes, and so one 
must always struggle for oneYs position in it. This struggle for 
p 
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existence will not just be waged in the battle between free beings but 
is also manifest in mankindis relation to Nature. De Beauvoir indeed 
believes that Nature is hostile to manis existence and must be overcomeo 
Such a perspective is less the result of de Beauvoirrs observations on 
Nature than of her philosophy of transcendence. Even if we could, we 
( 
should not live in tranquiJii ty or harmony with our natural surroundings 
I 
(t 
for, de Beauvoir argues: "•o• to conserve and continue the world as 
it is, seems neither desirable nor possible" (p .466). Indeed she openly 
attacks the largely feminine aspiration for contentment and happiness -
a state of e:x:i..stence which de Beau voir calls: "A gilded mediocrity 
lacking ambition and passion, aimless days indefinitely repeated, life 
that slips away gently towards death without questioning its purpose ••• n 
(p.466). 
For similar reasons Margaret Walters can with justification 
point out that "the emancipated woman" in de Beauvoiris work "sounds 
just like that familiar 19th century character the self-made man." 
Walters goes on to question if the model at the heart of all de BeauvoirVs 
philosophising is not: 
Early capitalist man, dominating and exploiting the natural 
world, living to produce, viewing his life as a product shaped 
by will, and suppressing those elements in himself - irrationalit~6 sexuality - that might reduce his moral and economic efficiency. 
In painting such a picture of the "human" being and hence the emancipated 
woman, de Beauvoir could hardly be further from modern feminists; 
neither abstract socialists nor radical feminists would see the self-made 
man as their model. Indeed even leaving aside feminists, it is unlikely 
that the majority of women would want to emulate such male existenceo 
III 
One of the major weaknesses of The Second Sex is that there is 
an inherent male bias in de Beauvoir9s theory; she often argues from 
a male perspective. The notion of woman as "the Other" is a persuasive 
analysis of the way in which woman is seen in patriarchal society and 
the way in which she defines herself. However, in many instances it 
is de Beau voir who argues that we should see woman in this way. She 
argues that one of the consequences of woman as "Other" is that, whereas 
man 9s boqy is seen as an objective instrument with which to think and 
act, woman is seen as immersed in subjectivity, confined within the 
limits of a distinctly "feminine" perspective. But to all intents and 
purposes is this not how de Beauvoir portrays feminine biology in 
The Second Sex? When de Beau voir argues that woman vs "passive eroticism" 
gives rise to a belief in magic and so an inauthentic autloo~ is she 
not postulating a distinctly feminine perspective which is inferior to 
its masculine counterpart? 
De Beauvoir's "masculine" perspective on woman is further 
epitomised in her discussion of sexualit,y. At no point in The Second Sex 
does de Beauvoir question our perception of sexuality and how it might 
be coloured by man's perception of coitus. Thus in the "objective" 
sexual act, applicable to humans and higher primates alike, the male 
is active, the female passive; he penetrates her, she is penetrated. 
De Beauvoir never asks if such a view emanates from male ideology- if 
the sexual act could be perceived quite differently. For example, 
de Beauvoir does not inquire whether, in a different culture in which 
women were not dominated by men, that we could see sexual intercourse 
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in terms of the male being "enclosed" by the femaleo Moreover, de Beauvoir 
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continually describes man's sexual behaviour using terminology of 
conquest. When analysing man's fascination for virginity, for example, 
de Beauvoir claims: ". • • in the irrevocable act of defloration he makes 
of that body unequivocally a passive object, he affirms his capture 
of it" (p .186). De Beau voir also :maintains as we have seen, that 
man 1 s penetration of wom.an· always .cbnsti tut.es a kind of "rape." 
However in 1972 de Beauvoir claimed: "It shocks me when people claim 
that all coitus is rape • I don't believe that. When they say that 
they are reproducing male myths like a man's penis is a sword, a 
21 
weapon." Nevertheless this is the position which predominates in 
The Second Sex. 
De Beauvoir' s theory is not simply fashioned according to mani s 
perspective.-but also she accepts what we may also call the "male myth"; 
that it is man, not woman, who is a more fully human being. The only 
difference between de Beauvoir and the proponents of patriarchy is 
that de Beauvoir does not believe woman's inferiority to be insuperable 
or desirable. She argues that the rea·sons for the differences :between 
man and woman can be overcome. 
In accepting man as the human being, de Beauvoir implicitly 
accepts that competition, violence, assertion, dominance are character-
istic of human action~ . Indeed de Beauvoir posits an ontology premised 
on a fundamental and 11 a priori" conflict between individuals in which 
each desperately tries to assert his sovereignty. "The temptation to 
dominate," writes de Beauvoir, "is the most truly universal, the most 
irresistable one there is" (po483). However de Beauvoir never shows 
that women have this desire to dominate or to assert their sovereignty 
in an aggressive way. She posits an ontology and exempts women from it. 
Indeed, as we shall see, de Beauvoir even outlines an alternative mode 
of behaviour for women; a pattern of behaviour which indicates a 
different type of human act. 
In her account of history de Beauvoir argues that in becoming 
a conqueror and a creator, man asserted his humanity. Woman, however, 
was not able to do likewise. Nevertheless, woman subsequently accepted 
her own devaluation because she accepted manYs worth,and not because 
of intimidation or blind fear. In other words, her devaluation was 
not similar to Hegel 1 s slave in as much as she was not ignobly beaten 
in combat. Thus de Beauvoirian woman made a courageous choice; she 
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became a martyr for human p~ogress by putting the good of the collectivity 
before her own "ontological pretensions.rr In so doing, one can argue, 
that in de Beauvoir 1 s thecry, woman made a conscious, undetermined 
choice to accept manis values; that she made a free choice and hence a 
human choice. Thus even if one accepts some aspects of de Beauvoir 1 s 
theory of the origins of woman's oppression and the values which 
underlie it, it is nevertheless possible to pick up on the positive 
aspects involved in such a historical martyrdom of women. Along with 
the idea that humanity is involved in risking oneis life. and creative 
labour, de Beauvoir might have developed the idea that it is also human 
to co-operate, to put the collectivity before immediate self-interest. 
Without eulogising women, from that perspective de Beauvoir could claim 
that woman's lack of assertion has its positive attributes; that it 
contributes to human development and :might, as Reed argues, even underlie 
it. 
De Beauvoir's failure to accommodate the nature of woman2s 
existence and behaviour into her ontology leads to a distorted picture 
of the human being and his/her relations with other people. It is a 
distortion caused by her construction of the world from a masculine 
perspective. Jean Baker Miller in her book Towards a New Psychology 
of Women (1976) illustrates how such a starting point leads to "strange 
theories about 'lhuman nature'~": 
It is clear that the large element of human activity that 
involves doing for others has been separated off and assigned 
to women. When this is combined with the fact that what 
women do is generally not recognised, we end up with some 
strange theories about the nature of human nature. These 
strange theories are, in fact, the prevailing theories in 
our culture. One of these is that "mankind" is basically self-
seeking, competitive, aggressive, and destructive. Such a 
theory overlooks the fact that millions of people (most of 
them women) have spent millions of hours for hundreds of years 
giving their utmost to millions of others. While this fact 
has important consequences for women, in an ultimate sense it 
has equally serious implications for men and for the dominant 
culture's theories about the nature of human beings. 22 
De Beauvoir'~ s 11 strange" concept of the human being and his/her relations 
with others emanates from her philosophy. It is both Hegelian and 
Sartrian perspectives which lead her to posit fundamental conflict and 
to see human acts in terms of domination and sovereignty. 
As long as such philosophies are used we shall come to see 
women as inferior to man. In Chapter Seven we saw this with reference 
to existentialism. There we learned that de Beauvoir 9 s existentialist 
ontology and ethics are individualistic and lead us to see any 
limitations on woman's ability to compete and struggle with the Other 
as barriers to full human development. De Beauvoir'~ s use of Hegelian 
concepts intensifies the view that man is a privileged existent. 
Indeed any theory of human development based on the idea that self-
consciousness and human characteristics evolve from a struggle with the 
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Other and from essentially individual acts, leads us to see woman as 
less equipped to enter such a struggle. Thus, because woman is 
usually identified more closely than man with her reproductive role 
and because this limits her potential for aggressive, individual action, 
it is difficult to imagine her becoming either equal or superior to 
man. We end up seeing woman as more bound to "animal" life and basing 
our concept of humanity on the activities of men. 
The Hegelian and Sartrian theories which underpin de Beauvoir's 
analysis in The Second Sex are its strength and its weakness. They 
allow de Beau voir to develop the concept of woman as "the Other," but 
give rise to the idea that anything feminine is animal and second-rate. 
Thus we must be selective in our use of Hegelian and Sartrian concepts. 
We must redefine why woman is "the Other." The idea of a hostile, 
threatening Other is not "a fundamental category of thought," but the 
product of an individualistic and competitive culture. In a patriarchal 
society which values assertive, domineering subjects, woman's oppression 
is characterised by her relegation to the status of object and "Other." 
As Berger illustrates, woman learns to cultivate her "objectivity" so 
she will be attractive to man. Thus woman 'l s status as "Other" is more 
cultural than de Beauvoir is prepared to admit. As we have seen, in 
recent years de Beauvoir acknowledged this unsatisfactory aspect of her 
theory, saying that now she would link woman as "Other" to the laws of 
"supply and demand." However, to resolve this problem in de Beauvoir's 
theory, more radical changes are required. 
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As an existentialist, de Beau voir is a doyenne of individualistic 
values and aspirations but, as a woman, she also knows that such values 
p:t 
conflict with "feminine" success. It is because she understands such 
tension that she is able to reveal the poignant nature of woman's 
experience. It is not fortuitous that de Beauvoir's philosophy allows 
her to convey so powerfully the nature of the contemporary relations 
between the sexes. It is "the woman in love," "the narcissist," and 
the "career woman" who testify to de Beauvoir's skills as an analyst of 
the plight of modern woman. Conversely, it is the historical, "factual" 
sections which illustrate the limitations of de Beauvoir's theor.y; they 
show how she is locked in an individualistic philosophy. As the 
entrepreneur serves too readily for her "human being," the oppression 
of woman is that she is a self-made man manque'. Thus it is only when 
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de Beauvoirian woman realises this, that she feels nauseated and alienated, 
resenting the limitations of her reproductive role. 
In the last few pages of The Second Sex de Beauvoir begins to 
reassess the values of her culture. She writes of the necessity of a 
socialist revolution to liberate women. But this arbi trar.y commitment 
· to a new economic order is not based on a genuine appraisal of human 
values. The male revolutionar.y is still an aggressive, assertive 
subject and in the struggle for a more egalitarian society woman is to 
become his apprentice. Indeed de Beauvoir's portrayal of the sexes is 
such, that in the project of becoming more ntruly human," woman has 
nothing to teach man. 
Certainly for generations it has been all too common for men 
to glorify femininity, yet confine woman to domesticity. We must 
recognise the aridity and claustrophobia of womenY s lives. But we 
must also recognise the human values of co-operation, tenderness, 
openness, and passivity which have resulted from the sexual division 
of labour. This is precisely what de Beauvoir' s theory fails to do 
in The Second Sex, and it is this which constitutes its fundamental 
flaw. In the words of Margaret Wal ters: "(De Beau voir) • • • made a 
powerful attack on the masculine ideology of femininity - but at the 






A Note on Terminology 
Woman In The Second Sex de Beauvoir writes about "la femme" when she 
wants to make general points about feminine existence. For the 
most part "les ferr.mes" is used only to discuss a deviation from 
archetypal woman or the experience of a particular group. Thus 
de Beauvoir talks of "les femmes frigides." In harmony with de 
Beauvoir's terminology, "woman" is used in this thesis in 
preference to "women." 
Man De Beauvoir also uses the singular ( "1 'homme") when discussing the 
Other 
particular nature of masculine existence and this has been followed 
here. However, when discussing Hegelian, Sartrian and de 
Beauvoirian theory "man" is also used to designate the human being. 
In Words and Women (1976) Casey Miller and Kate Swift argue: "The 
use of ~ to represent the human species reinforces the erroneous 
notion that the species is male or at least that the male is more 
1 
representative than the female." But it is precisely because 
there is a male bias inherent in this use of man)that this term has 
been chosen; for such a bias in favour of the male is inherent in 
these philosophies. 
When discussing Hegelian and Sartrian thought, the separate 
consciousness existing in opposition to Self is written: the Other. 
In The Second Sex de Beauvoir uses this notion of Self and Other 
("L'Autre"), but she also uses the notion that in relation to man, 
woman is "the Other." Thus when de Beauvoir's notion of woman's 
\ 
position vis a vis man is used> it is written: "the Other." 
Work/Labour Hannah Arrendt in The Human Condition makes a distinction 
between "work" and "labour". 2 However, in The Second Sex de 
Beauvoir makes no distinction between these two kinds of activity, 
and uses terms such as "travail" and "oeuvre" interchangeably. 









A pp en dix Two 
De Beauvoir' s Work Prior to "The Second Sex" 
When de Beauvoir wrote The Second Sex she had alreaqy published 
three novels and several philosophical essays, and was firmly established 
as an author. When discussing de Beauvoir's thought prior to 1949, three 




As de Beauvoir points out, the first period in her develop~ent 
2 encompassed the years from 1929-1939. Starting from her first meeting 
with Sartre, it embraces the time she spent teaching in the provinces, the 
threesome relationship with Sartre and Olga K. which provides the theme of 
her novel She Came To Stay (1943), and the beginnings of her life as a 
writer. 3 
She Came To St~, de Beauvoir's first published novel, opens with an 
Hegelian epigraph, "Each conscience seeks the death of the Other," which 
locates it in this 1929-39 period when her writing concentrated on the 
relationships between individuals. It is essentially a metaphysical novel 
in that the drama unfolds in a featureless, ahistorical world where the 
conflict in human relations, a central theme in the book, illustrates the 
difficulties of co-existence when each one claims his place at the centre 
of the world. There are noticeable connections between Sartre's philosophy 
and de Beauvoir's literary theme and this has led Hazel Barnes to claim that 
the novel's inspiration lies quite simply in "de Beauvoir' s decision to show 
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how Sartre's abstract principles could be made to work out in 'real life'." 4 
However, despite its aim to transpose existentialist ontology into everyday 
life, we learn from de Beauvoir's memoirs that most of this book was based 
on personal experience and partly resulted from Sartre's advice to put more 
of herself into her writing. The personal dimension is apparent in two ways. 
In the first place, the philosophical theme of the novel, the conflict 
between Self and Other, was something de Beauvoir had acutely experienced: 
The existence of Otherness remained a danger for me, 
and one which I could not bring myself to face openly. 
I had settled the anomaly of Sartre by telling 
myself that we formed a single entity, placed together 
at the world's centre. Around us other people circled, 
pleasant, odious, or ridiculous; they had no eyes with 
which to observe me: I alone could see.5 
However, the plot of the novel, a mature couple's relationship with a young 
girl who comes to wreak havoc in their lives, is based on the close 
involvement both she and Sartre had with Olga. Thus what might appear an 
abstract philosophical novel is a fictionalised account of de Beauvoir 1 s 
personal experience, informed by an ontology which starts from the assumption 
that there is a dramatic conflict between individuals. 
Fran~oise, the protagonist of She Came To Stay, epitomises the egotism 
of a sovereign subject who sees the rest of the universe and its inhabitants 
as subsidiary to her consciousness of them. But this perspective does not 
mean that Fran~oise experiences the inevitable solitariness of the Sartrian 
for-itself, for in her relationship with Pierre, she believes a shared 
existence possible. The mode of being for-itself-for-others, where both 
relinquish claims to individual self-importance, seems to have been attained 
by this couple; for them "we" has become more important than "I". Thus 
neither appears as an object or an Other for, in a union based on absolute 
sincerity and freedom, they seem to have a dual consciousness,.whereby they 
are together even whilst apart. In confronting the world they have a 
shared understanding. Pierre sums this up in his comment to Fran~oise: 
"You and I are simply one. That's the truth, you know. 
6 can be described without the other. 11 
Neither of us 
The reciprocity which appears to have been established between 
Fran~oise and Pierre is not, however, the basis of human interaction 
portrayed by de Beauvoir in this novel. Fran~oise 1 s sovereignty still 
requires to be confirmed in a series of possessive and domineering 
relationships. 
'\. 
She invites a yoliDg girl called Xaviere to live with her 
and Pierre, not out of generosity but because what she found particularly 
delightful "was to have annexed this insignificant, pathetic little being 
" into her own life! ••• Xaviere now belonged to her. Nothing ever gave 
Francoise such intense joy as this kind of possession." 7 
..) 
Thus Fran9oise 
epitomises the Satrian subject in that she uses others as means and not as 
ends. 
Francoise finds confirmation of her sovereignty in domineering 
:> 
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relationships, but Pierre finds his in inconsequential love affairs. Thus 
he wants to seduce Xaviere so that she will come to love and recognise him 
as the essential reality of her life. It is as single individuals that 
these two attempt to possess Xaviere and so, as we shall see, estrangement 
between the two partners ultimately ensues. 
Pierre's attempt to seduce Xaviere into wilful submission to his 
mastery and Frangoise's desire for domination lead to conflict in their 
relationship. But such difficulties are heightened by the nature of 
·' Xav1ere's consciousness and desires. She is a subtle form of the Satrian 
sadist in as much as she is determined to retain her sovereigntY, no matter 
what the cost. Thus not only is Fran~oise unable to make Xavi~re into the 
jiiiS 
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desired object for annexation but also, in face of Xavi~re's determination, 
any hopes for reciprocity are likewise doomed. Fransoise can only 
acknowledge Xaviere as an alien and hostile will. But just as Franioise 
' is becoming more repelled by Xaviere
1 
Pierre is growing more fascinated and 
more eager to seduce her. This couple believed they had a joint 
perspective on the world and its inhabitants, but now the presence of this 
third person destroys their unity. Frangoise becomes aware of their 
potential estrangement and realises that "the only way she could bring 




These attempts to accept Xavi~re do not, however, lead to peaceful 
co-existence and, paradoxically, begin the destruction of Fran~oise's entire 
world. In opening her relationship with Pierre to the scrutiny of another, 
their dual consciousness becomes the object of scornful attack. The basis 
of a relationship, previously taken for granted, is now open to question. 
Moreover, not only is Francoise's liaison with Pierre beginning to appear 
:, 
contingent, but also her own view of herself, formally solid and 
unquestioning, is now in the process of disintegration. She begins to 
' sense herself as an object for the Other and as this Other is Xaviere, an 
essentially alien and hostile will, she sees this as a threat to her very 
existence: 
Day after day, minute after minute, Fran~oise had fled 
the danger: but the worst had happened, and she had at 
last come face to face with this insurmountable obstacle 
which she had sensed, behind a shadowy outline, since 
her earliest childhood. At the back of Xavi~re's 
maniacal pleasure, at the back of her hatred and 
jealousy, the abomination loomed as monstrous and 
definite as death. Before Fransoise's very eyes, and 
yet apart from her, an alien conscience was taking up 
its position. 9 
As it is this "alien" cons.cience which Pierre finds so 
attractive it is not simply their potential estrangement which Fran~oise 
must now accept, for she must also come to terms with the facet of 
existence which they had previously sought to overcome. Thus it is only 
with her estrangement from Pierre that she understands what Sartre calls 
"the scandal of existence" - that "to be separate is to live out the 
separation alone." 
10 
' When the relationship between Pierre and Xaviere eventually goes 
sour, Fransoise sees this as a triumph. However, this feeling of triumph 
is shortlived for she is forced to contemplate the image Xa~iere holds of 
her. As Henri Peyre points out, an image of "a domineering, mean woman, 
prosaically jealous of a younger person, lying to herself in spite of all 
. . 11 her claims to utter s1ncer1 ty." Fran~oise had thought that she had 
rid herself of this "alien" Other, reduced her to an insignificant aspect 
' of her life, but Xaviere's freedom cannot be denied - her very existence 
constitutes a threat. Fran9oise is no longer prepared to compromise, she 
will not be an object for Xavie~and it is hate which motivates her 
subsequent act of annihilation. It is an act for which she alone is 
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responsible and which gives her so much pleasure: "'It is I who will it.' 
It was her own will which was being accomplished, now nothing at all 
separated her from herself. 
chosen herself." 12 
She had at last made a choice. She had 
' Thus it is with Fran~oise's murder of Xaviere, a murder which is 
contrived to look like suicide, that the conflict between these two women 
ends. And so de Beauvoir here gives literal and dramatic expression to 
Hegel's "each conscience seeks the death of the Other." It is, however, 
an expression which even de Beauvoir admits is unconvincing. Nevertheless 
pz 
de Beauvoir chose this ending because she maintains: 
Frangoise has given up looking for an ethical 
solution to the problem of co-existence. She endures 
the Other as an inevitable burden, and then defends 
herself against this invasion by accomplishing an 13 equally brutal and irrational act herself: murder. 
This may constitute an irrational act but it is this which, as Maurice 
Cranston points out, forms the moral of She Came to Stay in that to make 
a conscious choice is in itself ethical. l4 
De Beauvoir's portrayal of human relationships in She Came to Stay 
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is more Sartrian than Hegelian in that the conflict between consciousnesses 
is not dialectical; it is merely a battle, in this case to the death, from 
which there is no resolution. It is the consciousness of opponents in 
combat which underlies de Beauvoir's philosophy of human interaction; 
de Beauvoir allows no possibility for co-existence. However, Carol Evans 
believes that if we put the conflict between Frangoise and Xavi~re aside 
and examine the relationship between Fran~oise and Pierr~we shall find 
that co-existence may be difficult but not impossible, for the basis of an 
authentic reciprocal relationship between these two does exist. lS But 
Evans' argument is not convincing in the light of existentialism. 
Fran~oise and Pierre, although not acting in bad faith - deliberate self 
deception - do not acknowledge what Sartre calls the ontological "fact" of 
separation. When Xaviere appears they see her in different ways and their 
previous notion of a mutual perspective or joint consciousness is 
shattered. Pierre's "we are one" utterance is soon shown to be no more 
than 11 ontological optimism. 11 ' Even before Xaviere appeared, Francoise's 
~ 
relationship with Pierre did not illustrate the possibili~ of reciprocal 
relationships, the eradication of conflict, but merely replaced "I versus 
Others" with "We versus Others." The "imperialism" of the human 
p 
272 
consciousness is not obliterated in these two individuals who are 
supposedly capable of co-existence, but simply suppressed in their 
interaction with one another and aggressively directed towards the rest 
of the world. Thus even if the relationship between Frangoise and Pierre 
had been successful, this would not have solved the problems of co-existence 
but simply placed two, and not one, at the centre of the world in conflict 
with all others. 
An interesting feature of She Came to Stay is that de Beauvoir 
applies the ontology of Being and Nothingness to relationship~ between 
women. The "fundamental attitudes" outlined by Sartre are predominantly 
' played out in this novel in the relationship between Fran~oise and Xaviere. 
De Beauvoir's portrayal of these women is not totally unrealistic, yet 
there is something unconvincing about their relentless egotism. 
Unconvincing in as much as it belies "feminine" characteristics such as 
acquiescence, receptiveness, passivity. By the time she wrote The Second 
Sex de Beauvoir had developed a notion of woman as object and "Other." 
This does not mean that de Beauvoir refuted the idea that the consciousness 
she attributes to both Francoise and Xaviere is impossible for women; 
.) 
indeed de Beauvoir would never argue this since it is, after allJ an 
autobiographical novel. 
\ 
Thus Fran~oise and Xaviere might still continue 
to act out some of the Sartrian attitudes, but since there is also another 
process involved - woman as "the Other" - the relationships would be more 
complex than she had originally allowed. But before de Beauvoir became 
interested in the particular experience of women, she devoted her time to 
discussing ethical questions. 
II 
The change which took place in de Beauvoir's thought after 
1939 was inextricably linked to the political situation; a situation 
which ultimately culminated in the outbreak of war. Prior to this 
period de Beauvoir, and to a lesser extent Sartre, took little interest 
in politics. She tells us that at this time she was so concerned with 
maximising her own happiness that she refused to take account of external 
events which might clash with her individual goals. Despite increasing 
fascist provocations it was not until 1939 that de Beauvoir believed that 
attempts to counter fascist assaults were not merely necessary} but the 
only justifiable course of action. It was this kind of realisation which 
de Beauvoir has in mind when she tells us in The Prime of Life: 
•.• there is no doubt that the spring of 1939 marked 
a watershed in my life. I renounced my 
individualistic, anti-humanistic way of life. I 
learned the value of solidarity. • •. Histo~ took 
hold of me, and never let go thereafter. . . . 6 
As we have seen, Sartre's thought also underwent such changes. He 
decided that he could no longer· refuse to became politically involved and 
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devised the rudiments of a morality based on the notion of the "genuine man" 
in which each individual is required to shoulder the responsibility for his 
own and others' existence. De Beauvoir, now realising the necessity for 
this perspective, "rallied to his point of view inunediately." 17 
The change in de Beauvoir's thought is clearly manifest in the 
writings of this period. Her short philosophical essay Pyrrhus et 
Cineas (1944) 18 and her second novel The Blood of Others (1945) 19 are 
based on a philosophy of responsibility and a commitment to political action. 
By contrasting the epigraphs of the first and second novels we can see 
the dramatic change in de Beauvoir's thought; for the Hegelian 
epigraphJwhich suggests implacable conflict between independent subjects, 
is in direct opposition to Dostoyevsky's "each one of us is responsible 
for everyone and to every human being" which serves as the epigraph for 
the latter work. Before writing The Blood of Others de Beauvoir set out 
her ideas for its theme: 
I would like my next novel to illustrate one's 
relationship with other people (autrui) in all its real 
complexity. To suppress one's awareness of the Other's 
existence is mere childness. The plot must be far more 
closely linked to social problems than in the first novel. 
It should culminate in some sort of action2~ith a social dimension - though this is hard to find. 
Be Beauvoir decided eventually to use the Resistance as a social setting in 
which her ideas could unfold. Thus although the book on publication was 
hailed as a "Resistance novel" the use of the Resistance was only the 
backcloth and did not effect its main theme. 
As Hazel Barnes points out, Jean Blomart, the principal character 
of The Blood of Others, represents a true existentialist hero in the sense 
that he is honest with himself, recognising his responsibility for his own 
life and the necessity of respecting the freedom of others. 
21 
However, 
Blomart has not always been such an authentic individual and the novel's 
main concern is with his growing awareness of what has been termed "the 
curse of existence" -the problem of reconciling one's own freedom with 
others'. 
The son of a wealthy printer, Blomart experiences his privileged 
position with feelings of rebellion and guilt. He joins the Communist 
Party an~ in the fervour of political action,persuades a friend to take 
part in a demonstration at which the friend gets killed. Out of self-
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recrimination and guilt, Blomart attempts to remain totally detached 
from others' existence, and seeks refuge in political neutrality and 
evasion of emotional involvement. But, on both historical and personal 
fronts, he realises that he has set himself an impossible task: 
I cannot blot myself out. I cannot withdraw into 
myself. I exist outside myself and everywhere in this 
world. There is not an inch of my path which does not 
trespass into the world of someone else: there is no way 
of living which can prevent me from overflowing from 
myself at every moment. This life, which I spin from 
my own substance, presents a thousand unknown faces to 22 
other men; it flows impetuously through their fate ...• 
Politically this realisation,and the dilemma of action which results, 
stems from his awareness of the fascist activity in Spain and the 
increasing persecution of the Jews. By not acting he is allowing these 
atrocities to continue, but action would necessarily imply fighting 
violence with violence - intervention would mean that he was paying with 
"the blood of others" for the instigation of his values. 
On a personal level, Blomart's realisation that he cannot remain 
aloof from others' lives, stems from his meeting with a young woman called 
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, ' Helene and the relationship which follows. In the early stages of the book, 
Hel~ne epitomises a certain type of woman, apparent in most of de Beauvoir's 
novels, who attempts to use her love for a man as a justification for her 
. t 23 exls ence. Blomart is repelled by such a prospect and withdraws but, 
in the messy abortion which results from their affair, learns that by 
refusing love he is also influencing another's life and that he must 
ultimately accept responsibility for its effect. 
In face of this failed love affair, Helene takes refuge in 
indifference. She regards herself as independent of current events and 
watches the ascendency of fascism and the German occupation of Paris with 
impartiality. However, various events shake her out of this attitude 
and she finally becomes involved in the Resistance movement. What 
"' ' Helene "was to learn in the course of her development," writes de 
Beauvoir, "was the meaning of solidarity. . . • In the generous atmosphere 
bred by comradeship and action she finally won through to that 
'recognition', in the Hegelian sense of the word, which preserves man from 
mere immanence and contingency." 24 In the light of events Blomart too 
is forced, after years of pacificism, to accept that in certain 
circumstances violence is the only way to give meaning to life. As 
Victor Brombert points out, neither the philosophical awareness which 
Blomart gains, nor his political involvement} can "cure . . • (him) of his 
sense of alienation or cleanse him of his guilt." 25 Blomart never 
manages to resolve the problem of becoming a barrier to the freedom of 
others, nor does the mutual involvement in the Resistance help him 
transcend the separateness of human existence and the alienation which 
276 
this implies. De Beauvoir herself remarks that Blomart 's development "did 
not bring him peace of mind, but peace of mind he no longer aspired to; 
26 
he resigned himself to a life of mental agony." 
From even this brief look at The Blood of others we see how apt it 
is for de Beauvoir to call this her "moral period." 27 At the end of She 
Came to Stay the reader is prompted to conclude that one ought to be true 
to oneself by choosing and taking responsibility for one's decisions, but 
from the ending of this novel a more definite conclusion is urged. But 
this conclusion is still unclear, for beyond that of becoming politically 
involved we do not know what each one of us must do to become a truly moral 
being. "Each one of us is responsible for everyone and to every human being": 
de Beauvoir illustrates this theme but is unable to tell us how we must live 
--
a life commensurate with such a reality. 
In her philosophical essay Pyrrhus et Cin~as de Beauvoir 
elaborates some of the points raised in the novel. She attempts to show 
how our lives inevitably encroach on the freedom of others and that we 
have to face up to the responsibility this implies. But de Beauvoir 
confides in her memoirs that} having reached this conclusion in both these 
work~ she found that though aware of her responsibilities, she nevertheless 
28 
felt herself wholly incapable of action. Such feelings of impotence 
emanate from her abstract ethics and a call to action which glosses over 
many social issues and problems. And it is these feelings which de 
Beauvoir expresses in her subsequent novel, All Men Are Mortal (1946). 29 
III 
In discussing the main themes and philosophical points of All Men 
Are Mortal two problems immediately arise: on the one hand, we are faced 
with an immortal character and a story which presents historical events as 
the material for the development of his consciousness; while on the other, 
there is no smgle theme. De Beauvoir states that in this novel she was: 
. . • trying to say no more than the story I invented. ••. 
Human enterprise is neither the finite nor the infinite 
but the indefinite: this word cannot be fixed within 
and given limits, the best way of approaching it is to 
explore its possible variations. All Men Are Mortal is 
an organised version of such an exploration; its themes 
are not theses, but points of departure for unchartered 
wanderings. 30 
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For the sake of simplicity and clarity) let us leave aside the themes of time 
and death,which are of great concern to de Beauvoir but of little 
relevance to our stud~ and briefly examine the change which took place in 
her thought; a change which de Bea uvoir later claimed means that All Men 
--
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Are Mortal is a "complement" to her first novel but the "antithesis" 
of her second. 
/ 
In Force of Circumstance de Beauvoir tells us that in L'Experience 
Interiure George Bataille asks: "How can one consent to not being 
everything?" 31 And that although this question had been one of the themes 
of She Came to Stay she decided to develop it more fully in her third novel. 
Fosca, the protagonist of All Men Are Mortal is portrayed in the first part 
of the historical narrative as an ambitious envious individual who, in 
fighting for the glory of the city state Carmona, chooses to drink an elixir 
which will make him irrrrnortal and thus allow him to realise his ambitions. 
However, immortality, far from bringing success and fulfilment, brings 
growingly dramatic realisation of the futility of his goals. Through a 
long series of events he becomes involved in an undertaking to unite the 
world and thus confirm the happiness of its beings. However, faced by the 
countless deaths and the endless misery this project entails, he begins to 
doubt its validity. When he comes to contemplate the universe he seeks to 
rmite he finds only individual liberties: "There are only men, men forever 
divided." 32 Moreover, like a god he was seeking to define "Universal Good" 
and, in its imposition, deny that man must create his own values and shape 
his life accordingly. Fosca was thus engaged in a project which, if 
successful, robbed man of his freedom and condemned him to exist in a 
ready-made world where the only real choice open to him would be suicide. 
It is for this reason that Fosca declares that men do "not want happiness 
they want to live. There is nothing one can do for them, there is nothing 
one can do against them. There is nothing one can do." 33 It is this 
pessimistic declaration which, although slightly modified in later sections, 
could almost serve as an epigraph for the novel. :r;e Beauvoir tells us 
that she deliberately set Fosca's realisations of the futility of 
action in the Middle Ages: "Stupid wars, a chaotic economy, useless 
rebellions, futile massacres, population increases unaccompanied by 
any improvement in the standard of living, everything in this period," 
she writes, "seemed confusion and marking time. . .. " 34 
De Beauvoir admits that the conception of history which emerges 
from this section of the novel is "resolutely pessimistic" but argues 
that it does not imply cyclical movement, merely that historical 
development does not mean progress. It is, however, this sort of 
existentialist conception, and the interrelated notion of the futility 
of human action, which, as we have seen with reference to Satre's work, 
leads to difficulties in integrating existentialism and Marxism. 
Perhaps this explains why de Beauvoir was later at pains to point out 
that the pessimistic tone is to some extent corrected in the later stages 
of her novel>where she recognises the "truth" of "the victories won by 
the working class since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. 11 35 
Yet this optimism is not visible to Fosca. After centuries of political 
inaction he becomes involved and is subsequently imprisoned for 
revolutionary activity; but even so, he is unable to rejoice in the 
victories of the struggle in which he has been involved. He believes 
that "if one lives long enough, one sees that every victory sooner or 
later turns to defeat." 36 
In his long trek through history Fosca learns, however, that one 
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good does exist - to act in accordance with one's conscience. Thus echoing 
the conclusion of She Came to Stay de Beauvoir expresses the view that one 
must accept responsibility for one's choices but does not tell us what these 
choices ought to be. Unlike The Blood of Others there is no 
implication that one ought to engage in political action; this remains 
only one possibility and only so if it is what one's conscience 
dictates. Moreover the futility of action which emerges as a dominant 
theme in this book, is in complete opposition to the conclusion of The 
Blood of OthersJwhere one is morally obliged to become politically 
involve~ and it is in this sense that it carries an antithetical message. 
De Beauvoir's thought appears to have come full circle up to this 
point. It began with the notion that one should be true to oneself; 
moved to a morality which bids each individual to take responsibility for 
the society in which he lives; and then back to the idea that above all 
else one must act in accordance with one's conscience. However, although 
de Beauvoir's thought is in this respect circular, it has also progressed. 
She began with a completely ego-centred world view where the Other merely 
constitutes a threat to one's existence) but subsequently realised that 
Others do exist and with as much right as oneself. At one point this 
recognition led de Beauvoir to some moral positions. The idea of a 
commitment to the Other persisted, but de Beauvoir realised the difficulty 
involved in devising an ethical system. Our lives hopelessly intertwine, 
yet apart from living as our conscience dictates what else can we do? 
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Thus we see that like Sartre, de Beauvoir's thought stumbles on the 
question of ethics. Yet it is a problem which existentialists must face; 
for if man is free to create his own values on what criteria must he base 
his choices? This problem was later made redundant for Sartre by his 
acceptance of Marxism and a concomitant stress on political involvement. 
But in the intervening period)Sartre and de Beauvoir realised that 
existentialist ontology could not in itself allow one to differentiate 
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between different forms of political organisation. Thus they tried to 
differentiate between ontological freedom and soci-political freedom. 
It was in distinguishing between these two conceptions of freedom that 
de Beauvoir contributed most to the formulation of existentialist ethics. 
IV 
Being and Nothingness provides the underlying theo~ of de 
Beauvoir's work,The Ethics of Ambiguity. She begins from the notion that 
man has a nothingness at the core of his being; a nothingness which gives 
him the chance to become something -to make himself. As his own creator, 
man is a "useless passion. 11 But de Beauvoir refines Sartre's theory and 
argues that the absence of absolute values does not mean that everything is 
"absurd, 11 that nothing is justifiable, for it is man's responsibility to 
create his own values. It is he who must establish criteria to 
differentiate the "useful" from the "useless. 11 It is because man must 
create values in relation to his own life, that de Beauvoir claims his being 
is "ambiguous." Such ambiguity must not, however, be "dispelled" for it 
is man's "task" to realise it. 37 Accordingly, de Beauvoir maintains that 
despite popular belief, existentialism is not a philosophy of the absurd 
and of despair. On the contrary, it is a philosophy which can give rise 
to ethics: 
The most optimistic of ethics have all begun by 
emphasising the element of failure involved in the 
condition of man; without failure no ethics, for 
a being who, from the very start, would be an exact 
co-incidence with himself, in a perfect plenitude, 
the notion of having-to-be would have no meaning. 
One does not offer an ethics to a God. It is impossible 
to propose any to man if one defines him as nature, as 
something given. 38 
Dostoyevesky once claimed: "If God does not exist, everything 
39 is pennitted." But de Beauvoir, following the Sartre of 
Existentialism and Humanism, argues that the opposite is true for it is 
only in the absence of an absolute being, a creator of the universe, that 
man is responsible for everything and must justify everything he does. 
Thus eve~ individual must create his own values and make his own choices. 
The "genuine man" is one who realises this; who abandons "the dream of 
the inhuman objectivity." 4o However, de Beauvoir argues that there is 
in fact a foundation for individual choice and action: freedom. She 
claims that freedom is not a universal value in itself but is a 
prerequisite for all values and a justification for all human existence. 
"To will oneself moral and to will oneself free," writes de Beauvoir, "are 
one and the same decision." 4l This does not mean that we are not free 
but that we must establish a genuine political freedom on "the original 
42 upsurge of existence"; we must overcome the constraints which block our 
transcendence. 
De Beauvoir thus attempts to distinguish between ontological and 
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political freedom and define what may serve as a basis for moral evaluation. 
Subsequently she argues that one can will oneself not free and in so doing 
constitute oneself as an inferior mode of being; fail to realise one's 
human existence. And it is in allowing man the possibility to err in this 
way that de Beauvoir claims existentialism is able to introduce the concept 
of ethics. 
But having established the possibility for unethical action, de 
Beauvoir must account for it. She must explain why some individuals choose 
to live an inauthentic existence or why they want to enslave others. In 






! existentialism rejects the idea of essence. Nor is she able to explain 
such behaviour in terms of an individual's experience and subsequent 
character formation for, as we shall see, de Beauvoir argues that these 
are never so definite as to rule out the possibility of change. How, 
then, does de Beauvoir attempt to explain an individual's particular choice 
and consequent way of relating to the world? 
Quoting Des cartes' statement that "man's unhappiness . . . is due to 
him having first been a child," 43 de Beauvoir claims that it is only on 
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the basis of childhood experiences that we can explain why most men in adult 
life make unfortunate choices about their existence. As the child finds 
himself in a ready made world it appears to have an absolute quality to 
which he must submit. He accepts adults as the source of absolute 
knowledge and sees them as solid substantial beings. Accordingly) he 
accepts himself as a completed being. Moreover, he feels happily 
irresponsible for himself and his acts for they are insignificant in the 
face of such a completed universe. However, this state of serene acceptance 
rarely continues beyond adolescence. Cracks begin to appear in the 
perfection of adults and their world: "Men stop appearing as if they were 
gods, and at the same time the adolescent discovers the human character of 
the world about him. Language, customs, ethics, and values have their source 
in these uncertain creatures." 44 The crisis of adolescence is that the 
adolescent must assume his subjectivity, he must take responsibility for his 
actions and the social situation in which he finds himself. In m cmart ' s 
words: "I didn't create the world but I create it again by my presence at 
every instant." 45 Thus it is at the crisis of adolescence that the 
individual must decide his attitude to freedom - it is the moment of his 
moral choice. This decision may be changed in the future but, de Beauvoir 
argues (although not explaining why), as time passes this becomes more 
difficult. However, as man's freedom is always there, no choice is so 
unfortunate that it cannot be altered. 
When de Beauvoir discusses the impact of childhood on this 
process of choosing it is not clear exactly what she has in mind. It 
is not the way in which the child is socialised which is relevant in de 
Beauvoir's view, since socialisation is too deterministic to be accepted 
by existentialists. Thus it appears that "the misfortune which comes to 
man as a result of the fact that he was a child is that his freedom was 
first concealed from him and that all his life he will be nostalgic for 
the time when he did not know of its exigencies." 
46 
However, this does 
not explain anything about individual differences; in view of the fact 
that everyone has been a child and has had his freedom concealed, how can 
we understand why one individual confirms his freedom and adopts a moral 
attitude while another does not? De Beauvoir offers us no explanation. 
De Beauvoir gives some examples of situations which are analogous 
to the child's, such as slavery and the position of women in some 
civilisations. What characterises these groups is that they are: 
beings whose life slips by in an infantile world 
because, having been kept in a state of servitude and 
ignorance, they have no means of breaking the ceiling 
which is stretched over their heads. Like the child, 
the,y can exercise their freedom, but only within this 4 Universe which has been set up before them, without them. 7 
Thus the slave who has not yet gained consciousness of his slavery accepts 
the world of his masters, and women in some societies are so ignorant that 
they can only submit to the world and the values created by men. Such 
submission is also characteristic of some women in our society, but de 
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Beauvoir argues that what distinguishes Western women from the child is that 
their condition is not imposed upon them but chosen or at least 
consented to. Negro plantation slaves and Mohammedan women, for 
example, do not have the education and understanding to allow them to 
attack their oppression, "but once there appears a possibility of 
liberation, it is resignation of freedom not exploit the possibility, a 
resignation which implies dishonesty and which is a positive fault." 
48 
Thus de Beauvoir implicitly blames contemporary women for their oppressed 
position. Existentialist ontology leads de Beauvoir to argue that if 
women are degraded object~it is because they themselves have consented to 
this situation. As they are able to analyse their position, if they do 
not revolt then it is because of "dishonesty" or "fault." The social 
reasons for woman's acceptance of her passive role do not figure here, but 
a little leniency does creep in as de Beauvoir takes a fleeting regard for 
social constraints. She states that woman's restricted social and 
economic activity means that she is more likely to see the world as given. 
But de Beauvoir, a relentless moral critic, adds: 
There is often laziness and timidity in their 
resignation; their honesty is not quite complete; but 
to the extent that it exists, their freedom remains 
available, it is not denied. They can, in their 
situation of ignorant and powerless individuals, know 
the truth of existence and raise themselves to a 
properly moral life. 49 
But if woman's revolt is often hindered by "laziness" and 
"resignation" why is she more prone to such faults than man? If there is 
no essence and if socialisation is too deterministic a theory to be given 
much credence in existentialism, how can de Beauvoir explain the fact that 
passivity is a common trait of the female sex? It is apparent here, as 
elsewhere in Sartre's and de Beauvoir's thought, that existentialism fails 
to explain differences in human attitudes and conditions. Moreover, in 
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holding the oppressed, in this case women, responsible for their situation, 
de Beauvoir is open to Marcuse's charge that such a theory is an "insult" 
to the oppressed. Indeed since de Beauvoir actually apportions blame1 
her theory suggests that those few women, like hersel~ who have asserted 
their freedom are morally superior beings. 
But to return to de Beauvoir's concept of freedom, we see that she 
argues that for human existence, and the freedom which underlies it, to be 
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meaningful man must be in relationship with other people. To live a moral 
life involves the realisation that while others are potential threats to 
one's projects and possibilities, the world would be empty without them. 
"To will that there be being is also to will that there be men by and for 
whom the world is endowed with human significations ..•. To make being 'be' 
is to connnunicate with others by means of being. 11 SO Although the 
meaningfulness of existence depends on freedom and transcendence, there 
are situations where this is restricted; where man is not permitted free 
expression and is cut off from his goals. And it is this which de Beauvoir 
defines as oppression. Oppression, in de Beauvoir's terms, is only possible 
as a result of the actions of other men for the limiting forces of the 
in-itself - pestilence for example - do not constitute natural oppression 
but simply the material for man's projects. De Beauvoir's definition of 
oppression is important to note since it serves as a basis for her analysis 
of the plight of women in The Second Sex: 
my freedom, in order to fulfil itself, requires that 
it emerges into an open future: it is other men who open 
the future to me, it is they who, setting up the world of 
tomorrow, define my future; but if, instead of allowing 
me to participate in this constructive movement, they 
oblige me to consume my transcendence in vain, if they 
keep me below the level to which they have conquered and 
on the basis of which new conquests will be achieved, then 
they are cutting me off from the future, they are changing 
me into a thing. Life is occupied in both 
perpetuating itself and in surpassing itself; if 
all it does is maintain itself, then living is not 
only dying, but human existence is indistinguishable 
from absurd vegetation .••• 51 
For the oppressed there is only one solution: to prove their 
subjectivity and freedom in revolt. Echoing Hegel>de Beauvoir claims 
that if the revolt is successful then it is the oppressed who realise 
positive freedom and the tyrant who, in opposing freedom, becomes a thing. 
Those individuals who are neither oppressors nor oppressed have not simply 
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every right to intervene in this struggle, but are morally obliged to do so: 
52 
"Abstention is complicity, and complicity in this case is tyranny." As 
the cause of freedom does not belong to any individual or group> but is 
"universally human," in failing to becane involved in a liberation struggle 
one is implicitly aligning oneself with tyranny and against freedom. One 
cannot argue against this view by saying that the oppressed positively 
desire their oppression foiJ according to de Beauvoir, the slave "merely 
abstains from not wanting it (freedom) because he is unaware of even the 
possibility of rejection." 53 De Beauvoir does, however, argue that the 
urgency of liberation is not exactly the same for everyone. Contradicting 
Marx,she claims that it is moral exigenc~ and not literal necessit~ which 
is the determining force. The material conditions of a worker make him a 
likely candidate for revolt, but like any other man he may reject his 
freedom and accept various philosophical justifications for not fighting. 
De Beauvoir argues, therefore, that as freedom is the foundation of 
man's human existence anything that denies this must be overcome. An 
authentic individual is one who regards this struggle as part of his own 
individual struggle for human existence and who aids those in the pro·:;ess of 
liberation. However, by refusing the oppressor the right to treat people 
as things, this struggle between oppressor and oppressed inflicts one 
group's will on another. "In order for a liberation action to be 
thoroughly moral action," writes de Beauvoir, "it would have to be 
54 achieved with the consent and conversion of the oppressors." But 
de Beauvoir argues that to believe this possible is Utopian reverie. 
She maintains that it is therefore justifiable to prohibit oppression 
since "a freedom which is interested only in denying other freedom must 
be denied." 55 
De Beauvoir admits the complexity of the question of liberating 
action. One may accept that oppressors may have to be prohibited by 
violence but such violence will also be meted out to others who are not 
so culpable. Thus she claims that we are faced with a "paradox": 
"···no action can be generated for man without its being immediately 
generated against men." But later she adds: 
.•• it would be absurd to oppose a liberating action 
with the pretext that it implies crime and tyranny; 
for without crime and tyranny there could be no liberation 
of man; and one cannot escape that dialectic which goes 
from freedom to freedom through dictatorship and 
oppression. 56 
However de Beauvoir argues that liberation must not harden into its 
opposite, for violence is only justifiable as a means to an end; that is, 
in the struggle for freedom from oppression. In this struggle there must 
be no sharp distinction between present and future, means and ends. It 
is the individual who must be constantly seen as one of the ends at which 
our action must aim. Thus, for example, the abstract goal of socialism 
cannot be used to justify the deaths of numerous individuals; only the 




In outlining the ideas contained in The Ethics of Ambiguity 
those relevant to our study have been concentrated on at the expense 
of others. It may also be said that the section of the book dealing 
with the ethics of liberation struggles is the best and the one dealt 
with least in our study. However, in general it is a weak book and it 
is not surprising that de Beauvoir finds this her most "irritating" work. 
The reasons for this are given in Force of Circumstance: 
The fact remains that on the whole I went to a great 
deal of trouble to present inaccurately a problem to 
which I then offered a solution quite as hollow as the 
Kantian maxims. MY descriptions of the nihilist, the 
adventurer, the aesthete, obviously influenced by those 
of Hegel, are even more arbitrar,y and abstract than his, 
since they are not even linked together by a historical 
development; the attitudes I examine are explained by 
objective conditions; I limited myself to isolating 
their moral significance to such an extent that my 
portraits are not situated on any level of reality. I 
was in error when I thought I could define a morality 
independent of a social context. 57 
This is accurate self-criticism for, as we saw with reference to women, 
in this work de Beauvoir cannot account for the mechanism of oppression, or 
for differences between individuals and groups. 
The problem for de Beauvoir in this and other works, is that she has 
no theory of the impact of such matters as class, sex, race, religion on an 
individual's life and so on his "choice' of being. De Beauvoir expresses 
the problem, and gives a reason for it, in The Prime of Life: 
in reaction against my father's ideologies, I 
objected when people talked to me about Frenchmen, 
Germans, or Jews: for me there were only individuals. 
I was right to reject essentialism; I knew alreaqy 
what abuses could follow in the train of abstract 
concepts such as the "Slav soul", the "Jewish 
character", "primitive mentality", or das ewige Weib. 
But the universalist notions to which I turned bore 
me equally far from reality. What I lacked was the 
idea of "situation", which alone allows one to make some 
concrete definition of human groups without enslaving 
them to a timeless and deterministic pattern. 58 
This was also a problem for Sartre. He developed the concept of 
"situation" to overcome it. In Anti-Semite and Jew, for example, he 
used "situation" as a way to analyse the relation of oppressor to 
oppressed. De Beauvoir's first systematic attempt to apply "situation" 
came in The Second Sex. This Sartrian concept enabled her to extricate 
herself from some of the conceptual problems of her earlier fictionalised 
and ethical works. Thus we see how de Beauvoir's analysis of woman's 
oppression fits into the general development of her thought. 
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Appendix Three 
Sartre 's "Anti-Semite and Jew" 
Sartre wrote Anti-Semite and Jew in 1944 during the peak of the 
atrocities of Nazi Germany. He begins his study of anti-Semitism b,y 
maintaining that it is not an opinion>but rather a mode of being in the 
world freely chosen by the existent. Thus Sartre claims that the reasons 
for anti-Semitism cannot be found in economic, historical, or political 
factors. Although certain actions of the Jews may at one time have given 
rise to antagonistic feelings, these in themselves could not create anti-
Semitism because, Sartre argues, this requires the anti-Semite to desire 
the belief in a "Jewish" essence. It is for this reason that Sartre 
maintains: "It is therefore the idea of the Jew that one forms for 
himself which would seem to determine histo~, not the 'historic fact' 
that produces the idea." 1 Thus Sartre hopes to refute mechanistic, 
deterministic explanations of human behaviour by demonstrating the 
existent's ability to choose how he will live his life. Accordingly) what 
Sartre intends to show in the course of this essay is that anti-Semitism, 
far from being conditioned or determined by "external factors," is a "free 
and total choice of oneself, a complex attitude that one adopts not only 
towards Jews but toward men in general, toward history and society." 2 
Sartre's analysis of anti-Semitism is an attempt to illustrate 
what kind of life an anti-Semite chooses. We learn that it is a choice 
which, in existentialist terminology, is characterised by bad faith. The 
anti-Semite is not only a coward but also a person who has chosen to 
"reason falsely"; he has a basic fear both of himself and of truth. 
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According to Sartre the anti-Semite chooses his relation to 
the world and in this process also "makes rr the Jew. 3 That is to say, 
in defining a Jewish essence the anti-Semite forces the Jew into a 
situation in which he acquires the consciousness of being a 11 Jew." In 
the terminology of Being and Nothingness,we could say that the Jew is 
alienated because he is robbed of his transcendence and defined as 
existing in the mode of the in-itself. Sartre claims that the personality 
which the anti-Semite attributes to the Jew is experienced by the latter as 
a "phantom personality, at once strange and familiar, that haunts him and 
which is nothing but himself - himself as others see him." 4 While 
Sartre claims, on the one hand, that this is simply "the expression of our 
fundamental relation to the Other, 11 he nevertheless claims: "the Jew has 
a personality like the rest of us, and on top of that he is Jewish. It 
amounts in a sense to a doubling of the fundamental relationship with the 
Other. The Jew is over-determined. " 5 It seems, therefore, that Sartre 
maintains that the anti-Semite defines the Jew as a fixed and determinate 
object. As this object is also seen as being dedicated to the work of 
Evil, the Jew is more alienated in his relation with the Other than is 
normally the case. In other words, the Jew's being-for himself is 
hideously and totally transformed in the encounter with the anti-Semitic 
Other. 
In Sartre 's analysis, the "inauthentic Jew" is one who denies or 
tries to escape from his condition as Jew. That is to say, instead of 
openly confronting the realities of his situation)the inauthentic Jew 
attempts to flee it. In explaining "the avenues of flight" open to the 
Jew Sartre thus describes how in masochism, rationalism, and the adoption 
I 
of an "inferiority complex" for example, the Jew inauthentically lives out 
his Jewish condition. 
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The authentic Jew, on the other hand, has a "true and lucid 
consciousness of the situation" and also assumes "the responsibilities 
and risks it involves." 6 The authentic Jew is thus one who accepts 
his Jewish condition; it is within the constraints of his situation that 
he chooses how to live his life. Thus Sartre claims "the authentic Jew 
makes himself Jew, in the face of all and against all." 7 In saying 
this, however, one must understand that although the authentic Jew is a 
Jew, as an authentic human being he will no longer share the traits of 
other Jews; 8 traits which stem from these Jews' "common inauthenticity." 
Central to Sartre 's idea of the Jew is thus a "Jewish situation." 
It is this which, although not determining the Jew's choice of himself, is 
the material from which his choices must be made and which is such that he 
is unlikely to choose to lead an authentic existence. He is, according to 
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Sartre, a "haunted man, condemned to make his choice of himself on the basis 
of false problems and in a false situation, deprived of the metaphysical 
sense by the society that surrounds him. • •• " 9 In short, Sartre argues 
that the Jew's awareness of his ontological freedom is less likely to 
develop because of the situation in which he finds himself. As a result 
the Jew is more likely to adopt an inauthentic attitude to his own 
existence. 
The situation offue Jew may, in Sartre's terms, adequately explain 
the inauthentic choices he makes but how are we to understand the 
inauthentic choice which Sartre posits as the foundation of anti-Semitism? 
In other words, why does an individual choose the passionate life of anti-
Semitism, eschewing in the process a more rational and authentic 
interpretation of the world and his existence in it? The answer is 
difficult to find in Anti-Semi te and Jew. However much Sartre maintains 
that the Jew's inauthentic choice may be explained by his situation, 
he continually emphasises that the anti-Semite must be held morally 
accountable for his choices. Indeed as Sartre rules out the 
possibility that anti-Semitism is a response to objective economic and 
political factors it is only to the individual anti-Semite that we are 
able to apportion blame. 
Although Sartre argues that anti-Semitism is based on a totally 
free choice of oneself, he nevertheless outlines certain external 
conditions which are likely to lead to such a choice. For example, at 
one point he discusses how the nature of one's work can influence one's 
conception of the world: 
Each man judges history in accordance with the profession 
that he follows. Shaped by the daily influence of the 
material world he works with, the workman sees society as 
the product of real forces acting in accordance with 
rigorous laws. 10 
In this way Sartre tries to account for the fact that anti-Semitism is 
more a petit-bourgeois than working-class phenomenon. Thus Sartre 
claims that the materialist analysis of the world which workers tend to 
acquire, leads them to reject the notion of a "metaphysical essence"; a 
notion which Sartre maintains is central to the Manichean conception of 
the anti-Semite. Moreover Sartre argues that the working class are not 
only more likely to see the enemy in terms of class) but also that they are 
less likely to single out Jews as objects of their hate. 
Sartre does not simply argue that the bourgeois' lack of 
productive activity means that he fails to see the world in such a 
materialist light, but also that the nature of his business leads him "to 
eXplain collective events by the initiative of individuals." In other 
words, because personalities influence the course of their business they 
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believe that this is what "determines the course of the world"; and it 
is precisely this type of mentality which, in focus sing on "essence," is 
11 more likely to lead to anti-Semitism. 
Sartre is not a determinist; he merely outlines a set of factors 
which may influence the individual's outlook on the world. But even so, 
Sartre has introduced a concept which is at odds with his main theor.y. 
Given the fact that individuals are not totally free to choose which 
occupation to enter, (as this is largely dependent on external factors 
such as qualifications, geographical location, social background and the 
objective economic climate which determines the nature of the work 
available), Sartre's claim that work influences one's view of the world 
means that "external factors" do have an affect on anti-Semitism. The 
recent decline in the productive sector and the increase in tertiary 
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sectors of employment for example, could mean that the employment experience 
of individuals could lead them to "judge" history in such a way that they 
were more likely to become anti-Semitic. 
It is understandable that Sartre, writing during the Second World 
War, would want to blame anti-Semites for their actions. Nevertheless 
there is a theoretical problem in this work; namely that Sartre accounts 
for the sitmtion of the Jew, and hence his "inauthentic" choices, but is 
not prepared to discuss the situation of the anti-Semite in similar terms. 
This bias is prevalent in Sartre's other works. Maurice Cranston 
illustrates the bias in Sartre's novels and biography: 
Thus we see the sheep divided from the goats: on the . 
one hand, Genet, Gide, Ronquentin, artists all, if not 
all of equal merit, and all unequivocally anti-
bourgeois; on the other hand, Baudelaire and Fleurier, 
one an artist, the other not, but both on the side of 
the bourgeoisie and Fascism. The final criterion is 
thus, strictly speaking, neither literary nor 
psychological: it is political. 12 
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Cranston's comment about the political bias involved in Sartre's 
apportionment of blame leads us to question the politics of Anti-Semite 
and Jew. Sartre argues that while individual Jews can make "moral 
decisions" which help on "the ethical level," nevertheless these decisions 
do not provide political solutions. The political solution to which 
Sartre refers is contained in a throw-away line toward the end of the 
conclusion. "What is there to say," Sartre writes, "except that the 
socialist revolution is necessary to and sufficient for the suppression 
of the anti -Semi te. " l3 Given the idealistic nature of Sartre's analysis 
of anti-Semitism, this conclusion on the necessity of a socialist 
revolution is an adjunct; it has been tacked on to an analysis which does 
not point in a socialist direction. As Anti-Semite and Jew was written 
in the mid 1940s at the beginning of Sartre's flirtation with Marxism, it 
further illustrates Aron 1 s point that at this stage in his development 
Sartre's commitment to socialism was superficial; that it was more 
suited to "rhetoric than action. 11 
De Beauvoir 1 s project in writing The Second Sex is similar to 
Sartre's in Anti-Semite and Jew,for it too is an analysis of an oppressed 
;. 
group and its relations with the oppressors. As she uses Sartrian theory 
to analyse woman's situation many of the faults inherent in his work are 
replicated in hers. Thus she does net account for the situation of the 
oppressors and, with little theoretical justification, concludes on a 
socialist note. 
Appendix Four 
A Note on Differences Between Men in "The Second Sex" 
De Beauvoir argues in The Secorrl Sex that work makes man 
transcendent and ensures his superiority to woman. However, at one 
point she recognises that this is not always the case: 
There are many men who like women, are restricted to 
the sphere of the intermediary and instrumental, of 
the inessential means. The worker escapes from it 
through political action expressing a will to 
revolution; but the men of the classes called 
precisely "middle" implant themselves in that sphere 
deliberatel~. Destined like women to the repetition 
of daily tasks, identified with ready-made values ••. 
the employee, the merchant, the office worker, are in 
no way superior to their accompanying females (pp.635-6, 
emphasis added). 
But although this statement shows us which sections of the male population 
de Beauvoir believes gain no advantage from their work, the reasons for 
this are not clear. If we bear in mind, that de Beauvoir argues that to 
be male is to ."ratify" the world, then the exemption of "the worker" makes 
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little sense. De Beauvoir's emphasis on man's continual ability to change 
what is not to his liking renders her notion of "political action 
expressing a will to revolution" (emphasis added) a nonsense; for if being 
male means being able to transcend what is, then man's "will to 
revolution 11 automatic ally means revolution and in face of the continuation 
of the status quo such a "will" cannot exist. 
It seems
1 
therefore 1 that de Beauvoir's wish to exempt workers from 
her attack on middle-class men contradicts her theory. This is also true 
of the other main occasion when she restricts her comments to the petit 
bourgeoisie. Following on from the statement in which she e~essly 
exempts "the worker," de Beauvoir makes some observations on the nature of 
"the office universe" in which she u1 timately concludes that housewives 
are potentially more free and able to express themselves in their daily 
routine than this particular group of middle-class emplqyees. Yet, with 
minimum alteration, this statement on the restrictions imposed on these 
men in their work, and the contrast to be made with the relative freedom 
of housewives, can be made relevant to most workers: 
All day long he must obey his superiors,wear a white-
collar, and keep up his social standing; she can dawdle 
around the house in a wrapper, sing, laugh with her 
neighbours; she does as she pleases, takes little risks, 
tries to succeed in getting results (p.636). 
In other words, if we take into conxideration the hierarchical nature of 
most ~ployment and the control particularly exerted by management over 
workers in factories by such means as time-clocks and measured work, then 
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it is not clear why de Beauvoir does not portray most, if not all, jobs as 
restrictive. Indeed from de Beauvoir's comments on the restrictive nature 
of work in the office universe, it seems justifiable to infer that men in 
other occupations are able to spend their time singing, laughing and 
generally doing as they please! 
In de Beauvoir's terms, however, there is one occasion when she 
seems justified in making a distinction between middle-class men and 
"workers" in a way that would favour the latter. She argues that the 
petit bourgeois male often "lets himself be smothered by his career and 
his 'front'; he often becomes self-important, serious" (p. 636). In other 
words, this ~e of man is more likely to be drawn into a universe of 
purposeless formalities and, instead of seeing his project as a product of 
his choice, of his own values, he believes it to have some kind of 
"absolute". justification. He becomes in essence what Sartre defines as 
"the serious man." 
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So far we have seen that in The Second Sex de Beauvoir offers 
little explanation for her attack on petit bourgeois, male occupations. 
However, from a knowledge of Sartre's work it is possible to furnish an 
explanation for such an attack. In "Materialism and Revolution" Sartre 
emphasises the importance of work; this emphasis does not overtly emanate 
from a Hegelian notion of creative labour but from other factors: first, 
work liberates the slave from the "caprice" of the master and second it 
allows him to develop a materialist viewof the world. However, Sartre is 
not precise about the circumstances in which one benefits from labo~ 
except that it must involve material production. There are little 
benefits to be gained therefore from petit bourgeois emplqyment. Indeed 
Sartre claims that because the bourgeois "does not produce" but "directs, 
administers, distributes, buys, sells," his activity is based on a "constant 
l 
commerce of men." And this means that such a man is likely to choose to 
explain history and society as a result of individual wills; a view which 
leads to essentialist conceptions of histor,r and thus to various forms of 
bad faith. 
Relating Sartre's crude emphasis on productive labour and its 
implicit glorification of the worker to de Beauvoir's comments, we thus 
see why she would want to attack the work undertaken by middle class men. 
However, this attempt to differentiate between men in The Second Sex is 
superficial; it does not emanate from her theory and adds little to her 
analysis of the male-female relationship. In a word, it is little more than 
ideology. 
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In accordance with de Beauvoir 's usage, "man" and "woman" are 
used in this thesis in preference to "men" and "women." However, 
as in conventional usage, "man" is also used to denote the human 
being. See Appendix One for a discussion of this and other 
terminology. 
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Throughout this thesis the year given in brackets after a book 
title refers to first publication in its original language. 
For full bibliographical details of de Beauvoir's works, see 
section l(a) of the bibliography. 
See Appendix One for an explanation of the varied usage of the 
term "Other" in this thesis. 
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analysis (The Divided Self : An Existential Study in Sanity and 
Madness, Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1965; Self and other, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), than to de Beauvoir's S.S.. For 
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a discussion of the theories which have influenced modern feminism 
see Juliet· Mitchell's Woman's Estate (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), 
pp.l9-75. 
14. For publication details see section l(a) of the bibliography. 
15. Appendix Two outlines de Bea uvoir' s main work prior to S. S •• 
16. "Facticity" is a term used by Sartre in B.N. to refer to the 
"given" nature of our existence (e.g. such factors as age, class, 
historical background). The use of this concept in Sartre's work 
is outlined on p.28 ff below. 
17. Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, trans. Richard Howard 
(Ha~ondsworth : Penguin, 1975), p.l95 ff. Hereafter cited as 
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18. Simone de Beauvoir, The Prime of Life, trans. Peter Green 
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Chapter Two 
' 1. Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel : Lectures 
on "The Phenomenology of Spirit," assembled by Raymond Queneau, 
ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols (New York : Basic Books, 1969). 
2. For example, it has been claimed that Kojeve overemphasises those 
aspects of the master-slave dialectic, particularly the slave's labour, 
which make ftmore compatible with Marxism. See George Armstrong Kelly, 





















In F .C., (p.43) we learn that de Beauvoir was friendly with 
Raymond Queneau who assembled Kojeve's lectures for publication. 
For a comment on the impact Kojeve's lectures had on French 
intellectuals see Allan Bloom's editor's introduction to Kojeve. 
' Kojeve's existentialism is alluded to in Bloom's introduction to 
the book. Such existentialism is apparent in Kojeve's reading of 




When the term "Fight" is used to signify the Hegelian fight for 
recognition the first letter is capitalized. 
Kojeve, p. 8. 
' Kojeve, p.9. 
' Kojeve, p.l9. 
' Kojeve, p.l5. 
"Work" and "labour" are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
a discussion of this terminology see Appendix One. 
' p.49. Kojeve, 
Koj~ve, p.56. 
' Kojeve, p.56. 
Kojeve, p.l6. 
Kojeve, p.27. 
" Kojeve, p.59. 
' p.47. Kojeve, 
Kojeve, p.29. 
' Kojeve, p.25. 
Chapter Three 
For 
1. This is not to say that de Beauvoir's work did not make an original 
contribution to existentialism, simply that Sartre's works elucidate 
The Second Sex better than de Beauvoir' s. For a summary of de 
Beauvoir's work prior to 1947, see Appendix Two. 
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2. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. Philip Mairet 
(London Eyre Menthuen, 1973); hereafter cited as E.H •• 
3. In this chapter all page references to B.N. are given in brackets 
in the text. These page numbers refer to the Washington Square 
edition previously cited. 
4. This is the kind of question Sartre discusses in his biographical 
works: Baudelaire (1947), trans. Martin Turnell (London : Hamish 
Hamilton, 1949); and Saint Genet : Actor and Martt) (1952), 
trans. Bernard Frechtman (London : W.H. Allen, 196 . 
5. See Richard Schacht, Alienation (London : Allen & Unwin, 1970), 
for a discussion of different usages of the term alienation. 
6. See Pietro Chiodi, Sartre and Marxism, trans. Kate Soper (London 
Harvester, 1978) for a discussion of how Sartre, Hegel and Marx 
conceptualise the elimination of alienation. 
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8. As we shall see in Appendix Two, p.268, this is what Pierre wants 
from his relationship with Xaviere in de Beauvoir's first novel. 
9. John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (London : Duckworth, 
1957), p.478. 
10. Wilfred Desan, The Tra ic Finale : An Essa 
Jean-Paul Sartre 
11. As we shall see in Appendix Two, p.27Q it is hatred so defined 
which prompts Francoise to murder Xaviere in de Beauvoir's first 
novel. 
12. See, for example, Hazel Barnes, An Existentialist Ethics (U.S.A.: 
Vintage Books, 1971), pp.29-49. 
13. But although gender fits with Sartre's definition of facticity, 
he does not give it as an example. 
14. The idea that the natural world threatens to engulf us is a theme 
of Sartre's first novel Nausea (trans. Robert Balkick, Harmondsworth 
Penguin, 1973). 
15. Maurice Cranston, Sartre (Edinburgh Oliver & Boyd, 1970), p.lll. 
16. P.L., p.13. 
17. Quoted by Claire Cayron in La nature chez Simone de Beauvoir 
(Paris : Gallimard, 1973), pp.227-8. 
18. Cranston, p.lll. 
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21. t:f.·' p .434. 
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Quoted by Cranston, p.82. 
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35. Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. Bernard Frechtman 
(New York : Philosophical Library, 1948); hereafter cited as E.A •• 
See Appendix Two for a summary of its main argument. 
36. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Materialism and Revolution," in Literary and 
Philosophical Essays, trans. Annette Michelson (London : Hutchison, 
1969), p.230; hereafter cited as MR •. 
37. M.Re, p.l85 ff. 
38. Raymond Aron, "Sartre and the Marxist-Leninists," trans. Helen Weaver, 
in Marxism and the Existentialists (New York : Clarion, 1970), p.25. 
39. Friedrich Engels, Socialism : Utopian and Scientific (London : Allen 
& Unwin, 1950). 
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41. For a good illustration of the sense of failure in existentialist 

















47. Jean-Paul Sartre, Criti ue of Dialectical Reason I : Theor of 
Practical Ensembles, trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith London : New Left 
Books, 1976). 
48. Aron, p. 38. 
Chapter Four 
1. In the original French this is simply "aliene'e." All page 
references in subsequent notes for quotations from Le deuxi~me sexe 
refer to the Paris, Gallimard, 19.5.5 edition (books 1 and 2). 
2. In this and subsequent chapters all page references to the S.S. 
are given in brackets in the text. These refer to the Penguin 
1972 edition previously cited. 
3. The most significant exception to this in modern times has been in 
the "radical feminist" strand of the women's liberation movement 
as they have defined men as "walking abortions" and "genetic 
mutations". For details see p.247 below. 
4. A summary of the main points of Anti-Semite and Jew is outlined 
below in Appendix Three • 
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.5. Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew, trans. George J. Becker 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1976), p.78; hereafter cited as A.S.A.J •. 
6. A.S.A.J., p.79. 
7. Claude Levi ... Strauss' theory that women are "exchange objects" in 
primitive societies is outlined in Structural Anthropology, trans. 
Claire Jacobin & Brooke Grundfest Schoep (London : Allen Lane, the 
Penguin Press, 1968). 
8. Appendix Two gives a summary of the development in de Beauvoir's 
thought and explains why she came to believe in the possibility and 
desirabili~ of co-existence. 
9. Judith Grether in "Existentialism on the Oppression of Women : What 
can we learn?" (The Insurgent Sociologist, Winter 1974, pp.2.5-40), 
gives a worthwhile analysis of de Beauvoir's indebtedness to Sartrian 
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theory in the S.S.. However, as Grether only deals with 
Sartre's theory in B.N. she does not take into proper consideration 
the development in Sartre's thought up to 1947. 
10. E.A., p.8J. 
11. The process by which the subject "alienates" himself in order to 
become more fully conscious, is to be distinguished from the feelings 
of alienation which arise from the objectification affected by the 
Other. 
12. It is interesting to note that this is how similar existentialist 
works have been tackled. In A.S.A.J. Sartre, although less formally, 
analyses the Jew's situation in this way; and in Old Age (1970, 
trans. Patrick O'Brian, London : Andre Deutsch, 1972), de Beauvoir 
divides the subject manner in a similar fashion. 
Chapter Five 
1. P.L., p.J67. 
2. B.N., p.584 ff. 
3. In the original French, maintenance and creation reads "maintenir 
et creer" (Book 1, p.56). De Beauvoir 's ordering of the dichotomy 
has been followed in this thesis, although it is usually the first 
of these terms which designates the male (e.g. transcendence/ 
immanence; active/passive; reason/superstition). De Beauvoir's 
use of these terms is discussed on p.249 ff below. 
4. In the original French this statement reads: " la femme comme 
l'hormne, est son corps; mais son corps est autre chose qu'elle" 
(Book 1, p:-66). 
5. Although de Beauvoir frequently emphasises the dangerous and 
exhausting nature of pregnancy for woman at one point she adds: 
"True enough, pregnancy is a normal process which if it takes place 
under normal conditions of health and nutrition is not harmful to 
the mother" (p.62). 
6. In each of these cases, however, de Beauvoir would find it difficult 
to justify her point. Indeed the translator indicates this in 
footnotes. He points out that in recent death statistics "there is 
no age at which the death rate for women is higher than for men" 
(fn. p.59). He also states that as far as nausea in pregnancy is 
concerned "these symptans also signalise a faulty diet, according to 
some modern gynaecologists" (fn. p.62). Likewise many studies have 
shown that miscarriages are frequently due to thenalformation of the 
foetus, and not to psychological causes. As much of what de Beauvoir 
writes on this subject of woman's organic resistance echoes Sartre's 
concept of "nausea," it is best seen as an ideological point. 
I 
7. Schwartzer, §pare Rib, p.9. 
8. Mead, Saturday Review. 
9. In the original French this statement reads: 
". • • si elle procree librement, si la societ{ vient ~ son aide 
pendant la grossesse et s 1occupe de l'enfant, les charges 
maternelles sont leg~res et peuvent etre facilement compensees 
dans le domaine de travail" (Book 1, p.96). 
10. In the original French this statement reads: 
"Dans une societe convenablement organise'e, ou l'enfant serait 
en grande partie pris en charge par la collectivite, la mere 
soignee et aidee, la maternite ne serait absolurnent pas 
inconciliable avec le travail feminin" (Book 2, p . .34J_). 
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11. Friedrich Engels, Ori in of the Famil Private Pro ert 
trans. Robert Vernon New York : Pathfinder Press, 1973 ; 
cited as "Origin." 
and the State, 
hereafter 
12. Grether, p.36. 
13. Other writers on woman's oppression have arrived at the conclusion 
that the emancipation of woman is dependent on the removal of her 
reproductive role. Shumalith Firestone's The Dialectic of Sex : 
The Case for Feminist Revolution (New York : Bantam, 1971), is the 
most comprehensive expression of this idea and it is dedicated: 
"To Simone de Beauvoir who kept her integrity." 
14. Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1965). 
lS. Jean-Paul Sartre, The Age of Reason, trans. Eric Sutton 
(Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1974), p.20. 
16. Cayron, p.227 ff. 
17. P.L., p.78. 
18. Quoted by Caroline Moorhead in "Happiness is a snare when the world 
is a horrible place," (interview with de Beauvoir), The Times, 
16 May, 1974, ·p.ll. col. 2. 
Chapter Six 
1. See p. 140 ff. below. 
2. De Beauvoir clearly sees man being "naturally" on top during coitus, 
yet anthropologists have recorded that this is culturally determined. 
Some primitive people refer to this position as the "missionary" 
position since this is how Christian missionaries believe sexual 
I 
intercourse should take place. For a discussion of the 
variability of sexual habits see Margaret Mead, Sex and Tem)erament 
in Three Primitive Societies (Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1967 • 
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J. In the ensuing analysis of de Beauvoir's account of woman's emergence 
as "the second sex," the Hegelian principles of mastery and slavery 
are expressed as "violence and creative labour." In Koj~ve 's 
terminology the first of these principles is "fighting." However, 
violence has been used here since this corresponds to de Beauvoir's 
emphasis on "violence" in the S.S. yet is still close to the Kojevian 
original. 
4. In the following exposition of de Beauvoir's emphasis on violence 
only Hegelian philosophy is used. However, Sartre also emphasises 
the importance of violence. For example, in his preface to Frantz 
Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth (1961, trans. Constance Farrington, 
Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1972), he portrays violence as having 
cathartic qualities. But as Sartre does not make the connection 
between violence and human development,his theory does little to 
explicate the use of violence in de Beauvoir's account of history. 
For a discussion of the role of violence in Sartre's theo~ see 
Maurice Cranston, "Sartre and Violence," Encounter, Vol. XXIX, No.l, 
July 1967, pp.l8-24. 
5. See Chapter Eight. 
6. See p.206 below. 
Chapter Seven 
1. For de Beauvoir, as for Sartre, "recognition" is of little importance 
in human relations. In the S.S. it is only in the male-female 
relationship that "recognition" acquires importance. See p. 200 ff. 
below. 
2. art three of the enc clo aedia of 
Sciences translated Wllliam Wallace 
Oxford : Clarendon Press, 
3. Susan Brownmillar, Against Our Will : Men, Women and Rape 
(Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1977), p.l4. 
4. Brownmillar, p .15. 
5. See, for example, Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and Lousise Lamphere 
eds., Woman, Culture and Society (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 
1974). 
6. Evelyn Reed, Woman's Evolution : From Matriarchal Clan to 
Patriarchal Family (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1975). See note 
12 below. 
7. Reed, p.l24. 
310 
8. For a brief surrunary and critique of this ( "Tarzanist") school see 
Elaine Mbrgan, The Descent of Woman (London : Corgi, 1974), pp.l65-197. 
9. Reed, p.l26. 
10. For a discussion of how the relative strength of men and women 
varies with culture and patterns of employment see Mead, Sex and 
Temperament. 
11. For a short discussion of this point see Ann Oakley, Sex, Gender, 
and Society (London : Temple Hill, 1975), p.l32 ff. 
12. Reed's work is rejected by most anthropologists. While they may 
accept her observations on the extent of woman's work in primitive 
societies, they do not accept her evolutionary theory nor her belief 
in the prior existence of matriarchies. (See Rosaldo and Lamphere, 
p.3). However, this has little bearing on our comparison of de 
Beauvoir and Reed. In the first place we are dealing with a 
speculative theory of human origins which is not open to empirical 
verification. Coincidentally this is the point Sheila Rowbotham 
makes in her article "When Adam delved and Eve span ••• " (New Society, 
4 Jan. 1979), with reference to de Beauvoir and Reed. Writing on the 
speculative nature of any theory of the part wanan played in human 
development,Rowbotham asserts: "··· the need to distinguish between 






'woman's lot was very hard in the primitive horde' is as much a hunch 
as Evelyn Reed's claim that women were the first potters" (p.ll). 
Secondly, the purpose of our comparison of these two theories is to 
illustrate the values and assumptions on which each is based and is 
not concerned with whether they are "correct." 
Reed, p.46. 




18. Desmond Morris, The Naked Ape (London : Corgi, 1969); Robert Ardrey, 
The Hunting Hypothesis (London : Collins, 1976). It is interesting 
to note that Ardrey prefaces his book with the statement: "While 
we are members of the intelligent primate family, we are uniquely 
human even in the noblest sense, because for untold millions of years 
we alone killed for a living" - a statement which echoes de Beauvoir' s 
claim that humanity has'been accorded "not to the sex which brings 
forth life, but to that which kills." 
Chapter Eight 
1. Mitchell, Woman's Estate, p.82. 
2. For a summary and critique of Engels, see Rosalind Delmar, 
"Looking Again at Engels' 'Origin of the. Family, Private Property 




















9. De Beauvoir only criticises Engels on philosophical grounds yet his 
explanation of the transition from g~oup-marriage to pairing-marriage -
a key development in his theory - is based on the Victorian assumption 
that women would want this change because of their dislike of sexual 
relations with more than one man. For an exposition and critique of 
this point see Millett, pp.l20-7. 
10. De Beauvoir's theory apparently underlies Figes' claim in 
Patriarchal Attitudes : "··· the motivation for male dominance over 
the female is intimately connected with the idea of paternity. 
the idea of personal continuity is born if man can only control his 
woman, (for) he becomes in a sense immortal" (p.39). 
11. See P·208ff· 
12. See Chapter Thirteen. 
13. F.c., p.l9S. 
Chapter Nine 
1. Other examples are Elena Giann Belotti 's, Little Girls : Social 
Conditionin and its effects on the stereot ed role of women durin 
infancy London : Writers and Readers, 1973 ; Sue Sharpe, Just Like 
a Girl : How girls learn to be women (Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1978). 
















3. In the original French this statement reads: 
"··· c'est l'ensemble de la civilisation qui eiabore ce 
produit intermediaire entre le male et le castrat qu'on 
qualifie de f eminin" (Book 2, p .13) . 
4. In the original French this statement reads: 
" c'est un destin qui lui est impose parses 8"ducateurs et 
par la societe" (Book 2, p. 26). 
5. Moorhead, The Times, 15 May 1974, p.9, col. 7. 
6. Simone de Beauvoir, All Said and Done, trans. Andre Deutsch 
(London Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1974), p.449. 
7. Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism (London Allen Lane, 
1974, )p.318. 
8. For information on psychoanalytic theories on women, see Jean Baker 
(ed.), Psychoanalysis and Women (Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1974). 
9. Although de Beauvoir usually portrays man's·penis as a source of 
10. 
his superiority, at one point she claims that like woman's body it 
illustrates the immanence of his flesh: "Man is ambivalent about his 
penis - proud when transcendent; ashamed when it is passive flesh 
through which he is the plaything of the dark forces of life" (p.l95). 
But as far as man's advantage over woman is concerned, this ambivalence 
is preferable to the way in which de Beauvoirian woman experiences her 
body. 
Ann Foreman, Femininity as Alienation (London 
p. 85. 
Pluto Press, 1977), 
ll. In the original French this statement reads: 
12. 
13. 
"· •• l'intervention du m~le ••• constitue toujours une sorte de 
viol" (Book 2, p .131). 
In the English translation H.M. Parshley translates "viol" as 
"violation" and not as "rape." This weakens the meaning of de 
Beauvoir 1s argument and so this translation has not been followed here. 
When de Beauvoir makes a more restricted point about the defloration of 
some young women Parshley translates "viol" as "rape" (p.461 and Book 2, 
p.218) and so it appears that "rape" is only an unacceptable 
translation of "viol" for Parshley when it is used to describe the 
general nature of coitus. 
In 
In 
the original French this statement reads: 
"Car elle ne choisit pas en toutes ces conjonctures de refuser 
authentiquement son destin" (Book 2, p.lll). 
the original French this statement reads: 
"La jeune fille enterre lentement son enfance, cet individu 
autonome et imperieux qu 1elle a ete; et elle entre avec 
soumission dans l'existence adulte" (Book 2, p.l24). 
14. For a discussion of these points see Appendices Two and Three 
below. 
15. De Beauvoir's comments on woman's subordination in E.A. are 
outlined on p.284 ff below. 
16. E.A., p.J8. 
17. Colin Radford, "Simone de Beauvoir : Feminism's Friend or Foe?" 
Nottingham French Studies, Oct. 1967, p.89. 
18. See p.295 ff in Appendix Three. 
19. See p.254 ff below. 
Chapter Ten 
1. A.S.A.J., p.J. 
2. De Beauvoir at points actually romanticises the couple relationship; 
a romanticism which contradicts some of the major premises of her 
theory. For example, she believes it desirable for the partners of 
a couple to seek "justification of their existence through one 
another" (p. 273 ) when she is intolerant of other circumstances in 
which one tries to justify one's existence through another person. 
But she is pessimistic about the longevity of the carnal dimension 
of a long-term relationship. When discussing sexual attraction de 
Beauvoir maintains: "(It) dies almost •.• surely in an atmosphere 
of esteem and friendship for two human beings associated.in their 
transcendence, out into the world and through their common projects, 
no longer need carnal union; and because the union has lost its 
meaning they even find it repugnant" (p.465). 
Chapter Eleven 
1. For a short discussion of this topic see Figes, Patriarchal 
Attitudes. 
2. But de Beauvoir contradicts the general drift of this argument when 
she maintains that through woman "man inveigles the obscure 
palpitations of life into his house, without this mystery being 
destroyed by possession" (p. 208). 
3. Francis Bernard Harrison in "Judgement and the Concept of Justice in 
the plays of Jean-Paul Sartre," (M.LITT thesis, University of 
Edinburgh, 1978) argues that the role of judge is assigned to women 
in Sartre's plays. 
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4. This is particularly true if we bear in mind the concept of 
oppression de Beauvoir uses in E.A.J as it refers to a situation 
in which the existent is deprived of transcendence. 
Chapter Twelve 
1. For an analysis of housework from a feminist perspective see 
Ann Oakl~, Housewife (Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1976). 
2. It is interesting to note, however, that de Beauvoir has been 
accused of such "confusion~" In a review of de Beauvoir 1 s 
travelogue America Day by Day (1948, trans. Patrick Dudley, London 
Duckworth, 1948), Diana Trilling, in "America Through Dark Spectacles" 
(The 20th C, July - Dec. 1953), lists the vast number of factual 
inaccuracies which abound in this work. 
3. See P-294 of Appendix Three. 
4. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, p.240. 





(7 days, 8 Mar. 1972), when she said: "Women don't want to be 
conceded equality, they want to win it, which is not at all the same 
thing." 
Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Charles Lam Markman 
(New York : Grove Press, 1967), p.219. 
Paulo Freire, The Pedagogy of the Op}ressed, trans. MYra Bergman 
Ramos (Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1972 , p.42. 
Freire, p. 24. 
In the original French these statements read: 
"· .• qu 1 on lui restitue sa souveraine singularitE{, ••• (Book 2, 
p. 57 6). 
" 1 ••• l 1homme ••. lui donne' son renvoi"' (Book 1, p.395). ,.. 
"··· ainsi les horrrrnes ont ete amenes, dans leur propre interet, 
~ emanciper partiellement les femmes : elles n 1ont plus qu 1 ~ 
poursuivre leur ascension et les succes qu 1elles obtiennent les 
y encouragent; il semble a peu pres certain qu' elles accederont 
d 1ici un temps plus ou mains long ~ la parfaite egalite 
economique et sociale, ce qui entra1ndera une metamorphose 
interieure" (Book 2, p.574). 
10. In the original French this statement reads: 
"Soustraite en tres grande partie aux servitudes de la 
reproduction elle peut assumer le role economique qui se propose 
a elle et qui lui assurera la conquete de sa personne tout 
entiere" (Book 1, p. 203). 
ll. A.S.A.J., p.l33. 




Such confidence can a.!..so be 
early attitude to nol~t"' "c; e-;-e:::ts. ...,..._ = ...... C.e =e.a:..:7.:.:.,.. ~l~~::-~: 
"Public affairs bo~ed--..:;:- ioie cc-.:::: e.:. ~::: e7~:-~-:s -·-.......~..:~ ... - -·---... ,;~ --:: ---"' 
according to our 'i\'ishes ioi::._-:r..:;:::: &..::J" ::eei :.:r ·..:.s -:.: ::-~x ::.:_-_ -:~:.e:::-_ 
personally" ( p .15'). 
"ll n 'y a pour la fe~!.e a·~c .. ~:e a.·~:~"'e :..s~·~e ~~...:e 
sa liberation" (Book 2, ~.h::;·;-). 
In the original French t~is ~tats~~-~ ~-=a~s: 
"L 'ex.istant aue l 'Oil cc::siC.e:re c.:r.:-.e i::ess~~:-:.::.c..-. :-. .: -::::..:: 
, -/ . '· . - . . - / manquer ae pretenare re'taQ.!..:...:r sa sc::.-:;-~ra:.::e:e"' ~3.::-.::~ 2! .... ::·.:::- \ :. -· -·- . 
However, in a sense this is a ! a..:... se q_~es:.:...:-:: : .:'1" .:::e 3-=s·..:-;- .::..r s ~-...: e 
she later argues (p .17 3 ff) tha. t i·i cr-~e:: ~;.a-:;-e :=.2. iois~s ::ee:: C.e:::e:::.e.::: 
men. 
Cha uter Thirteer: 
1. In F .C. de Beauvoir tells us that o:: D"J.blicatic:: - ~ =·rs:-~c e ··:-~:e 
SecOlld Sex was very badly received" (~. 2CC) ":.;y- t!:e ::.e..::. .:...:: :.::e 
following discussion of whether this is s '!scci2ist" ~.:·.:~ :.!:e re-.ac:i.::: 
of the contemporary left has not bea."'l tcke:: i::t.:- cc::siC.e::"a-:i.:::~ :.:::" 
until the late 1960's the left tended to di.sziss t!:e '!ioi x:s.:: q·..:es:.i.::;:: ·~ 
as a "bourgeois deviation." For a ciiscL:.ssi-::~: cf -:!:e ::..e.:-:•s a::,i:.·..:.=:e 
to this subject up until the new feminist wave, see .R.uwboth&"7i, ii.:r.:an' s 
Consciousness, Man's World, pp.l2-2.5. 
2. A.S.A.D., p.4.56. 
3. De Beauvoir' s interview with Alice Schwartzer appeared in 7 Days 
under the heading: "Today I've changed, I've really become a Feminist" 
and its main theme is that whereas de Beauvoir was a "socialist" when 
she wrote the S.S. she is now a "feminist". 
4. Mitchell, Woman's Estate, pp. 94-.5. Mitchell gives as examples of 
"abstract socialist" analyses1 Engels' Origins and August Bebel's 
Woman Under Socialism (1883, trans. Daniel De Leon, New York : Schocken 
Books, 1971). Firestone's Dialectic of Sex is given as an example of 
a "radical feminist" text. Interestingly, Mitchell discusses the S.S. 
along with the socialist books (see p.240 below). Mitchell argues 
that these two analyses of woman's oppression "are possibly right 
together," but "both are certainly wrong apart" (p.9.5). Mitchell 
subsequently tries to fuse Marxist and feminist analyses of woman's 
oppression. Mitchell's work has been succeeded b,r a number of 
analyses of woman's oppression from a Marxist perspective which do 
not fall into the "abstract socialist" category. They attempt to 
use Marxist concept~ such as surplus value} to analyse how woman's 
reproductive and domestic roles interface with capitalist society. 
See, for example, M. Coulson, B. Magas and H. Wainwright "The 
Housewife and her Labour under Capitalism - a critique," New Left 
Review, 89, pp.47-.58. 
5. F.c., p.2o2. 
6. See Appendix Four for a discussion of the major differentiation de 
Beauvoir makes between men in the S.S. 
7. It is interesting to note that de Beauvoir's conception of the 
difference between man and woman in this respect is similar to the 
distinction Hannah Arrendt makes in The Human Condition (Chicago : 
Chicago University Press, 1958) between "work" and "labour"; between 
"Homo faber" and "animal laborans." The former, like de Beauvoirian 
man, "is master of himself and his doings." The latter resembles 
w<lnan and "remains in dependence on his fellow man" (p.l44). 
8. C. Wright Mills, "Women the furling Little Slaves," rev. of S .S. in 
Power, Politics and People (New York : OUP, 1963), p.343. 
9. See p.32 ff of P.L. for de Beauvoir's description of how she and 
Sartre despised the bourgeoisie. 
10. John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women (London : Dent, 1970) : 
"... the principle which regulates the existing social relations 
between the sexes - the legal subordination of one sex to the other -
is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human 
improvement" (p. 219). 
11. Mi tchell, Woman's Estate, p. 81. 
12. F.C., p.202. 
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13. This reference to "the facts of supply and demand" echoes Sartre's 
assertion that "scarcity" is the cause of hostility in human relations. 
This idea was developed by Sartre after de Beauvoir had written the 
S.S. and he was more committed to Marxism. It gives a materialist 
explanation for the conflict between individuals and groups - conflict 
which could be overcome if scarcity could be eradicated. (See, 
Sartre's Critigue.) 
14. Marcuse, p.l74. See also Georg Lukacs' essay "Existentialism" in 
Marxism and Human Liberation : Ess s in Histo Culture and 
Revolution New York : Delta, 1973 where he writes of "the fetish of 
freedom" in Sartre 's work (p. 257). 
1.5. Rene Girard, ''Memoirs of a Dutiful Existentialist," Yale French 
Studies, 27, 1968, p.4l. 
16. Girard, p.45. 
17. As we shall see in Appendix Three this is also true of Sartre's 
A.S.A.J •• 
18. F.C., p.202. 
19. Schwartzer, 7 Days. 
20. Schwartzer, 7 Days. 
21. A.S.A.D., p.456. 
l. 
Chapter Fourteen 
Mary Wollstonecraft, Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792, 
London : Dent, 1970). For a summary of the aims and ideology of 
the suffrage movement see, for example, Trevor Lloyd, Suffragettes 
International (London : Lib. of 20th C., 1971). 
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Valerie Solanis, SCUM (Society for Cutting Up Men) Manifesto (London 
Olympia, 1971), p.3. 
Elizabeth Gould Davis, The First Sex (London : Dent, 1973), p.35 ff • 
Walters, p.356. 
Schwartzer, 7 Days. 
Schwartzer, Spare Rib, p.9. 
Schwartzer, Spare Rib, p.lO. 
Quoted in Moorhead, The Times, 1.5 May, p.9, col. 8. 
See Appendix Four. 
Quoted by Figes, p.l79. 
F.C., p.l99. 
Mills, p. 34.5. 
In the original French this statement reads: 
" ..• hommes et fermnes affirment sans equivoque leur fraterni tern 
(Book 2, p.577). 
16. Freire, pp.20-21. 
17. Freire, p.22. 
18. Although the notion of "struggle" is the logic of de Beauvoir' s 
theo~ of woman's emancipation, at points she maintains that the 
male-female relationship will develop into a truly reciprocal 
relationship between the sexes. On the penultimate page de 
Beauvoir even describes a new relationship between man and woman 
involving "mutual recognition" in that each will simultaneously see 
him or herself as both subject and object. 
19. De Beauvoir, however, contradicts this as she claims that sexual 
desire dies in a relation of esteem and friendship. See fn. 2 of 
Chapter Eleven. 
20. Walters, p.357. There is no verb in the original. 
21. Schwartzer, 7 Days •. 
318 
22. Jean Baker Miller, Towards a New Psychology of Women (Harmondsworth 
Penguin, 1977), p.73. 
23. Walters, p.377. 
Appendix One 
1. Casey Miller and Kate Swift, Words arrl Women : New language in New 
Times (Harmondsworth : Penguin, 1979), p.l74. 
2. Arrendt, pp.79-174. See fn. 7 of Chapter Thirteen. 
Appendix Two 
1. In this Appendix only the most important of de Beauvoir's early works 
will be considered. See section l(a) of the bibliography for a full 
list of de Beauvoir's works. 
2. P.L., p.367 ff. 
3. S:ilnone de Beauvoir, She Came to Stay, trans. Yvonne Moyse & Roger 
Stenhouse (London : Seeker & Warburg, 1949); hereafter cited as 
S.C.T.S •• 
4. Hazel Barnes, The Literature of Possibility (London Tavistock, 1961), 
p.227. 
5. P.L., p.l25. 





































Maurice Cranston, 11Simone de Beauvoir, 11 in The Novelist as Philosopher 
(London : OUP, 1962), ed. John Cruickshank, p.l75. 
' Carol Evans, "Le Probleme de 1 'Autre dans 1 'oeuvre de Simone de 
Beauvoir" (M.A. thesis, Cardiff : University of Wales, 1964). 
P.L., p.359. 
P.L., p.429. 
Simone de Beauvoir, Pyrrhus et Cineas (Paris : GallimaFd, 1944). 
Simone de Beauvoir, The Blood of Others, trans. Yvonne Moyse & Roger 
Stenhouse (London Seeker & Warburg, 1948); hereafter cited as B.O.O •. 
P.L., p.546. 
Barnes, The Literature of Possibility, p.81. 
B. 0 • 0 • , p .1 09 • 
See Walters, p.372 ff. 
P.L., p.542. 
Victor Brombert, The Intellectual Hero : Studies in the French Novel 
1880-1955 (London : Faber, 1961), p.l94. 
P.L., p.541. 
P.L., p.547. 
For a discussion of this point see Evans. 
Simone de Beauvoir, All Men Are Mortal, trans. Leonard M. Friedman 
(Cleveland : World Publishing, 1955); hereafter cited as A.M.A.M •• 
!:£., P-70. 
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31. F .C., P·70· 
32. A .M.A .M., p.201. 
33. A .M.A .M., p. 202. 
34. F .C., p. 72. 
35. F .C., p.73. 
36. A.M.A.M., p.l). 
37. E.A., p.l3. 
38. H·, p.lO. 
39. E.A., p.l5. 
40. E.A., p.l4. 
41. E .A., p.24. 
42. H·, p.25. 
43. E.A., p.35. 
44. E.A., p.39. 
45. B.O.O., p.l6. 
46. E.A., p.46. 
47. E.A., p.37. 
48. E.A., p.38. 
49. E.A., p.48. 
so. E.A., p. 71. 
51. E.A., pp. 82-3. 
52. E.A., p.86. 
53. H·' p. 87. 
54. E.A., p .96. 
55. E.A., p.91. 
56. E.A., p.l55. 
57. F .C., p. 76. 




1. A .S .A. J., p.16. 
2. A.S.A.J., p.17. 
J. A. S .A. J., p.69. 
h. A.S.A.J., p. 7 8. 
s. A. S.A .J., P· 79. 
6. A .S .A .J., p.So. 
7. A.S.A.J., p.1h1. 
8. A.S.A.J., p.1J7. 
9. A. S .A.J., p.1JS. 
10. A .S .A .J., p.J6. 
11. A .S.A. J., p.J7. 
12. A. S.A .J., p. 99 • 
13. A.S.A.J ., p.1SO.· 
Appendix Four 
1. A.S.A.J., p.J7. 
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